[Selections by Humberto Barreto for SHOE list.]

1. 
   
2. Louis Bachelier's Théorie de la spéculation : The missing piece in Walras' general equilibrium By Nicole El Karoui; Antoine Parent; Pierre-Charles Pradier
   
3. The late emerging consensus among American economists on antitrust laws in the 2nd New Deal (1935-1941) By Thierry Kirat; Frédéric Marty
4. The Politics of Funding: the Rockefeller Foundation and French Economics, 1945–1955 By Serge Benest
5. The renaissance of ordoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s By Krieger, Tim; Nientiedt, Daniel
6. Is economic forecasting a science? By Olivier Pilmis
7. Spontaneous Norms in Law and Economics: A Sketch Typology By Zdybel, Karol B.
8. Rational Inattention: A Review By Bartosz Maćkowiak; Filip Matějka; Mirko Wiederholt
9. The New Speak and Economic Theory or How We Are Being Talked To By Jean-Paul Fitoussi
10. Why is economics the only discipline with so many curves going up and down? And are they of any use? By Giovanni Dosi

1. 
   
2. Louis Bachelier's Théorie de la spéculation : The missing piece in Walras' general equilibrium

   By:	Nicole El Karoui (LPSM (UMR_8001) - Laboratoire de Probabilités, Statistique et Modélisation - SU - Sorbonne Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UPCité - Université Paris Cité); Antoine Parent (LED - Laboratoire d'Economie Dionysien - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po, CAC-IXXI, Complex Systems Institute); Pierre-Charles Pradier (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
   Abstract:	We propose a revisited view of Louis Bachelier's contribution to economic analysis. Conventional wisdom presents Bachelier as the founding father of modern financial theory. We show that Bachelier's work is constructed to respond to a gap in the Walrasian general equilibrium, where the options market is verbosely introduced but not modeled. By providing a price formation theory for the missing options market, Bachelier undoubtedly presents himself as the heir apparent of the mathematical economics tradition founded by Walras. Indeed, Bachelier's methodological stance is clearly formed on the "rational method" of Walras, proceeding by mathematical demonstration from postulates that we make explicit. We show additionally how Walras and Bachelier in pre-WW2 France reached to the same audience. We propose to name this augmented general equilibrium model the Walras-Bachelier model of intertemporal general equilibrium in the presence of risk. This theory prefigures the Arrow-Debreu model, with some differences which we make clear.
   Keywords:	General equilibrium, Financial markets, Option pricing, Bachelier, Walras
   Date:	2022–10
   URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:spmain:halshs-03815600&r=hpe

3. The late emerging consensus among American economists on antitrust laws in the 2nd New Deal (1935-1941)

   By:	Thierry Kirat (IRISSO - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Sciences Sociales - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Frédéric Marty (CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - COMUE UCA - COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)
   Abstract:	The article presents the late convergence process from American economists that led them to support a strong antitrust enforcement in the Second New Deal despite their long-standing distrust toward this legislation. It presents the path from which institutionalist economists, on the one side, and members of the First Chicago School, on the other one, have converged on supporting the President F.D. Roosevelt administration towards reinvigorating antitrust law enforcement as of 1938, putting aside their initial preferences for a regulated competition model or for a classical liberalism. The appointment of Thurman Arnold at the head of the Antitrust Division in 1938 gave the impetus to a vigorous antitrust enforcement. The 1945 Alcoa decision crafted by Judge Hand embodied the results of this convergence: in this perspective, the purpose of antitrust law enforcement does consist in preventing improper uses of economic power.
   Keywords:	Antitrust, Efficiency, Economic Power, Institutional Economics, Chicago School, New Deal
   Date:	2021–06–16
   URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:spmain:halshs-03261721&r=hpe

