----------------- HES POSTING ----------------- Patrick, I would disagree that it is by mathematics that Samuelson carries out his "pigeonholing." He does the pigeonholing first and then derives the mathematical implications for Pareto Optimality. One can dispute the validity of the latter procedures (use of calculus to study optimization), but that is a distinct problem from what is at issue here. The real issue is the nature of "collective consumption goods." Now, you are correct that Samuelson provided very little analysis of the property rights issues or possible alternative arrangements or specific aspects of non- excudability, etc. in his original papers, beyond simply asserting the likelihood of a non-optimal outcome from a vaguely specified laissez-faire outcome. However, subsequent discussions have made it clear that in the real world we see a spectrum between "pure private"and "pure public" goods. For this intermediate spectrum, a variety of alternative arrangements along Coasian lines may be manageable. But, Samuelson was dealing with pure cases, food as a private good and national defense as a collective consumption good. The hard fact is that when one is dealing with a pure collective consumption good, it is very hard if not impossible to assign any kind of individual property rights in any meaningful way. That is what Samuelson showed, even if he did not draw out the argument fully. I think a reasonable response to this is to argue that there are in fact very few such pure collective consumption goods, rather than to dismiss Samuelson's analysis for having failed to deal with all the possible intermediate cases. Barkley Rosser ------------ FOOTER TO HES POSTING ------------ For information, send the message "info HES" to [log in to unmask]