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From:
[log in to unmask] (Lawrence Boland)
Date:
Fri Mar 31 17:18:55 2006
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----------------- HES POSTING ----------------- 
 
Pat, 
 
I think Marshall was talking about perfect knowledge in the way  
you call "counterfactual". But I think he was saying that if there  
were perfect knowledge on the part of ALL participants in a market  
then there would be no need for the market. Your counterfactual  
method is merely Weber's ideal-type methodology which was  
intended to be like physics and the assumption of no friction. In  
ideal-type methodology, the "real" world is seen to be some  
distortion from the "ideal" world. Explaining  the source of the  
distortions (with respect to the "ideal" world) constitutes an  
explanation of the "real" world. But I think Marshall was making a  
stronger point, namely, the perfect knowledge assumption is  
inconsistent with assuming a perfectly functioning market system.   
 
While all of this methodology discussion is interesting, it is not  
addressing Jan's nor my question of who started this assumption.   
 
The quotation from Marshall, it needs to be emphasized, was from  
Book 6. Your complaints about mathematics is relevant only for  
Book 5 where Marshall discussed the mathematical neighbourhood  
properties of the long-run, general equilibrium. Unfortunately, Book  
5 is the basis for almost all neoclassical textbooks. In Book 6  
Marshall goes beyond this to address more interesting questions  
than what can be handled with Book 5.   
 
Many of us are willing to recognize that Hayek (1937) put his finger  
on the importance of addressing just how the decision maker  
acquires the knowledge required for an equilibrium. It should also  
be noted that he recognized consequences of false knowledge  
when it came to investments (his 1933 lecture about  
malinvestments). And he recognized that change is usually the  
consequence of recognizing that one has made an error. My views  
of all this are in my 1986 book, specifically, Chapters 2, 6 and 8.  
For those interested, a free PDF copy of my book is available at  
<http://www.sfu.ca/~boland/book2.htm>.    
 
When all is said, Robin is correct, but I would go further to say that  
the "perfect knowledge" assumption is useful both for those who  
need to quickly apply a pro-market argument and for critics who  
want to ridicule that argument. What Hayek (1945) questioned was  
is whether the assumption is necessary for that argument. So, I  
would add to Robin's observation that, while policy makers may  
need the quick fix, theorists who are aware of Hayek's views ought  
to know better.   
 
Lawrence A. Boland 
Simon Fraser University 
 
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