I would like to make a comment about the argument presented in Michael Lusztig's, _The Limits of Protectionism_ that was recently reviewed by Anthony Patrick O'Brien. [http://eh.net/pipermail/hes/2004-December/002741.html] I write because the argument in Lustig's book appears necessarily convoluted. There appear to be serious difficulties with the argument presented, difficulties that were not addressed by O'Brien. Lustig begins with an apparent dichotomy, if legislators are held captive by special interests, why have legal changes in recent decades generally supported free trade, which apparently would hurt those special interest groups? To quote O'Brien, "In Lustzig's view legislators are corrupt, their votes for sale to the highest bidder, and so tend to favor protection. On the other hand, heads of government -- presidents and prime ministers -- favor liberalizing trade because they are either beneficent social planners or because they reap the political benefits of the more efficient economies that result from free trade." It seems this argument requires two distinct pools of politicians, those who run for offices in legislature and those that run for heads of government. Does this seem even remotely plausible? There would need to be one bad group of politicians and another good group of politicians. The division between bad and good politicians would also need to be synchronized with the division of politicians into those who favor protectionism vs. those who favor freer trade. Good politicians would always be selfless and support free trade. Bad politicians would always be captive of special interests and support protectionism. If you want to accept the public choice argument, wouldn't the logical conclusion be that the politician's votes are bought by the most powerful and wealthy interests, and that those interests on balance favor globalization? While some businesses or interest groups may favor protectionism, they are not as influential and powerful as those who favor new trading rules? Thus, the politicians that run for and gain the highest offices are merely being paid by the most powerful interest groups. While the implications are much less pleasant for proponents of new trade rules, this at least seems to be an easier way of resolving the dichotomy presented by Lusztigs. Eric Hake