Does a discussion about economic fallacies belong the HES list? This question - or perhaps objection - has been raised. Allow me to give a clear yes as an answer. I see two major arguments for a yes. First of all, within academia, the evolution of economics can be studied as a story of debunking fallacies. Every new generation has been inspired by the "fallacies" (broadly interpreted) of previous generations. Commonly, "fallacies" have been a major source of inspiration to economists. Let me illustrate this argument by five cases from the history of Swedish economic thought. 1. Gustav Cassel wanted to purge economics of "metaphysics" - which included much of economic thought prior to him. Fallacies of economists of the past should be thrown onto the "scrap-heap". See e g the introduction to Theory of Social Economy. He viewed himself as the "voice of economic reason", well suited for this task. 2. Eli Heckscher studied mercantilism, inspired by his critical view of anything not being liberal. 3. Gunnar Myrdal turned against the value judgements of earlier generation of economists, in particular those of his close friend Cassel. (They still remained friends although Cassel told Myrdal that he was the "most dangerous man in the country" when he embraced him after the inauguration lecture when Myrdal replaced Cassel on the chair at Stockholm University.) 4. Bertil Ohlin, in his memoirs, is very open on this account, arguing that the best way of getting international recognition is by attacking a fallacy of a major figure in the profession, in this case Keynes. Ohlin did this in the debate on German reparations and again in 1937 in his critique of Keynes' macroeconomics, while introducing the concept of the Stockholm School of economics. And the recipe worked well for Ohlin. 5. Knut Wicksell was advised to study economics (by David Davidson) to avoid "fallacies" when he presented his neo-malthusian message to the public. Wicksell did so and "the rest is history". If we move out of Sweden, I am convinced that similar cases exist for other countries. And today in economics, a most rapid way of gaining a fame and respect is to prove that other economists have committed a fallacy, preferably a theoretical one. The pay-off is surely higher than making an improvement upon existing bodies of thought. Second of all, outside academia, many prominent economists have been active in public debate, as journalists, opinion-makers, policy-advisors, where they have attacked "fallacies" of all sorts. These extramural activities have been an important channel of ideas and intellectual influence from research to policy. This bridge is an important one in the study of the history of economics. To sum up, the study of the history of economics may be viewed as a study of fallacies. Or am I pushing the argument too far? Lars Jonung