Bateman, Bradley wrote: >John Medaille's characterization of Moore's ethical position may fit >textbook descriptions in some limited sense, but it is badly mistaken. Well, Okay. My characterizations fit "in some limited sense." At least we have some limited agreement. But as far as being "badly mistaken," I am not convinced. >When Moore says that the good is indefinable, he is arguing that it is a >Platonic essence that would be intuited identically by any reasonable >person. We might be tempted to ignore the suspicion that "Reasonable person" here might merely mean middle-class Englishman, but it would be a mistake to do so. Whether you call it intuition or emotion, you must end up making it a psychological reality rather then something in the real world. After all, to make it real would be the "naturalistic fallacy." There is no doubt that Moore wanted the good to be something objective; but he made it impossible for it to be so. Whatever else may be the case, it is the case that if the good is something that can neither be proved nor disproved, then no rational discussion can take place. You end up with an appearance rather than the reality of a reasonable position, but have discounted reason, then the appeal to "reasonable persons" has a hallow ring, does it not? What Moore wanted to do and what he did might be divergent things. It wouldn't be the first time that intention did not match performance. John C. Medaille