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Societies for the History of Economics

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From:
J. (J.)
Date:
Fri Mar 31 17:18:27 2006
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----------------- HES POSTING ----------------- 
 
 
Patrick, 
 
I have already said all I have to say about the 
math issue vis a vis this matter, so let's stick to 
verbalizations by Samuelson. 
 
In an earlier post I quoted Samuelson directly 
from his original article.  I shall not quote directly again, 
but simply restate.  I fully agree that his upfront definition 
is rather vague.  But in his discussion of why he saw a 
problem for the "spontaneous decentralized solution," he 
posited the possibility of everybody internalizing somehow 
a bureaucrat's optimal solution, but then rejects this on the 
basis that individuals will be able to "snatch some selfish 
benefits" by departing from such behavior.  Again, I see 
this as arising not from non-rivalry, but indeed from non- 
excludability, even if Samuelson did not use this terminology 
or proceed to analyze all kinds of property rights solutions 
to this problem.  Do you see this terminology on his part 
as posing anything other than the non-excudability problem? 
 
I remind that Samuelson admits that it may be that few 
goods fit the polar cases he described and analyzed.  However, 
I think many of us feel that this polar categorization was worthwhile 
because it did highlight certain essential aspects of the problem. 
 
Indeed, I would submit that the Samuelsonian analysis is 
still useful even in a purely privatized world of clubs which form 
to provide goods or services that have some kind of (purely 
local presumably) "collective" aspect (if I dare use that word 
at all).  Thus, we have gated communities providing their own 
law and order, as well as streets, etc.  I gather this is the sort of 
thing that you have in mind, right, that Samuelson and I and 
everybody else should have open minds about, right?  So, 
even in such a world, the question arises as to how the gated 
community is to decide how much it is to spend on hiring the 
private police who guard their gates and enforce the restrictive 
covenants and anti-noise rules that the gated community adopts? 
Samuelson's argument that it should be the sum of the 
willingnesses to pay of those involved still seems to be the 
relevant solution.  What other is there? 
 
Now you pose as a way of ejecting someone from being 
defended against a life-destroying nuclear attack (or from a 
life-destroying asteroid hit), putting them in jail or killing them. 
Now, I grant, that threatening such actions might well induce 
them to pay up to the private provider of such defenses.  But 
these will still not prevent the from being protected 
against a life-destroying nuclear attack (or a life-destroying 
asteroid hit), although killing them would make the whole issue 
moot.  But, I note that authorities that have the right 
to kill people are known as states and do so according 
to laws.  A private entity that abrogates to itself the right to 
kill people that do not go along with group decisions about 
the provision of goods would certainly be a state for all practical 
purposes, even if it called itself something else. 
 
Finally, with regard to the nuclear war example.  It is 
certainly true that the original rationale for nuclear weapons 
arose in a context of "us against them," in which presumably 
somebody could be made to not be "defended" by expelling 
them from the country (in which case, they would probably not 
be subject to nuclear attack anyway).  But, because of ignorance 
and prisoners' dilemma problems we ended up with a situation 
where deterring a nuclear attack in fact meant deterring against 
a globally life-destroying event.  Nobody can be excluded from 
the benefits of that, as long as nuclear arsenals and their delivery 
systems remain large enough to bring about such an outcome. 
Even those who are killed by the state are still not excluded from 
being defended against such attack (or their posthumous remains). 
 
BTW, I think that this will be my last post on this topic, 
unless something especially new or insightful is said. 
 
Barkley Rosser 
James Madison University 
 
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