I'd like to add one side note to the discussion.  When I as a   
historian of political thought look at attempts to justify private   
property, it does seem to me that land requires odd treatment, i.e.,   
that some note needs to be added to bring land into the fold.  
        For Locke in the 2nd Treatise, for instance, with his labor   
theory of property, it is easy to see how catching a deer makes it   
yours, but less easy to see how tilling a field one spring makes it   
yours for the next year.  
        For Rousseau in the 2nd Discourse, taking possession of what   
you need to survive makes sense, but (in a famous quotation I cannot   
reproduce) at the beginning of the 2nd Part of the 2nd Discourse, he   
rails against the first person who marked off a field, claimed it as   
his, and found people stupid (gullible?) enough to believe him.  
        For Hegel, who has a will-based theory of property, the issue   
is a little less difficult:  you put your will in the thing (I will   
to own this as property, and mark and work it as mine).  
  
So, when the argument between the Georgists and the standard American   
economists hinges partly over landed property and why it is different   
(or not) from capital, I get interested in wanting to know that   
answer, because I think that the oddity of treatment of  
land in the justifications of private property suggests ... well, it   
suggests something, either that Locke et al could not see or could   
see but did not articulate.  
  
So, can someone (maybe one person from each side) tell me the   
difference (or non-difference) for George and for contemporary Amer   
economists between land and other forms of property/capital.  
  
Thanks,  
  
Peter G. Stillman