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Published by EH.NET (August 1999)
Thomas Cate, Editor, G.C. Harcourt and David C. Colander, Associate
Editors. _An Encyclopedia of Keynesian Economics_. Cheltenham,
UK and Brookfield, MA: Edward Elgar, 1997. xxiv + 638 pp. $235,
ISBN: 185898145X.
Reviewed for EH.NET by Michael S. Lawlor, Department of
Economics, Wake Forest University. <[log in to unmask]>
Macroeconomics today is in a peculiar state. Internally, the profession
seems to have lost interest. Macroeconomics is neglected as a research
topic. Outside of handy data to which to apply the latest advances in
time-series econometric technique, graduate students seem to frown
upon it as a dissertation topic (judging from the informal sample of
assistant professor candidates we have interviewed in the last ten
years). No longer are the heady debates, claims and counter-claims of
the theoretical battles of the 1970s and 1980s making headlines in the
journals.
Yet simultaneously, externally, out in the real economy, something of a
revolution (to use a phrase popular in macro-talk) does seems to be
taking place in macroeconomic performance, and possibly also in
policy. This is especially so in the case of the United States economy.
U.S. real output growth has exceeded all consensus forecasts for the
last 3 years (final figures for 1997 and 1998 came in at 3.8% and 4.2%).
The duration of the expansion of the economy has now pushed into
record territory. Unemployment has been falling for years and has now
stood below 5% since 1996. And, most macroeconomically amazing of
all, these good times have been accompanied by _falling_ rates of
inflation (below 3% for all but two quarters since 1995, below 2% since
1997:4). On the policy side, meanwhile, there is a degree of unreality.
Fiscal policy, long ignored in the shadow of deficit politics, has
seemingly dropped from the U.S. policy debate (although not so in
Japan). Monetary policy in the era of Greenspan is widely given credit
for engineering the U.S. miracle. But if you look a bit closer, both
Greenspan and his cheering section seem a bit puzzled, even nervous
about all the good fortune. M2 growth has fluctuated widely in the
nineties, with little apparent correlation with inflation. Moreover, as
inflation has declined, M2 growth has been consistently above the
upper bound of its target range for most of the period since 1995.
Consequently, both publicly and privately the Fed has abandoned
money as an intermediate target, preferring to concentrate on the federal
funds rate. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) minutes reveal a
confusing search for signs of inflation that "must be there," given the
state of unemployment, along with much vague discussion of the
financial press's view that we are now in a "New Economy." The
essence of the novelty and the puzzlement seems to be a search for an
unexplained and unmeasured productivity boost. Finally, there is the
intriguing macroeconomic record of the rest of the world to add spice
to this seemingly fertile ground for macro researchers. The largest
experiment in one-shot monetary reform since Bretton Woods is taking
place in Europe, while all of its major member states, except the
dissenting U.K. (see IMF, 1999 for complete details), are still suffering
from years of persistently high unemployment. The Asian Tigers have
come down with a case of financial flu-if not pneumonia. Japan, the
shining light of the 80s, has been limping through a very depressed
decade, with disastrous GDP growth, and an interminable financial
mess. As Japanese short-term interest rates have hovered below 1% for
over four years now, we are perhaps catching the first real glimpse of a
that old Keynesian curiosa, the liquidity trap. These are interesting times
indeed.
What does modern macroeconomics have to tell us about all this? Has
the profession's enlightenment by the New Classical school helped us
in understanding this state of affairs? More to the point of the book
here under review, can we now profitably reassess the recent decades
of macroecomic debate and experience with a less ideologically heated,
more balanced and sober historical view? These are the issues that
reading the current volume bring to mind, especially when considering a
review for a list that has recently staged a fascinating forum calling for
research on "economic history since 1950."
