I agree with Evelyn that there are special feminist applications of economic theory. Her point is that females, in general, have preferences (and/or perceived opportunities) that differ from males. There are also presumably male applications of economic theory. If this is all there is to feminist economics, then one could specialize in this subject by first learning economic theory and then learning about the special preferences or perceived opportunities of females. The same would presumably be true of a Chinese economics and a ghetto economics. As I recall, development economics is sometimes presented partly as an application of economic theory to the special tastes and perception of opportunities of people in less developed areas. But isn't there something else? Do females have different choice-making techniques? Are they more or less "entrepreneurial" than males? More or less technical? More or less inclined toward non-market interaction? Regarding Roy's response to Larry, it is easy to define "better" in the hard sciences because we can measure without attaching values. We can easily find out whether a Ferrari can travel faster than the Toyota or farther on a tank of petrol. In social science, we must choose values in order to define "better." Traditionally the values in economics have been broadly utilitarian. This is why the economists of the late 19th century developed a model of a market economy in which the value of a thing or action can be traced to the wants of individuals in the role of the consumer, via opportunity costs perceived by individuals in the role of the entrepreneur who know how to produce goods. This model dominates the textbooks today, which suggests that economists still adhere to broadly utilitarian values. Of course, it is possible to develop an economics based on different values. For example, people could propose that government policy X would be more likely to achieve eternal bliss according to the words in the Holy Book or in the writings of a revered ancestor. The logic and relevance of such an argument could be evaluated in the same way that economists evaluate the logic and relevance of arguments that policy X is in the interest of individuals in their role as consumers. But what is the point? Are there other standards for defining "better" that could compete with utilitarianism that are not merely modifications of it or supplements to it? Would an economics that completely neglected consumer utility be economics? Pat Gunning