May I offer my own suggestion regarding the
treatment of time in selection?
The suggestion is that we select by reference to
situation, and our situation unavoidably includes a temporal dimension. In
a simple case, if we have to be at a meeting by 9.00 a.m., we need a train
that will get us to the venue for that time. Selection is always related to
situation, and situation always incorporates an element of time. It also
incorporates a spatial dimension, which means the train must leave from a
station near to us. More, generally, however we define situation dictates what
we prefer and select.
The idea is set out in 'Selection as Determinant of
Selection and Valuation', in the Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol.
35(2), 335-356.
My apologies for self-promotion.
Patrick Spread
Sent: Monday, January 21, 2013 12:23 PM
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Preference axioms
Thank you, all, for the wonderful suggestions. Just in case there's someone
else interested in and benefiting from them as well, I guess it's
worth putting forward Maurice Lagueux's The forgotten role of the rationality
principle in economics (2004). Journal of
Economic Methodology, 11(1), 31-55.
Samuel, yes, although not just time but also context. Yet, I am not sure
that the problem with indifference has to do with time-independence or that it
makes sense even in the present. What's debatable is not so much that it
suggests people make choices as (neoclassical) economists think they should but
that it suggests they evaluate choices in this way. For indifference suggests
that - even if taken just in the present - two distinct options are deemed of
equal let's say value in the most general sense. A bottle of water and eight
packs of chips might for an economist be only quantitatively different from
three bottles and five packs (the closest the theory coming to a qualitative
evaluation probably being the diminishing rate of MU). Hence, he is able to
equate them. But is it so for the everyday decision maker (be it an economist or
not) who would probably be more inclined to view them as qualitatively different
and hence non-equalisable?
M. U.
-------- Оригинално писмо --------
От: Samuel
Bostaph <[log in to unmask]>
Относно: Re: [SHOE] Preference
axioms
До: [log in to unmask]
Изпратено на: Понеделник, 2013, Януари 21
03:04:23 EET
If one assumes that decisions take place out of time, then
neoclassical utility theory makes sense, doesn't it? But, decisions of
actual human beings take place in real time and indifference is one of
those things that only make sense in the present--an infinite slice of
time. I agree that indifference is not indecisiveness. Indecisiveness can
be timeless; indifference--being a type of decision--cannot.
Samuel
Bostaph, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus of Economics University of
Dallas
"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them
pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing happened."--Winston
Churchill
--- On Sun, 1/20/13, Марина Узунова
<[log in to unmask]> wrote:
From:
Марина Узунова <[log in to unmask]> Subject: Re: [SHOE] Preference
axioms To: [log in to unmask] Date: Sunday, January 20, 2013, 2:17
PM
Yes, Rothbard's fallacy of indifference is very astutely and
elegantly put forward. But it has always seemed to me, isn't the fallacy
- and the poor Buriden's ass misfortunate fate - due to a mixing of the
notions of indifference and indecisiveness? The two being distinct
states. After all, indifference has a very precise meaning in utility
theory and it's not equivalent to the lack of ability to decide which
option to take.
M.U. -------- Оригинално писмо -------- От:
Samuel Bostaph Относно: Re: [SHOE] Preference axioms До:
[log in to unmask]Изпратено на: Събота, 2013, Януари 19 15:01:28
EET
Also worth reading on this topic is Murray
Rothbard's "Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare
Economics." It is refreshingly critical of the concept of revealed
preference. Although included in several edited collections over
the years, it can easily be googled.
Samuel Bostaph,
Ph.D. Professor Emeritus of Economics University of
Dallas
"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most
of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing
happened."--Winston Churchill
--- On Fri, 1/18/13,
Марина Узунова <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
From:
Марина Узунова <[log in to unmask]> Subject: [SHOE]
Preference axioms To: [log in to unmask] Date: Friday, January
18, 2013, 8:51 AM
Greetings all,
Can someone recommend studies - theoretical papers,
experiments, books, lectures - on the axioms of (revealed)
preference theory? My interest in particular lies in any
explorations of "completeness" and "indifference" although I'd
be happy if someone can think of works similar in their breadth
to that of Sen's "Behaviour and the concept of preference".
Philosophical, historical, theoretical and experimental
suggestions are all welcome alike.
Thanks in advance and best wishes,
Marina
Uzunova
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