Let me postpone some short remarks on these questions, though, to
turn to the volume I was given to read. _An Encyclopedia of Keynesian
Economics_ contains 169 entries by 144 contributors and runs to 638
pages, with no index. The entries are of three varieties: brief
biographies of various economists associated with "Keynesianism,"
very broadly conceived (Silvio Gessel, Arthur Okun and Robert Lucas
are profiled, for example); brief sketches of theoretical issues, models
and tools arising in macroeconomic debates (e.g., "Okun's Law" and
"The Lucas Critique"); and longer pieces which typically deal much
more closely with issues in Keynes scholarship (e.g., "The Influence of
Burke and More on Keynes").
The quality of the entries is varied. Some of the entries are entirely
pedestrian, perhaps intentionally so to fit the evidently strictly imposed
space requirements for the shorter biographies and theoretical topics.
Theoretical topics suffer the most from this enforced brevity. Overall, I
find the average level of the discussion in this volume inferior to some
other recent reference works of its kind. _The New Palgrave: A
Dictionary of Economics_ (Eatwell, Milgate and Newman,1987), more
deeply covers many of the same topics, albeit mixed in with much else.
On the general topic of macroeconomics, the recent _Business Cycles
and Depressions: An Encyclopedia_ (Glasner, 1997) provides more
complete coverage, especially of empirical issues in macroeconomics.
Closer still to Keynesian concerns, but a beast of a different kind, is
_"A Second Edition" of the General Theory_ (Harcourt and Riach,
1997), which includes much more extensive treatments of issues arising
within and from Keynes's landmark book. At a minimum I would
recommend cross-references to these sources be consulted along with
the entries in the present volume. In any case such short entries as are
here provided for theoretical issues can only serve as a mere starting
point for further reading, and in this volume the excellent bibliographies
attached to many entries will be as valuable a tool in that search as the
articles themselves.
Some entries are not well done-"The Monetarist School of Economics"
is bizarrely written, for example. It appears to have been inelegantly
ripped from the preface of the author's book on the subject, making
references to that text that are unintelligible to the readers of the
encyclopedia. But others are remarkable, mostly in those instances
where more freedom of space was allowed. My favorite, was "Marshall
and Keynes" by Peter Groenewegen, a fascinating and admirable
condensation of the extensive treatment Groenewegen gave to this
topic in his recent biography of Marshall (Groenewegen, 1995). It
shows clearly the continuing impact of Marshall and Marshallian habits
of thought on Keynes's work up to and including his framing of the
_General Theory_. Other entries raise expectations that are ultimately
disappointed. In the treatment of Lucas and the "New Classical School
of Economics," for instance, there is a lamentable failure to confront
the challenge that the last decades' theoretical debates have posed for
Keynesian economics. The reader longs to see a position taken on who
has been left standing after the dust settles. Instead, we get sterile
recounting of the dry points of various famous articles (evidently no
"books" are influential in this field anymore) with no attempt at
evaluation. (For a sterling discussion of this very topic, one that goes
far to redeem Keynesianism, while recognizing the contributions of
Lucas, see Peter Howitt's "Expectations and Uncertainty in
Contemporary Keynesian Models" in Harcourt and Riach, 1997). I
suspect that the editors wanted to limit the partisanship of the volume
and thus let each camp speak for itself. No conflict seems evident in
this account and thus no evaluation of what we have learned from the
tumultuous debates of the last twenty years emerges. Similar
complaints apply to the entries on "Money," "Neutrality of Money: The
Keynesian Challenge," "Monetary Policy," and "Business Cycles."
