You are correct; I missed your main point. Methodological expositions always have underlying epistemological and metaphysical "stances"--whether their authors are aware of them or not. So far as I know, assumptions about the ground of being are not provable but consist of statements like "I think, therefore I am" (Descartes); "I am, therefore I must think" (Rand); or "Only I am" (simple-minded solipcism). Mises's methodological "exposition" merely spins out the implications for praxeology (and economics) of the metaphysical assumption that human beings exist physically separate from one another, but reason can explain their interactions--those interactions themselves having no physical existence. He uses a lot of assumptions concerning the nature of human beings and human consciousness that are themselves subject to argument and lead to the sort of discussions that Bruce Caldwell would like to see ended. Samuel Bostaph