> Steven H. wrote: >> I'm not even going to bother to refute the >> "self-interest maximizing" part because Mises >> never invoked the language of "maximization" and >> his notion of "self-interest" was so broad as to >> be nearly empty. It certainly was not narrow >> "self-interest" in the way we often talk about it now. John C.Medaille wrote: > Then how do you reconcile that with this > statement from Mises (and many just like it): > "The man who gives alms to hungry children does it, > either because he values his own satisfaction expected > from this gift higher than any other satisfaction he > could buy by spending this amount of money, or because > he hopes to be rewarded in the beyond. (735)" > The concept in this statement hardly seems > "empty" at all; clearly, he believes that even in > charity the benefit derived must exceed the > dollars expended. Is that an "empty" concept? And > is this really different from "narrow > self-interest" as "we often talk about it now"? > The difference is not clear to me. This is a very old question. The difference has been clear and unclear to many people. In my opinion, it was settled by Joseph Butler (Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature. Charlottesville, VA: Ibis Publishing, 1987(1726).) In his refutation of psychological egoism, he noted that the distinction between my self-interested desires and my other desires does not disappear just because they are both *my* desires. You have not faced two related questions: what is the nature of this satisfaction (i.e., self-interested or not), and why might the man get satisfaction from making such a gift? Cheers, Alan Isaac PS I discussed this and related questions in "Morality, Maximization, and Economic Behavior", Southern Economic Journal 63(3), January 1997.