Partly this unsatisfactory nature of the debate reflects the problem of
what purpose such a volume is intended to fulfill. This encyclopedia
seems to be at cross-purposes with itself. It wants to reach out for
inclusiveness-arguably all macroeconomics _can_ be considered in
some sense derivative from Keynes. Yet it must be taking sides to
some extent in light of its very title. There has obviously been an
explosion of scholarship on Keynes, Keynesianism, Post-Keynesianism
and things Keynes-like (e.g., the philosophical issues surrounding
expectation formation) in recent years. Much of this work was spurred
by the combination of dissatisfaction with macro theory in the seventies
and the publication of Keynes' _Collected Works_. Thus there is now
a whole (often interesting) sub-culture of the sub-culture that is the
History of Economics devoted to Keynes studies. Another aspect of
the same period of resurgence of interest in Keynes has been the
extreme partisanship of macroecnonomic debates. It came to be
something of a political and methodological 'statement' to be identified
as a Keynesian in the eighties. While none of the issues raised in this
period were ever settled-indeed I would say that much of Keynesianism
has aged the period considerably better that any one would have
predicted in the midst of the New Classical heyday-the debate itself
seems now to have disappeared (except to be drearily recounted in the,
significantly _last_, chapters of most otherwise Keynesian intermediate
macro texts). Talking to most recent Ph.D. graduates reveals a
pervasive ignorance and disdain for the whole topic of
macroeconomics. Thus at whom is the present volume aimed? Is it
designed to convert the heathen or to preach to the choir?
Consideration of this issue will bring us back to the peculiar state of
modern macro theory mentioned above. To motivate that consideration
I would like to direct attention to the general history of encyclopedias,
looking for clues to the role they have played in past eras of
scholarship.
Encyclopedias as a bibliographic form can be traced back more than
2000 years (see the _Encyclopedia Britannica_ entry for a useful
account). The beginnings in Greek and Roman times play upon the first
meaning of the word-a circle-to imply a complete system of learning or
an all around education. There is a long and fascinating history of the
concept since Plato's nephew Speusippus (died 339 BC) began to
convey his uncle's ideas by recording the spoken word of the Forum.
Some issues that arose over the course of this long development are
interesting to consider in relation to our current theme. The question of
audience has always been paramount. For most of their history
encyclopedias were written to be a source of sound moral instruction.
Hence the fashion of including biographies of exemplars from the past.
The reader, it was hoped, would be elevated, inspired and refined by
contact with the minds and lives of ideal man. Prior to the
Enlightenment, encyclopedias were usually intended for very select
groups that the author or editors could easily visualize and about whom
they could therefore make certain assumptions. Early on, one could
assume that he could read Latin (or "she" could-one of the most
beautiful mediaeval encyclopedias is an illustrated manuscript of 636
pages by the abbess Herrad (died 1195), for use by the nuns in her
charge). Other safe assumptions included that he or she was of high
status and young and so in need of instruction, or later that he or she
was a believing Christian, probably a Catholic cleric. In these didactic
encyclopedias the common presumptions of the background of the
reader were the source of the notion that encyclopedias should
dispense with excessive moralizing and commentary in trade for brevity
and clarity. Thus many early encyclopedias were little more than
compendiums of selected passages of great writers, chosen to impart
information that would be useful in the readers' work and private life.
Another closely associated concern of encyclopedias in the pre-
Modern period was the issue of the division of knowledge into the
Sacred and Profane, or the Spiritual and the Secular. Increasingly, as
scholarship became more developed and use was found for non-
Christian ancient texts in describing the world, the Scholastic
encyclopedists found themselves torn between acceptable beliefs and a
passion for objective reporting of scientific observations. This division
of course reached its height in the Enlightenment period. In the hands
of Bacon, and especially Denis Diderot, the implicit and explicit
purpose was to herald a new secular order where all thought would be
encompassed in a philosophical system based on logic and natural law -
the Enlightenment project. Diderot's famous _Encyclopedie_ (1751-
65) enlisted, perhaps for the first time, a gigantic assemblage of high
quality writers, commissioned to survey only secular knowledge.
Scandalous in its day as a challenge to orthodox authority, this
concept, as much as its uneven execution, has been accorded a
substantial role in conditioning the revolutionary spirit of France in
those crucial last decades of the Ancien Regime (Darnton, 1979).