4. The Politics of Funding: the Rockefeller Foundation and French Economics, 1945–1955

   By:	Serge Benest (CSO - Centre de sociologie des organisations (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Universitat de Barcelona, Department of Economic History, Institutions, Politics and World Economy)
   Abstract:	Following World War II, the director of the social sciences division at the Rockefeller Foundation, the industrial economist Joseph H. Willits, thought it important to extend its activities to Europe, especially France. His agenda was to strengthen institutional economics and to create modern research centers with a view to stabilizing the political situation. In the postwar decade, almost all economic research centers in France were funded by the Foundation, which helped provide greater autonomy to French economists within academia but failed to reshape French economic training and research.
   Date:	2022–06–27
   URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03779060&r=hpe

5. The renaissance of ordoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s

   By:	Krieger, Tim; Nientiedt, Daniel
   Abstract:	The economic tradition of ordoliberalism, understood as the theoretical and policy ideas of the Freiburg School, emerged in 1930s and 1940s Germany. In the years thereafter, it was quickly superseded by Keynesianism and other theories imported from the English-speaking world. The crisis in Keynesian economics in the mid-1970s led to what has been described as a "renaissance of ordoliberal reasoning" (Gebhard Kirchgässner) during the late 1970s and the 1980s. The present paper describes this development in detail and shows how it affected the academic discourse and, more indirectly, policymaking. In academic economics, ordoliberal concepts were used to inform debates about pressing issues of the day such as unemployment, social security reform, competition policy, the provision of public goods, and European integration. There was, however, no consensus on the methodological question of whether ordoliberalism could be fully integrated into international research programs such as the new institutional economics or constitutional economics. The paper argues that the renaissance of ordoliberalism failed to have a lasting impact on German academic economics and discusses possible implications of this finding for the future of the ordoliberal research agenda.
   Keywords:	Ordoliberalism, Freiburg school, Economic policy, Social market economy, Keynesianism, European integration
   JEL:	B29 D4 E6 H6 P16
   Date:	2022
   URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wgspdp:202205&r=hpe

6. Is economic forecasting a science?
   

7. By:	Olivier Pilmis (CSO - Centre de sociologie des organisations (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
   Abstract:	Dealing with the scientificity of macroeconomic forecasting, the text highlights some of its properties as a production process. First, macroeconomic forecasting does not rely solely on the use of econometric models, but it is part of a broader division of expert labor. This division involves "epistemic participation", namely the inclusion of "representatives" of the economy itself. This contrasts with the idea of forecasters watching the economy from above. Finally, certain concepts that are at the heart of economic forecasting, such as potential GDP, demonstrate that the descriptions produced by forecasters can never be neutral, but already include political qualifications of economic situations.
   Abstract:	Abordant la prévision macroéconomique sous l'angle de la scientificité qu'on lui prête, ce texte met en lumière certaines de ses propriétés en tant que processus de production. D'abord, celui-ci ne repose pas exclusivement sur l'utilisation de modèles économétriques, mais s'inscrit dans une division plus large du travail d'expertise. Celle-ci comprend même certains « représentants » de l'économie elle-même, ce qui invite à rompre avec l'idée de prévisionnistes qui observeraient l'économie depuis une position surplombante. Enfin, s'intéresser à certains concepts qui figurent au cœur de cette activité, comme celui de PIB potentiel, souligne que les descriptions produites par la prévision ne sont jamais parfaitement neutres mais comprennent déjà des qualifications politiques des situations économiques.
   Date:	2022
   URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03894747&r=hpe

