Jim asks why anyone should accept a proposed "conceptual framework...as the single point of view from which to judge all knowledge and error." He goes on to argue that one cannot judge a "theoretical-conceptual framework" without looking at the past. Thus, the past is relevant to the goal of choosing among conceptual frameworks. It follows, he believes, that the argument of the Harvard chaps must be wrong. It seems to me, however, that this does not address the main argument. One need not look at the DISTANT past in order to choose among conceptual frameworks. It is possible that, in disregarding the distant past, one would overlook a superior framework. But there is no necessary reason to believe this. Can he or anyone give an example of a case where an overlooked conceptual framework of the distant became relevant? (Note: if one could do this, he would at the same time be providing an example of error in that those who had adopted alternative frameworks must have overlooked a superior one from the distant past. Nor does the argument that "mainstream economics," whatever one means by this, is increasingly pluralistic imply that the study of pluralism is worthwhile except as a pastime. There has been a proliferation of games and sports. Unless one can confidently assert that economics is something more than a game or sport, one would not expect the study of its pluralist history to yield anything more useful than a travel report from...well, Cambridge. Which takes me to the principal issue. The statement about the "Harvard economists" contains an implicit judgment about the goal of economics. What goal are they assuming? John Womack did not specify it. Yet without it, one cannot evaluate their statement. In natural science, it is possible to determine whether a particular method or conceptual framework helps one achieve a goal. One does not need omniscience to determine whether a rocket has reached Mars, as its designers, using some conceptual framework, intended. The presumption of the "Harvard economists" seems to be that a comparable goal exists in economics. It seems to me that this is why HESers are so disturbed by John's hearsay statement. They look with disdain upon those who believe that such a goal exists. HESers write vaguely about how those Harvard chaps must be wrong and they gain empathy from their professional colleagues. But they miss the point of the argument that the study of the history of economics is useless. By the way, I do not subscribe to the view that the study of HOT is useless. I am merely trying to get at the logic of a number of responses made by Jim and others. Pat Gunning