I was hoping with my questions to motivate Sumitra Shah to rethink her position regarding childcare, eldercare, and the usefulness of attempting to impute values to home production. Her response shows that I failed. Let me restate the conclusions to which I was trying to direct her. First, neither childcare nor eldercare qualify as public goods, properly defined. We have two criteria (in economics) for them, namely (a) joint consumption -- vertical addition of individual demand curves -- and (b) difficulty of excluding from their consumption those who would not pay. An excellent example of a public good is thus national defense. "Public [school] education" does not qualify either. Besides, childcare and eldercare are services produced by those who employ their capitals (funds devoted to earning profits) and labor in such enterprises. Unless they received enough compensation for their services, they would be inclined to direct their capitals and labor elsewhere. Talking about making such services "affordable" does not get at the economics of the situation; much too imaginary. Besides, for the government to subsidize their consumption, taxes must be raised to pay for them. And taxes have their opportunity costs in terms of those things that do not get produced as a result. On interpersonal comparisons, I think only those who do not recognize the degree of presumption involved would be inclined to think that they can feel exactly what someone else feels. The adage, beauty is in the eyes of the beholder is quite apt, in this regard. Adam Smith's use of empathy as a *moderator* of individual actions (in public) must not be confused with this. In fact, Smith also warns in the Wealth of Nation against the folly and presumption (Hayek would call conceit) of law givers to direct the use or investments of other people's property, employing precisely this point. In Smith's own words: "What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him. The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no counsel or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it." This is miles away from Shah's view that "A better management through the public sector will improve total economic welfare," I submit. Voluntary exchange or laissez faire is thus a better guarantor of the overall betterment of the public than government management of otherwise private resources. Long before he wrote the Wealth of Nations, Smith also argued: "Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice: all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." Would that we paid careful attention to his views rather than attempt to extract from Smith that which he opposed. James Ahiakpor