Richard Adelstein wrote: > Barkley Rosser's point is dead on, and very important. There is > indeed no other explanation for the extraordinary plunge in > unemployment in Germany between 1933 and 1936 (not 1939, as Barkley > suggests) than the large scale public spending of the German > government on roads, infrastructure and similar capital projects > (largely related only indirectly to military objectives, as in the > case of the Autobahnen), financed by public debt through the device of > Mefo bills, undertaken from the outset of the Nazi regime. This was > precisely what Keynes's letter to the New York Times prescribed on > December 31, 1933, and was widely recognized as such at the time, as > Friedrich Baerwald's admiring account in the AER in 1934 makes clear. > Despite some divergences from what the General Theory would later > advocate (higher taxes, enforced saving and, of course, increasing > dirigisme over the entire period), there's no serious doubt that > Hitler's policy in these crucial years represented the first serious > experiment in "Keynesian economics," at least as Keynes's himself > understood it at the time, and that this is true whatever Hitler's > ultimate intentions in reviving the German economy might have been, > and whether Hitler knew anything at all about Keynes's economics, or > anyone else's. > I'm afraid Adelstein's valiant attempt to defend the efficacy of fiscal policy (deficit spending) to reduce the rate of unemployment with reference to the German experience is incomplete, misleading, and dangerous. First, who purchased the Mefo bills? If it was the German central bank, then it was the increased quantity of money (currency) rather than the deficit /per se/ that should be cited as the cause of unemployment reduction. (Remember James Tobin's famous 1978 "post hoc, ergo propter hoc?" critique of Milton Friedman.) Government deficits financed by bonds sold to the public would simply substitute government spending for private sector spending. This is, of course, the famous "Treasury View," or what we now term the crowding out of private sector spending by government spending. And as R.G. Hawtrey pointed out while disputing the efficacy of Keynes's multiplier argument, "The true function ... of the capital outlay undertaken by the Government is not to fill a gap between capital outlay and savings, but to bring about a release of cash. If it is sufficient to outweigh the general tendency to absorb cash [hoarding], it will 'set the ball rolling.' ... It is only called for at all on the assumption that the banking system cannot perform the necessary service" (1937, 127). It helps understanding of Hawtrey's argument also to appreciate that savings are spent, as the classics have taught, and that they are not the equivalent of cash hoarding or a leakage from the expenditure stream. Adelstein also has to tell us what happened to prices in Germany with Hitler's method of financing the government's deficits. The classical forced saving doctrine, which Keynes (1936) either misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented, explains that an increase in the quantity of money (currency) relative to its demand raises the price level, reduces real wages (given fixed nominal wages) as well as real interest and rental rates, and thus causes the rate of unemployment to decrease in the short run. The German episode appears thus to be an illustration of a well-known classical principle. However, the German experience occurred under a totalitarian state, which could order people into its chosen activities and also prevail over sharply falling real wages for quite a long time. (What was the rate of unemployment in the Soviet Union, and what is it now under Castro's Cuba?) As Keynes notes in his Preface to the German edition of the /General Theory/, such regimes could afford to ignore "the influence of loan expenditure on prices and real wages, the part played by the rate of interest" (xxvii) -- the factors that cause a reversal of the short-run positive effects of monetary inflation "under conditions of free competition and a large measure of laissez-faire" (xxvi); recall the modern long-run, vertical Phillips curve analysis. Thus, one might argue that the German success in reducing the rate of unemployment to the extent and duration it did under Hitler, had more to do with the ability of a totalitarian regime to achieve such a result than with the efficacy of fiscal policy or deficit spending. Several dictatorships around the world have run huge budget deficits, financed by their central banks, but have not been able to replicate the German experience. Therein lies the danger of Adelstein's incomplete analysis. I also have a preference for the kind of economic analysis that points the way to enhancing human well-being rather than promoting widespread repression and destitution. James Ahiakpor