----------------- HES POSTING ----------------- Thanks, J. Barkley, for your post. I went back and looked at the Head paper, which discusses the section in the Samuelson article to which you refer. I also looked at the Samuelson paper. Head acknowledges that Samuelson associates collective consumption goods with "external effects," which gives rise to a free rider problem. Samuelson wrote that "external effects" are "basic to the very notion of collective consumption goods."(389) Head goes on to point out that in the earlier econ literature (he refers to Sidgwick and Ellis and Fellner), external effects were associated with a "divorce of scarcity from effective ownership." Then he introduces the term "nonappropriability" to refer the impossibility of private firms or individuals "to appropriate the full benefits...arising directly from their production and/or consumption of certain goods." He goes on to discuss "ownership difficulties."(203-4) Head points out that Samuelson's public goods exhibit this characteristic. But in my reading, Head's exercise is not simply a repeat of Samuelson. On the contrary it is an insightful interpretation that Samuelson did not himself make. I would argue that it is precisely this interpretation that opened the door to the developments in the theory of property rights that have led to the current textbook definition. Had we followed Samuelson, we would be defining public goods mathematically and technically instead of asking questions about the optimal set of institutions and rights to control resources. I stand by my original "humble" description of the history. But let me change hats to that of a not-so-humble historian of thought (or what the grumblers would call a "whig" historian). In my view, Coase, while not focussing on public goods to any great degree, is the giant in this field because he initiated the revolution in thinking that led at least some economists to couch all market failure problems in terms of the obstacles individuals face in reaching the optimal solution through exchanging rights to control actions. Looked at in this way, the prospective interventionist must ask how the intervention will affect (1) the existing configuration of (a) rights to control actions and (b) rights to exchange control over actions and (2) actions that will be taken under the various configurations. I see nothing in Samuelson that even hints of this. On the contrary, one who follows Samuelson would seem more likely to pigeonhole public goods problems and proposed interventionist solutions into mathematically-defined classes. Samuelson, Paul, "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior," Economica, 1938. Head, J. G., "Public Goods and Public Policy," Public Finance, Vol. 17, 1962. ------------ FOOTER TO HES POSTING ------------ For information, send the message "info HES" to [log in to unmask]