If this can only seem incredible to us today-a revolutionary
encyclopedia! - it is not only due to the irrelevance of the Academy in
our post-Modern age. More directly it is due to the British reaction to
the French Encyclopedia. The _Britannica_ consciously avoided the
lengthy and scandalous polemics of Diderot's work, and instead
soberly set out to achieve with an extensive list of short, factual
entries,
the aim of complete scientific and scholarly coverage. To this day we
associate this task with the very meaning of encyclopedic. In the
vernacular, completeness is the essence of what might be called the
popular view of encyclopedias as the ready source for the answer to all
queries. (In this regard it is useful to recall that in the 18th and 19th
centuries most encyclopedias were sold ahead of time by mass
subscription, the funds from which went to pay the writers. Since then
the notion of a mass audience, not a select few, has characterized most
modern encyclopedias.) This all-encompassing authority of
encyclopedias is a view that has no doubt been much damaged at the
hands of encyclopedia salesmanship, but still "sells" to the general
public via parental faith in educational salvation for their children and
schoolroom searches for last minute research papers. Truth be told the
attraction reaches much higher in the hierarchy of the knowledge
industry than that. What scholar can deny the still live attraction of the
promise of knowing the essentials of all there is to know? Thus we can
easily connect with the marketing savvy that inspired Dominco Bandini
to market his fifteenth-century encyclopedia as _Fons Memorabilium
Universi_ ("The Source of the Noteworthy Facts of the Universe").
Considering this complex set of issues from the general history of
encyclopedias along with modern economics is an interesting exercise.
Let us begin with the question of audience. An outside audience for
economics in its true rhetorical dress of peculiar notation and
specialized jargon is now an impossibility. Most of economic
"research," like most of science in general, has now progressed into
corners that only the sub-discipline specialists themselves care to
venture. Consequently the notion of an all-encompassing dictionary of
economics, let alone of all knowledge as in encyclopedias of old, now
is beyond belief. Today, the primary purpose of a scientific
encyclopedia is to explain to the profession as a whole what the
specialists in any area are doing. Here is one dimension in which
economics truly can compare to modern science. The _New Palgrave_
definitely fits this bill, as anyone who has ever sent an undergraduate
over to the library to consult it has found. If ever there was one of
those much discussed businessmen for whom Marshall was writing at
the turn of the century, they are definitively not the targets of economic
encyclopedias, the _Encyclopedia of Keynesian Economics_ included.
Who among us economists then would profit from the volume? It is
safe to say that anyone _could_ profit from some aspect of the
volume. At the most universal level some biographies are very
interesting and even instructive (some are horribly dull). My favorite
was the account by Robert Leeson of the New Zealander A.W.H.
Phillips, of the much abused Phillips Curve (an association he was
evidently loath to acknowledge). He was a kind of Henry-George-like
figure in his colorful background and circuitous route to economics by
way of earning his living as a fiddler, crocadile hunter, RAF officer,
Japanese prisoner of war and engineer. He seems also to have been an
exemplar of the gentleman scientist in the best possible sense of the
phrase-disdaining both his own personal acclaim and the, as he saw it,
distasteful acrimony of the macro policy debates inspired by his
famous paper. But even less colorful biographies offer interesting
tidbits-for instance that R. E. Lucas's parents were New Deal
Democrats, that he earned his BA in history and that he prefers to be
called a "Monetarist" rather than a "New Classicalist." Of course the
fascination of Keynes's biography needs no elaboration. Beyond the
personal stories, unfortunately, it seems very doubtful to me in our ever
more unconsciously conservative profession that many besides the
already initiated will find a dictionary on "Keynesian" economics worth
the look.
Which brings me to the issue of fact versus faith, or what the medieval
monks who compiled encyclopedias termed, "the sacred and the
profane." If encyclopedias are to instruct the young and uninitiated they
must have some imprimatur of authority akin to the ecclesiastical seal
that the scholastics put upon medieval texts and the similarly
ceremonial listing of the legion of famous authorities, resplendent in
their degrees and positions, which all modern mass-market
encyclopedias display prominently at the head of the first volume.
