Richard Sutch has chosen to respond to my mocking question in a serious mode. His comments merit a serious reply. Inasmuch as this discussion originally concerned whether economics is a theory of choice, let me confine myself to the choice theoretic context of the activity of child labor in this initial reply to Sutch. The first context is that of individual choice. Here, it would be necessary to acknowledge differences in the age of maturity in different cultural and social contexts, and the importance of the particulars of parental (or adult choice in place of that of children in the absence of parents) as compared to those of the choices of children. Given an argued position on those questions (admittedly philosophical, rather than economic), it would then seem possible to examine the question of labor vs. education vs. leisure for "children" in different societies and circumstances. The fact that econometric studies reveal a positive relationship between lifetime pecuniary returns and years of education is interesting, but not relevant to any individual decision of a parent or child with respect to what choice to make at any given point in real time. It is likely that the result of such an approach would reveal that different circumstances elicit different decisions with respect to the labor/education/leisure decision. I would expect the theoretical expectations to roughly mirror the historical patterns of U.S. and other countries's experience of child labor-- adjusted for the extent of governmental intervention in the respective societies concerned, of course. This leads me to my second point. To say that "society has an interest" in x, y, or z just seem meaningless to me in an economic context. "Society" is not a decisionmaker. It may be a substitute term for some individual's view of what is good for themselves or other people, but it is not informative in economic decisionmaking--which decisionmaking is always made by individuals in light of their consideration of what is to their respective best interest at a particular point in time and in particular circumstances of time and place (to use Hayek's phraseology). When the question of social decisionmaking is introduced, economic considerations must give way to political ones. That is the only sense in which I can understand any discussion of "social interests." It is in the political sphere that some individuals impose coercive restraints on the decisions of others. Here, there seems a vast gulf between Richard Sutch's views and mine. I understand him to be arguing that: 1.political means are justified in making some people become more productive in an income sense than they might otherwise choose to be by preventing child labor and compelling child education of some kind that he would approve; 2.that political means are justified in establishing a social welfare system and that any "undesirable" drain on that system is to be prevented by coercion, if necessary; and 3. every member of the population has a claim against every other member of the population that he or she be as highly educated as they can be compelled to be in order to optimize the technological advancement of the society. So far as my own views are concerned, I recognize only one "social interest": it is the political protection of the individual rights of the individuals in any society. That is the only legitimate purpose of government. Once the definition of political maturity and the rights of children is established by law, there is no foundation for additional "paternalistic" measures to compel certain behaviors or outcomes, whether some consider the decisions of others to be ignorant, a result of lack of foresight or self control. Perhaps a case could be made for the general prohibition of child labor in a rights context. I don't see that there is one in an economic context. Steve Horwitz has addressed the second of Sutch's "economic" arguments for a prohibition of child labor, and I will not add to his comments at this time. Sam Bostaph