It is worth noting that among other things Thomas Kuhn provided a conception of the advance of science in which the individual is dependent on a wider social context for his own rationality in a manner closely parallel to the 'Austrian' account of the dependence of the individual on the social context of changing price signals for his own ability to rationally evaluate his or her own success in fitting into a wider order. Indeed, Kuhn implicitly provides a parallel argument against the 'central planning' of science -- pointing out that operation of science necessarily allows for personal judgments of intolerable anomaly and of the risks and opportunity of alternative research programs, and in fact that the process in which divergent judgment allow for the exploration of new paradigms across 'revolutions' is absolutely required for the advance of science. Kuhn's point is that a distribution of different accessments of promise in science is required -- that without this variability alternatives which allow scientists to get from one framework to another would never be explored. By 'hedging bets' during periods of scientific crisis, the community is allowed to 'see past' any single conceptual framework, allowing it to explore across a varied landscape of conceptual space. In Kuhn's picture, a distribution of individual differences during periods of scientific crisis is essential to the scientific process -- risky venture based on differences in perception and judgment is required. These differences are essential, and part of the _social rationality_ of scientific development. For, as Kuhn suggests,, "No process essential to scientific development can be labelled 'irrational'" Greg Ransom Dept. of Philosophy UC-Riverside [log in to unmask]