Amongst the brothers and sisters of the macro faith today, though, the
priesthood is in serious disarray. There is little enough agreement on
basic principles for a consensus among specialists, let alone among the
profession as a whole. Just who are the true priests and who are the
worshipers of false idols varies by sect. It is this state of uncertainty
and discord, I believe, that has effected the graduate training of new
economists and turned them away from macroeconomics at just a point
in time when the topic seems so interesting. If one has to spend hours
learning the latest refinements of New Classical, Real Business Cycle,
New Keynesian and Cash-in-Advance macro models to get through the
macro sequence, there is little time left to synthesize what one really
knows about macroeconomic theory, much less macroeconomic
events that will not be covered on the preliminary exam. More telling
perhaps is the partisanship, for no vibrant research program is ever just
a catalogue of received truths, but must generate ever-new questions
and puzzles to progress. If there is little tolerance shown for alternative
viewpoints by the lights of the profession, then graduate students are
not to be blamed for their reluctance to try to sort it all out for
themselves.
Moreover, if the student does happen to have a prior interest in macro
events or, more likely, finds himself assigned to teach or write about
macro to a non-economist audience (like a group of Principles
students) he will quickly find that the only intelligible framework for
doing so is the very same old-time Keynesian macro of the pre-Lucas
era that was supposedly destroyed by that JPE paper back in '75! An
archipelago of islands inhabited by rational agents, continuously in
equilibrium but frustrated by the signal extraction problem is interesting
enough, perhaps-but what does it have to tell us about the crash of the
crash of the Indonesian Baht and its implication for the sustainability of
the long boom in the U.S.? Faced with the latter question, one
inevitably starts talking about aggregate demand, lender of last resort,
etc., in ways that would hardly surprise your average 1970s-era macro
theorist.
Or, alternatively, we have this puzzle that Alan Greenspan has now
spoken of on numerous occasions of how to determine if the recent
(pleasant) inflation surprise was a temporary cyclical artifact of reduced
world demand or a new era of increased productivity growth. From the
realm of high theory we might well sense a resemblance to both the new
endogenous growth literature and the real business cycle model. But
what do they have to offer in explanation for the current short-term
situation or as a guide to Fed policy making? Next to nothing it would
seem, judging from the discussions at the recent FOMC meetings. Yoo
(1998) offers a very interesting analysis of the "puzzlement" in the
FOMC over what they should do to respond to the current macro
situation. His analysis, following their discussion, is framed in terms of
such issues as the state of "aggregate supply," "productivity," the
"investment and consumption components of aggregate demand" and
the "capacity constraints on the economy." Reflecting on the impact of
the recent macro theory debates, he notes that the Fed continues to
distrust money supply growth as a reliable indicator and finds itself
"puzzled" by recent performance. The minutes for the FOMC meeting
of May 20, 1997 report that:
The members found it very difficult to account for the surprisingly
benign behavior of inflation in an economy that had been operating at a
level approximating full employment, indeed, possibly somewhat above
sustainable full employment in labor markets in the view of a number of
members, especially taking into consideration the recent further decline
in the unemployment rate. On the basis of historical patterns, any
overshooting of full employment would be expected to generate rising
inflation over time. (quoted in Yoo, 1998, p. 35)
In one fashion we might say that the big puzzle for the Fed has been to
try to uncover what the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment
(NAIRU) now is, after having seen virtually every consensus estimate
of it for the last 15 years succumb to continuing growth with falling
inflation.
My point is that virtually all of this policy discussion is conducted in
terms of an aggregate short-run supply and demand framework that
most closely resembles textbook Keynesianism of the kind that still
dominates the intermediate course market. It bears little evidence of
influences from the last 20 years of macro research. And if such an
application were to be attempted, what would it suggest? That we
continuously measure the elasticity of substitution between labor and
leisure and between present and future consumption? That we try to
anticipate the next shock to the economy's production function - which
are after all considered completely stochastic in the New Classical/Real
Business Cycle literature anyway? At best such models approach
reality by a non-unique calibration of a whole set of parameters that
allows the model to simulate the record of past business cycles. They
seem to have no forecasting ability. Note, that while automatic "rules"
are very popular among recent theorists of macro policy, no central
bank is actually bold enough to seriously adopt one. Flying completely
blind, counting on the economy to right itself, neglecting any attempt at
anticipation of events, is not in the repertoires of central bankers today
-
if it ever was (see John Wood's forthcoming book (Wood, 2000) for a
fascinating argument about the mindset of central bankers versus that
of economists).
