Doug Mackenzie wrote: > > John C. Medaille wrote- > > > We (you, me, Mises) all seem to agree that > > meaning derives only from a social context; the > > question is whether MI can account for that > > context, and indeed whether it simply begins at > > the wrong end. But we might even use a better > > description of meaning. The statement "all > > meanings are individual meanings" is at best > > partial and at worst simply wrong. Would it not > > be more accurate, at a merely descriptive level, > > to say that "all meanings are individual > > expressions of socially derived meanings." > > >Socially derived though the interaction of >individuals? Who else? Of course people learn from >each other and each individual is part of a social >context, along with other individuals. I see nothing >wrong with MI at this point. YOu have not made any >problem clear, not anything that Mises (1922) and >Hayek (1937) did not deal with. But he doesn't deal with it; he merely asserts that his method can, but he doesn't attempt to account for the fact that individual attitudes are already socially formed before anyone acts. The social plays no part in his axioms of action. What you have in the relationship between the individual and society is a chicken-and-egg problem, and such problems are never solved by asserting either chicken OR egg; they can only be resolved by finding a way to assert BOTH chicken AND egg. By asserting the chicken (the individual), Mises assumes that the egg (a social product) will take care of itself. It won't. Mises pays lip service to the social, but his solution is in no way different from those who don't, from pure individualists. What is most baffling in all this is how unproblematic Misians consider their theory to be. In this discussion (and in HA) I have had pushed at me the notion that praxeology belongs to neither the speculative nor the practical reason (and I agree), an epistemology divorced from philosophy, actions divorced from psychology, a social theory rooted in pure individualism, an idealism which handles prudential issues under imaginary constructs, among other problematics. Now, all of these things may be true, but then are not unproblematic. But Misians never seem to recognize the problematic nature of their formulations and questions seem to irritate them; indeed, Mises claims that Praxeology has the same epistemological status as do logic and mathematics, stating that it is "unconditionally valid for all beings endowed with the logical structure of the human mind. (57)" Now, the best thing you can say for someone who thinks he has "discovered" something as intuitively obvious as logic or mathematics, but which no one ever noticed, is that he is in the grip of an enthusiasm; the worst you can say is that he has fallen prey to arrogance. I think we all >agree that the standard textbook NC approach fails, >and you seem to admit that Mises tried to do things >differently. I don't admit this; that is my point. The differences are trivial, though hotly debated. See Mason Gaffney's post. Are there real policy prescriptions that are different in a fundamental way? >Please explain exactly how exactly >Misesean economics fails. Isn't the prior question, "show a case in which Misesean economics has succeeded"? John C. Medaille