================= HES POSTING ================= It seems wise to begin my comment on Professor Henderson's editorial by identifying the class of ideas with which I assume the history of economics is concerned. The fundamental idea is that of how normal human beings interact under the conditions of the market economy. This includes the following ideas, among others: (a) ideas about the effects of an unexpected increase in the quantity of money, (b) ideas about the effects of government barriers on imports into a market economy, (c) ideas about the difference between interaction under conditions of competition and monopoly, (d) ideas about who receives the benefits of the market economy and (e) ideas about the effects of deficit government spending. To highlight what seems at first to be the difference between my view of the history of economic thought and that of Professor Henderson, let me put myself in the shoes of a first-time, invisible visitor from outer space, who has an interest in the history of ideas like these. I might form two initial hypotheses. First, I might hypothesize that I would discover that the history represents the replacement of ideas that are less adequate with those that are more adequate. Second, I might hypothesize that the appearance and disappearance of ideas would represent no notion of adequacy but that it might inform me about the nature of the people who expressed the ideas. (I will not in this short note express my criterion for judging adequacy. The interested reader can find an example at http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/subjecti/workpape/role_ent My aim here is only to draw the attention to the difference between the two hypotheses.) Professor Henderson seems to believe that the study of economic ideas will inform him about the people who had the ideas and that the primary focus ought to be on the people. I have no particular interest in the people unless they are in some way related to what I identify as contributions to the growth of ideas. Thus, I have no special interest in "sociologising" or "contextualising" ideas, although there may be some benefit in trying to distinguish social conditions under which growth occurred from those in which there was stagnation or regression. In addition, it may be necessary to sociologize and contextualize in order to avoid mistakes in the interpretation of statements. We don't want to make the error of attributing an idea to someone who did not have it, or vice versa. Thus my aim of identifying cases of the "growth of ideas" differs significantly from Professor Henderson's apparent aim of studying people who have ideas. HESers can proceed with either aim. I would suggest, however, that the latter aim comes very close to RELATIVISM. In its most extreme form, relativists aim to convince us that all ideas are relative and that others who claim that ideas are absolute are misinformed and likely to be pompous and elitist. However, confidence that the human mind can make progress is hardly pompous and elitist. The extreme relativist is left to explain what ordinary people would never deny -- the progress of human civilization via the development of the human mind. If ordinary people would never deny the progress of human civilization, HESers should be careful not to deny the progress of ideas in economics. I don't believe that Professor Henderson is an extreme relativist. In describing the approaches of "sociologizing" and "contextualizing" and after rejecting "whig history," he says that both approaches "emphasize the view that economics is a knowledge-producing enterprise." It seems obvious that when we presume that knowledge is produced we are making an implicit judgment about the adequacy of the "thing" that is produced. So I believe that his real message is simply that HESers ought to pay more attention to historical context. Read the masters first, he says, then head off to the archives, read the correspondence, the discussions at professional meetings, the book reviews, contemporary magazines, etc. My recommendation is: Don't get lost in the archives, as fascinating as you may find them. Don't forget that you came there to study knowledge-production -- the replacement of a less adequate idea with one that is more adequate. One final comment. I would recommend being careful when discussing the control over a scientist's choices. Economists seem to differ radically regarding the "proportion" of their moves that are "free" and "forced," to use the words referred to by Professor Henderson. It seems quite reasonable to presume that everyone is partly a product of his environment (nature and nurture) and partly a free spirit (a distinctly human being). But it seems equally reasonable to presume that the "mix" varies from person to person. Were Einstein's moves forced or free, compared with his contemporaries? It seems quite possible that those who produced more adequate economic ideas are the same as those who rank highest on the freedom scale. Of course, to make a free move does not insure the production of knowledge. Don Quixote also made free moves. Nevertheless, to produce knowledge may require that one make a free move. -- Pat Gunning http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome ============ FOOTER TO HES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info HES" to [log in to unmask]