Yet confidence in the self-correcting automaticity of the
macroeconomy is the bedrock of classicism (old and new), considered
as a policy framework. Thus to give the classical view its due we
should also consider the possibility that we have returned to the long-
run stability of some past macroeconomic golden age-the gold-
standard era seems to be a favorite. This would be a period when
budgets were routinely balanced, governments non-intrusive and money
so stable in value that actors on the economic stage did not even
consider monetary policy in their calculations. Or, put more
theoretically, the explanation might be that macroeconomics is not even
at issue and what we are dealing with today is long-run supply
considerations that no macro policy could do anything to foster in the
first place. It is tempting to reply, "tell that to the Japanese!" More
soberly, what evidence can we bring to bear on this proposition?
First I believe it is the economic historians who staged the debate in the
last 15 years or so on the question of the relative stability of older
(pre-
war, pre-Keynesian) business cycles, versus newer (post-war, activist
government-era) cycles. The exact outcome of the debate as I read it
(Romer, 1986, Lebergott, 1986, Weir 1986, Diebold and Rudebush,
1992) is that the initial, and macroeconomically conventional, claim that
the post-war business cycle was more stable (challenged by Romer,
defended by the others) still holds up. But whatever the case, no one
has suggested that the post-war cycle is _less_ stable than the pre-war
one. Outside of price stability (where the Gold-standard era is clearly
superior), data scarcity makes macroeconomic comparisons before
1929 difficult. But an argument can certainly be made (given one's
weighting of low unemployment and growth along with price stability)
that the 1950-1970 era (1961-1969 is still the longest expansion on
record but is normally discounted for the "war" effect when compared
with "peacetime" expansions) is the most 'golden' of ages from the
standpoint of macro performance - particularly if we look at
international comparisons. Is returning to a pre-war policy context
_necessarily_ a good thing?
But other problems are also evident in a crude classical view from a
shorter-term perspective. One, the fiscal policy aspect is not at all
clear.
The long-boom(s) of the last 15 years (the expansions 1982:4 - 1990:3,
plus 1991:2 - today) were of course mostly a period of extremely high
and growing deficits, though followed by shrinking ones after 1992.
Moreover, as the European countries positioned themselves for
monetary union, they too shrunk their deficits as a percent of GDP
(since about 1994). But they have mostly seen no similar decline in the
unemployment rate. Thus the role of fiscal effects is not easy to
untangle. An alternative story could be told that the U.S. example is one
of fiscal demand stimulus (under the banner of supply-side
economics), followed by a cyclically balanced budget as the Clinton
tax-plan and output increases pushed up tax revenue. Finally, as to the
benefits of the productivity shocks we may be experiencing, they are of
course part of the Keynesian view in terms of the effect on aggregate
supply. But one does wonder about Japan in this context, which seems
to be the source of much of the information management and inventory
techniques that are often cited as the source of the "New Economy,"
but which can't pull itself out of a very deep recession. (It has been
interesting to watch the US administration, the policy institutes and
even the _Wall Street Journal_, admonish the Japanese for not pushing
a more aggressive fiscal stimulus package. Evidently the rhetoric of
balanced budgets stops at our shores.)
