I have been wanting to respond to this thread of conversation and only now have the time to do. I was shocked that well educated people would present a view that the past is the study of error and therefore worthless. There are arguments against such a view. I have not read all of the responses, but here are my thoughts Many years ago, I thought of a term which might fit the position described. I will call it "reconstructive presentism." This would be the view that the past inevitably has led to the current dominant theory or position and therefore all useful knowledge is encapsulated in the present version of a theory. Conversely, there is nothing useful to learn from the past. Reasons against this position in economics might be some of the following: 1. Statements about knowledge, in order to be considered as some form of knowledge, need to be contextualized. Context requires an awareness of alternatives both in the present and in the past. 2. Any conception of error would require a conceptual framework from which to make judgments about knowledge and error. But one would also like to evaluate that conceptual framework with meta standards and with relevant historical context about its coherence and relative success. Why should anyone accept the conceptual framework being advanced as the single point of view from which to judge all knowledge and error? More specifically, my response to the economists at Harvard would be something like this? How do you know that the theoretical-conceptual framework from which you dismiss the past is not itself in error? One cannot answer such a question without looking at the past and at alternative schools of thought in contemporary economics. 3. The argument advanced by the Harvard people seems to be a tautology. Our theoretical- conceptual framework does not make errors, therefore we our not interested in error. 4. Mainstream economics is increasingly pluralistic as Dave Colander has argued. Many of the research programs within economics would no doubt define error differently. 5. The appeal to mathematics is not much help. When economists heavily imported advanced mathematics into economics in the 1930s to give better foundations for economic theory, mathematical theorists were finding that math had no firm foundations. Thus one could ask how can a theoretical-conceptual framework without anything like firm epistemological foundations not lead to error? Thus error is certainly in the future of economics. If error is going to happen in the future, then the only way to study it is by looking at the past. 6. Studies of the history and philosophy of science since Kuhn and Popper have suggested that error and a conception of error is crucial to scientific advancement. This is true for the natural and physical sciences not just economics or other social sciences. 7. If we live in a universe of evolutionary complexity, then asymmetric knowledge or information is pervasive. Whatever we think we know would need to be contextualized and tested in specific circumstances. What we think of as knowledge and error would have to determined by active processes of professional investigation. In many circumstances the line between knowledge and error could be shifting continuously. 8. Only an omniscient being could really know the difference between knowledge and error given our understanding of the various sciences that has evolved over the past few decades. Has the economics department at Harvard moved over to the Divinity School? Actually theologians are very concerned about error. Shouldn't economists be even more concerned about error since there is a great deal more data available to economists than to theologians about their differing domains of inquiry? These are just the beginnings of arguments that could be made about the need to study error. I will be out of the office for a few days and unable to respond immediately. Jim Wible