==================== HES POSTING ==================== I find Peter's categories of 'methodology of economics', 'intellectual history of science' and 'history of thought as contemporary theory', and his implication that there is some cut-and-dried distinction to be made between such 'logical categories' to be mostly rubbish -- the best work in the advance of thinking in Darwinian biology can't be 'cut-at-the-joints' in such clear categories -- e.g., see the work of Ghiselin, Mayr, and Hull. All at once, in one complex structure, Ghiselin, Mayr, and Hull have transformed our understanding of the logical status and explanatory strategy of Darwinian biology, its history, and how it should be understood -- while advocating this change, and attacking rival pictures, i.e. while acting as 'ideological advocates'. You can't isolate these endeavors as stand-alone domains of inquiry, they are inextricably part of a whole. I find so much of what passes to be 'methodology', 'history', or 'contemporary theory' to be both blind and sterile for the very reason that folks attempt to pretend that these are isolated endeavors. My criticism here goes beyond June Flanders' familiar point that contemporary theorists waste a tremendous amount of time 're-inventing the wheel' every generation. The point can perhaps best be illustrated by pointing out how efforts to understand and recast a set of problems implicates all at once the logic and explanatory strategy of an endeavor, its historical understanding, and contemporary answers and constructions. It is only a myth to believe that this only goes on in Darwinian biology, and not in other areas, such as physics, political theory, the problem of communication, etc. Now it is true that, e.g., Ghiselin and Mayr, put themselves at greater risk because they so clearly advance theses and findings that challenge the standard accounts of folks who wish to avoid being held to standards that engage more than what they hope can be the self-contained world of 'method' or 'history' or 'contemporary theory'. For example, someone who in the past has attempted something like Ghiselin and Mayr might have produced work that does not stand-up or contribute to the conversation by the lights of competent work on issues of logical status, contemporary theory, or history of ideas. In the light of criticism, Ghiselin and Mayr have continued to advance in the same inclusive direction, only doing this better. Others retreat and say they no longer wish to be held to the standards of some supposed independent domain of 'method', or 'theory', or 'history'. But what we find is that these folks continue to bend to the wholist results and contributions of folks like Ghiselin and Mayr -- who lead the way in important dimensions for all of those seeking protection in 'independent domains'. Greg Ransom Dept. of Philosophy UC-Riverside [log in to unmask] http://members.aol.com/gregransom/ransom.htm ================ FOOTER TO HES POSTING================ For information, send the message "info HES" to [log in to unmask]