Pat Gunning said: >Regarding Roy's response to Larry, it is easy to >define "better" in the hard sciences because we can >measure without attaching values. We can easily find >out whether a Ferrari can travel faster than the >Toyota or farther on a tank of petrol. In social >science, we must choose values in order to define >"better." Traditionally the values in economics have >been broadly utilitarian. This is why the economists >of the late 19th century developed a model of a market >economy in which the value of a thing or action can be >traced to the wants of individuals in the role of the >consumer, via opportunity costs perceived by >individuals in the role of the entrepreneur who know >how to produce goods. This model dominates the >textbooks today, which suggests that economists still >adhere to broadly utilitarian values. > >Of course, it is possible to develop an economics >based on different values. For example, people could >propose that government policy X would be more likely >to achieve eternal bliss according to the words in the >Holy Book or in the writings of a revered ancestor. >The logic and relevance of such an argument could be >evaluated in the same way that economists evaluate the >logic and relevance of arguments that policy X is in >the interest of individuals in their role as >consumers. But what is the point? Are there other >standards for defining "better" that could compete >with utilitarianism that are not merely modifications >of it or supplements to it? Of course. Just to scratch the surface, try Elizabeth Anderson, *Value in Ethics and Economics*, Jean Hampton, *The Authority of Reason*, Robert Brandom, *Making It Explicit* There is a huge body of philosophical literature that denies that our reasoning about the good is consequentialist (the genus of which classical utilitarianism is a species). Closer to home, try Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments! Kevin Quinn