8. Spontaneous Norms in Law and Economics: A Sketch Typology

   By:	Zdybel, Karol B.
   Abstract:	This article offers a concise typology of spontaneous norms - i.e., norms that are formed or sustained through decentralized collective behavior in a community. The typology combines three criteria for identifying spontaneous norms: (i) implicit formation of (customary) rules, as opposed to explicit formation; (ii) enforcement through decentralized sanctioning actions, as opposed to enforcement by a special social agent; (iii) private interpretation of compliance with rules, as opposed to the presence of a public interpreter of compliance. The paper also suggests how identified types can be modeled game-theoretically as repeated games. It is argued that structural differences between various types of spontaneous norms can be best understood as differences in the sequence of play in a stage game. Further, the typology is illustrated with examples from legal history and legal anthropology. Supposedly dissimilar systems of norms (e.g., customary international law and primitive law; norms of warfare and domestic social norms) are shown to exhibit structural resemblance.
   Keywords:	spontaneous norms, custom, customary law, social norms, comparative legal history, typology
   JEL:	B41 K00 N40 O17
   Date:	2023
   URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ilewps:66&r=hpe

9. Rational Inattention: A Review

   By:	Bartosz Maćkowiak (CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR); Filip Matějka (CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR); Mirko Wiederholt (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR)
   Abstract:	We review the recent literature on rational inattention, identify the main theoretical mechanisms, and explain how it helps us understand a variety of phenomena across fields of economics. The theory of rational inattention assumes that agents cannot process all available information, but they can choose which exact pieces of information to attend to. Several important results in economics have been built around imperfect information. Nowadays, many more forms of information than ever before are available due to new technologies, and yet we are able to digest little of it. Which form of imperfect information we possess and act upon is thus largely determined by which information we choose to pay attention to. These choices are driven by current economic conditions and imply behavior that features numerous empirically supported departures from standard models. Combining these insights about human limitations with the optimizing approach of neoclassical economics yields a new, generally applicable model.
   Date:	2022
   URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03878692&r=hpe

10. The New Speak and Economic Theory or How We Are Being Talked To

    By:	Jean-Paul Fitoussi (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LUISS - Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli [Roma])
    Abstract:	This article seeks to show how the impoverishment of language has changed the course of the evolution of economic theory, much as in 1984 the Newspeak changed the order of things and the course of the political regime. At the origin of such an evolution was the stratagem to act as if neoclassical theory was subsequent to Keynesian theory. The inversion of the time arrow had far reaching consequences on the development of economics. In great part the development of a science depends of the scholars who practice it and of its teaching to the new researchers who will further develop it. Both depend on the history of thought. The consequences on economic policies have been major, especially in Europe. By cancelling most of the Keynesian concepts from the Newspeak dictionary, the relative weights of the market and the state were changed, which could only lead to a preference for liberal, market- oriented, policies.
    Date:	2022
    URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03812818&r=hpe

11. Why is economics the only discipline with so many curves going up and down? And are they of any use?

    By:	Giovanni Dosi
    Abstract:	Even the most rudimentary training from Economics 101 starts with demand curves going down and supply curves going up. They are so 'natural' that they sound even more obvious than the Euclidian postulates in mathematics. But are they? What do they actually mean? Start with ''demand curves''. Are they hypothetical 'psychological constructs' on individual preferences? Propositions on aggregation over them? Reduced forms of actual dynamic proposition of time profiles of prices and demanded quantities? Similar considerations apply to ''supply curves'' The point here, drawing upon the chapter by Kirman and Dosi, in Dosi (2023), is that the forest of demand and supply curves is basically there to populate the analysis with double axiomatic notions of equilibria, both 'in the head' of individual agents, and in environments in which they operate. And the issue is even thornier when dealing with ''curves'' going up and down in macroeconomic contexts where one is basically talking of a mystical construction of a meta meta meta loci of equilibrium - first, in the head of each agent, next, in each market (for goods, for savings, etc.), finally in the overall economy. Supply and demand ''curves'', I am arguing, are one of the three major methodological stumbling blocks on the way of progress in economics - the others being 'utility functions' and 'production functions' -. There is an alternative: represent markets and industries how they actually works, and model them both via fully fledged Agent Based Models and via lower dimensional dynamical systems.
    Keywords:	Demand and supply curves; aggregation; costs and prices; dynamical systems.
    Date:	2023–01–07
    URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2023/02&r=hpe