Lastly there is the hand wringing over the financial and monetary
situation. We have seen the Fed successfully intervene to ward of the
contagion of financial crises and stock-market crashes both at home
and abroad in this time period. The money supply seems to have
become unhinged from inflation. Most policy moves are made today
with a fearful eye on how the bond and stock markets will react. And
the guru of the whole era's prosperity, Alan Greenspan, has nothing but
stern words for the high-flying stock market. This potentially unstable
combination of interlocking psychologies and ultimate dependence on
the Fed to do what is right when the Fed itself seems puzzled over what
is going on, does not look like an "automatic adjustment" economy to
me. In fact it looks very much like the kind of economy Keynes was
describing in the _General Theory_. Is this what the advocates of the
supposedly unmanaged economies of old have in mind?
The French Aristocracy and Jesuits together vehemently opposed
Diderot's _Encyclopedie_. They were astute enough to realize the
threat of Diderot's self-consciously secular system of knowledge
becoming widely disseminated. It was not dangerous that the
Philosophes were themselves embracing a new language in which to
conduct their professional conversations. What was dangerous was for
the 2000 subscribers and the members of the Paris salons in which they
gathered, to begin to notice that the entries on government and morality
put forth in the _Encyclopedie_ declared their position to be derivative
of natural laws and not divine or ecclesiastical authority. If this view
were to become widespread, they correctly sensed, the basis of the
Ancien Regime was at risk.
Today in macroeconomics we have a curious reversal of this old
conflict between social authority and profane science. The 'science' of
macroeconomics itself has retreated into a kind of religiousity - what
Keynes, complaining of his classical critics, called "scholasticism." To
him this was a discussion that proceeds in a kind of infinite loop,
sustained by shared cherished assumptions that are not allowed to be
questioned- like continuous market clearing and the insistence on
modeling all choice as if it were made by rational anticipation of the
consequences in situations defined by the impossibility of such
anticipation. The risk of such private conversations is that
Macroeconomics may be in the process of becoming irrelevant.
Meanwhile the macroeconomy marches forward and policy analysis
has become the province of non-economist policy analysts and low-
status (within the economics profession) government staff economists.
Much of the toolkit of these (evidently very successful) practitioners
are filled with theories and tools that modern highbrow theory has
relegated to historians and outmoded "Keynesians." Many of these
tools are profiled in the encyclopedia under review.
Michael S. Lawlor is Professor of Economics at Wake Forest
University. His most recent publication on Keynes was the chapter
"The Classical Theory of the Rate of Interest," in G.C. Harcourt and
P.A. Riach, eds, 1997. _A 'Second Edition' of The General Theory_.
London and New York: Routledge.
REFERENCES
Darnton, Robert, 1979. _The Business of the Enlightenment: A
Publishing History of the Encyclopedia_. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press
Diebold, Francis X., and Glenn D. Rudebusch. " Have Postwar
Economic Fluctuations Been Stabilized?" _American Economic
Review_, 82 (1992): 993-1005.
Eatwell, John, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman, eds. 1987. _The
New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics_. London: Macmillan.
Glasner, David, ed., 1997. _Business Cycles and Depressions: An
Encyclopedia_. New York and London: Garland.
Groenewegen, Peter D. 1995. _A Soaring Eagle: Alfred Marshall 1842-
1924_. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
Harcourt, G.C. and Peter Riach, eds. 1997. _A 'Second Edition' of
The General Theory_. London and New York: Routledge.
International Monetary Fund, 1999. _Chronic Unemployment in the
Euro Area: Causes and Cures_. Washington D.C.: International
Monetary Fund.
Lebergott, Stanley. "Discussion." _Journal of Economic History_ 46
(1986): 367-71.
Romer, Christina D. "Is Stabilization of the Postwar economy of
Figment of the Data?" _American Economic Review_ 17 (1986): 314-
34.
Weir, David. "The Reliability of Historical Macroeconomic Data for
Comparing Cyclical Stability." _Journal of Economic History_ 46
(1986: 353-65).
Wood, John H. _"A Company of Merchants:" A History of the
Theories and Ideas That Have Shaped Monetary Policy_.
Forthcoming.
Yoo, Peter S. "The FOMC in 1997: A Real Conundrum." _Review of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis_ 80:5 (1998): 27-40.
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