John C.Medaille wrote: > > We can certainly agree on the historical importance of Mises, if not > for the same reasons. You, for his uniqueness, me for his typicality. > > Steven Horwitz wrote: >> "As a thinking and acting being, man emerges from his prehuman >> existence already as a social being. The evolution of reason, >> language and cooperation is the outcome of the same process; they >> were inseparably and necessarily linked together." (HA: 43) >> >> "Inheritance and environment direct a man's actions. They suggest to >> him both the ends and the means. He lives not simply as a man in >> abstracto; he lives as a son of his family, his race, his people, >> and his age; as a citizen of his country; as a member of a definite >> social group; as a practitioner of a certain vocation; as a follower >> of definite religious, metaphysical, philosophical, and political ideas; >> as a partisan in many feuds and controversies. He does not himself >> create his ideas and standards of value; he borrows them from other >> people." (HA: 46) >> >> "Individual man is born into a socially organized environment. In >> this sense alone we may accept the saying that society is - logically >> or historically - antecedent to the individual." (HA: 143) > > You are certainly correct in that Mises does recognize man as a social > being, but he draws no conclusion from this, at least none that I can > see. Instead, he insists on a methodological individualism. But if man > is a social being, how is this possible? It does not seem to me that > Mises answers this question. > He does. His defense of methodological individualism is not an ontological one, but an epistemological one. All of the statements about humans as social beings can be reconciled with his methodological individualism by noting, as he does, that "Methodological individualism, far from contesting the significance of such collective wholes, considers it as one of its main tasks to describe and to analyze their becoming and their disappearing, their changing structures, and their operation." (HA: 42). MI is required to do this because "It is the meaning which the acting individuals and all those who are touched by their action attribute to an action, that determines its character. It is the meaning that marks one action as the action of an individual, and another as the action of the state or of the municipality. The hangman, not the state executes a criminal. It is the meaning of those concerned that discerns in the hangman's action an action of the state.... Thus the way to a cognition of collective wholes is through an analysis of the individuals' actions." (HA: 42). And finally, "Whether [a] crowd is a mere gathering or a mass...or an organized body or any other kind of social entity is question which can only be answered by understanding the meaning which they themselves attach to their presence. And this meaning is always the meaning of individuals. Not our senses, but understanding, a mental process, makes us recognize social entities." (HA: 43) Mises's economics is an economics of meaning. Because, he argues, only individuals can attribute meaning to actions, any analysis of action, including collective action, must begin *but not end* with the meaning that individuals ascribe to them. It is not that social orders are "simply" the product of individual action, or that individual actions temporally or ontologically precede social wholes, but that to *understand* social orders, we need to start from the subjective meanings that individuals ascribe to them. Mises's MI is of a more sophisticated sort, I would argue, than the caricature that is frequently drawn of MI in the literature, especially the critical literature. Emerging from the German philosophical literature of the early 20th century, Mises's economics has to be understood in that context. That said, I will agree that Mises overemphasized the "agency" side of the "structure/agency" debate, but that doesn't mean the "structure" issues weren't there. The same could be said of Hayek. More contemporary Austrians have tried to redress that imbalance. An excellent critical overview of those attempts can be found in Paul Lewis's "Structure, Agency, and Causality in Post-revival Austrian Economics: Tensions and Resolutions" ROPE 17 (2), April 2005: 291-316. I would also recommend G.B. Madison "How Individualistic is Methodological Individualism?" *Critical Review* 4 (1/2) Winter/Spring 1990. Steve Horwitz