----------------- HES POSTING ----------------- I have been asked by one of the editors of the "Writings of C. S. Peirce" about an article or book of Edgeworth's that Peirce might have been reading when he referred to cobwebs in a book review in 1892. Peirce was reviewing Karl Pearson's, "The Grammar of Science" which was published in the Nation in that same year. Since I know only the basic stuff about Edgeworth, I hope someone might know a great deal more about Edgeworth and provide a helpful reference. The editor's message to me and the relevant passage from the review follow below. Your help is greatly appreciated. Editor Cornelis de Waal [mailto:[log in to unmask]] writes: "I was wondering whether you would be able to help us with a question that relates Peirce with economics. In his 1892 _Nation_-review of Karl Pearson's _The Grammar of Science,_ Peirce makes a comment related to F. Y. Edgeworth's cobwebs (I will quote the passage below). Would you have any idea what book or article of Edgeworth Peirce is referring to. Peirce owned Edgeworth's _Mathematical Physics_ of 1881. I looked through that volume, but could not really find any clear reference to cobwebs. (Could it be a reference to the cobweb theorem, or is that post 1892?) Should you be unfamiliar with this particular area, I would greatly appreciate it if you could suggest someone whom I could contact about this." Here is the context [a quote from Peirce's review]: "In his application of his nominalism to problems of science, Prof. Pearson has adhered to the spirit of the 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft' with surprising fidelity. He has said things which Kant did not say, but which are so completely in his line of thought that we almost seem to be reading the old master himself. Many of his observations are interesting; others seem quite untenable. Thus, he adheres to {AN:W8.rr.4.7} Laplace's doctrine of indirect probabilities {\AN:W8.rr.4.7} in its least acceptable form, relying here upon {AN:W8.rr.4.8} Mr. F. Y. Edgeworth's cobwebs{\AN:W8.rr.4.8}. In a still weaker fashion, he allows himself to be confused by such a writer as {AN:W8.rr.4.10} Dr. Ernst Mach, in regard to the relativity of motion{\AN:W8.rr.4.10}. The conclusion to which his nominalism leads him is that motion is wholly relative. If this were proved, the truth of {AN:W8.rr.4.12} Euclid's postulate concerning parallels {\AN:W8.rr.4.12} would be an easy corollary; but, unfortunately, as far as rotation is concerned, the proposition is in flat conflict with the accepted laws of mechanics, as {AN:W8.rr.4.15} Foucault's pendulum-experiment{\AN:W8.rr.4.15} will remind us." Jim Wible University of New Hampshire ------------ FOOTER TO HES POSTING ------------ For information, send the message "info HES" to [log in to unmask]