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It seems wise to begin my comment on Professor Henderson's editorial by
identifying the class of ideas with which I assume the history of economics
is concerned. The fundamental idea is that of how normal human beings
interact under the conditions of the market economy. This includes the
following ideas, among others: (a) ideas about the effects of an unexpected
increase in the quantity of money, (b) ideas about the effects of
government barriers on imports into a market economy, (c) ideas about the
difference between interaction under conditions of competition and
monopoly, (d) ideas about who receives the benefits of the market economy
and (e) ideas about the effects of deficit government spending.
To highlight what seems at first to be the difference between my
view of the history of economic thought and that of Professor Henderson,
let me put myself in the shoes of a first-time, invisible visitor from
outer space, who has an interest in the history of ideas like these. I
might form two initial hypotheses. First, I might hypothesize that I would
discover that the history represents the replacement of ideas that are less
adequate with those that are more adequate. Second, I might hypothesize
that the appearance and disappearance of ideas would represent no notion of
adequacy but that it might inform me about the nature of the people who
expressed the ideas.
(I will not in this short note express my criterion for judging
adequacy. The interested reader can find an example at
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/subjecti/workpape/role_ent My aim
here is only to draw the attention to the difference between the two
hypotheses.)
Professor Henderson seems to believe that the study of economic
ideas will inform him about the people who had the ideas and that the
primary focus ought to be on the people. I have no particular interest in
the people unless they are in some way related to what I identify as
contributions to the growth of ideas. Thus, I have no special interest in
"sociologising" or "contextualising" ideas, although there may be some
benefit in trying to distinguish social conditions under which growth
occurred from those in which there was stagnation or regression. In
addition, it may be necessary to sociologize and contextualize in order to
avoid mistakes in the interpretation of statements. We don't want to make
the error of attributing an idea to someone who did not have it, or vice
versa.
Thus my aim of identifying cases of the "growth of ideas" differs
significantly from Professor Henderson's apparent aim of studying people
who have ideas. HESers can proceed with either aim. I would suggest,
however, that the latter aim comes very close to RELATIVISM. In its most
extreme form, relativists aim to convince us that all ideas are relative
and that others who claim that ideas are absolute are misinformed and
likely to be pompous and elitist. However, confidence that the human mind
can make progress is hardly pompous and elitist. The extreme relativist is
left to explain what ordinary people would never deny -- the progress of
human civilization via the development of the human mind. If ordinary
people would never deny the progress of human civilization, HESers should
be careful not to deny the progress of ideas in economics.
I don't believe that Professor Henderson is an extreme relativist.
In describing the approaches of "sociologizing" and "contextualizing" and
after rejecting "whig history," he says that both approaches "emphasize the
view that economics is a knowledge-producing enterprise." It seems obvious
that when we presume that knowledge is produced we are making an implicit
judgment about the adequacy of the "thing" that is produced. So I believe
that his real message is simply that HESers ought to pay more attention to
historical context. Read the masters first, he says, then head off to the
archives, read the correspondence, the discussions at professional
meetings, the book reviews, contemporary magazines, etc. My recommendation
is: Don't get lost in the archives, as fascinating as you may find them.
Don't forget that you came there to study knowledge-production -- the
replacement of a less adequate idea with one that is more adequate.
One final comment. I would recommend being careful when discussing
the control over a scientist's choices. Economists seem to differ radically
regarding the "proportion" of their moves that are "free" and "forced," to
use the words referred to by Professor Henderson. It seems quite reasonable
to presume that everyone is partly a product of his environment (nature and
nurture) and partly a free spirit (a distinctly human being). But it seems
equally reasonable to presume that the "mix" varies from person to person.
Were Einstein's moves forced or free, compared with his contemporaries? It
seems quite possible that those who produced more adequate economic ideas
are the same as those who rank highest on the freedom scale.
Of course, to make a free move does not insure the production of
knowledge. Don Quixote also made free moves. Nevertheless, to produce
knowledge may require that one make a free move.
--
Pat Gunning
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome
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