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------------ EH.NET BOOK REVIEW --------------  
Classic Reviews in Economic History  
  
Brinley Thomas, _Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great   
Britain and the Atlantic Economy_. Cambridge: Cambridge University   
Press, 1954. 362 pp. (second edition, 1973, xxxi + 498 pp.)  
  
Review Essay by James Foreman-Peck, Department of Economics, Cardiff   
Business School, Cardiff University.  
  
  
                The Rise and Fall of the Atlantic Economic Community  
  
  
Brinley Thomas' (1906-1994) contention that "it is instructive to   
regard the Atlantic community of nations as one economy" was   
immensely refreshing for those of us brought up on national economic   
histories. Interactions with the wider world tended to be downplayed   
or at least left unexplained in more conventional accounts. Moreover   
_Migration and Economic Growth_ was not the work simply of a period   
specialist historian; Thomas was an economist, deploying a massive   
range of statistics to discover the nineteenth-century world that had   
been lost after a half century of total war.[1] In the second   
edition, this world, in many respects rather close to textbook   
neoclassical economics, provided a fruitful means of interpreting the   
great boom after 1945, as well.  
  
Unusually by today's standards, the study begins with a history of   
nineteenth-century thought about non-competing groups, social   
mobility and migration. Traditionally trade theory assumed perfect   
mobility of labor within the national economy, but none between   
economies. Changes in trade policy and market integration required   
shifts of employment between sectors within the national economy. Yet   
in the later nineteenth century, rather than change occupation and   
sectors, workers would often choose a different country of residence;   
they were not substitutes or competitors for other types of labor.  
  
Thomas concentrates on class rather than occupational immobility,   
however. He has a model of secular changes in social structure and   
mobility (from landless laborer to landowning farmer). This scheme   
bolsters an argument for national protectionism, when land is owned   
by residents of a different country. Industrialization brings social   
stratification and, with a rigid social structure, immigrants are no   
longer welcome. In a later chapter his "dynamic theory of economic   
development," involving increasing U.S. social rigidity as the land   
filled up over the nineteenth century, is used to explain the switch   
of British immigration away from the U.S. in the years 1896-1913,   
when immigration from other destinations was booming.  
  
In Part 2, Thomas discusses his British and U.S. statistical sources.   
He concludes that changes in the series, if not the levels, can be   
trusted. Part 3 contains the analysis of the first edition and the   
second edition includes a Part 4, a reappraisal.  
  
As Thomas's obituarist and former research assistant makes clear, the   
structure of the book, and particularly the second edition, is the   
outcome of an evolutionary process (Lewis 1996). The central idea was   
published as an article in 1951, and appears as chapter 7 -   
"Migration and the Rhythm of Economic Growth." The new edition was   
strongly influenced by Thomas's work in the intervening years on   
urban development and economic growth and on the Welsh economy. The   
chief revision to the material of the first edition concerns Southern   
U.S. migration to the North. Thomas also adds chapters taking issue   
with his critics on the brain drain and on monetary influences, these   
last two swayed by the very different economic environment of the   
1950s and 1960s.  
  
Unlike Schumpeter, Thomas regards international migration as   
responding to innovations, as well as contributing to fluctuations.   
He also believes internal or rural-urban migration was a substitute   
for emigration so that when one was high the other was low. If the   
same type of people emigrated as migrated internally this is what we   
would expect -- but not if they were non-competing groups.  
  
Thomas's central theme translates well as a real business cycle. A   
technology shock in a region raises the productivity of labor there.   
More capital and labor are supplied (migration) because higher wages   
match higher productivity; there is a positive correlation of the   
real wage and the upswing. This contrasts with shorter cycles perhaps   
based on workers' misperceptions of prices and the real wage in   
monetary fluctuations. In the region without the positive shock, less   
labor and capital are supplied, because better returns are to be had   
elsewhere. In the booming region, the time necessary for building the   
infrastructure to take full advantage of the technology means that   
the flow of labor and capital continues for some years, until   
marginal returns are equalized again between regions (allowing for   
non-pecuniary differences and costs of migration), or other shocks   
occur.  
  
Demographic impulses as well as technology shocks promote the   
distinctive inverse cycles between the regions. A case in point is   
the Napoleonic war "baby boomers" that, in due course Thomas   
maintains, created the "hungry forties." Malthusian pressure in   
Europe pushed migrants to the U.S., capital tended to follow them and   
the demand for housing in the U.S. rose (even though, in contrast to   
the positive technology shock, real wages in the receiving region   
fall and those in the transmitting region rise, relative to what they   
would have been). Non-competing groups add richness to the model. To   
the extent that the immigrants are complementary to the indigenous   
work force, wages will rise. More likely is that some wages (say   
skilled) will rise and others fall - if, for instance, immigrants are   
unskilled. The more capital that flowed with the migrants the   
stronger the growth they promoted, and the less adverse the impact on   
wages.  
  
Today we are more likely to consider Heckscher-Ohlin derived   
approaches, for example that focus on income distributional   
consequences of factor flows, or the determinants of skill premia.[2]   
When transport costs fall, free trade permits a lower price of food   
in land-scarce countries like Britain and leaves landowners and   
agricultural laborers worse off. This encourages migration (internal   
or external) from the rural sector regardless of class mobility,   
although not regardless of occupational mobility. But Thomas largely   
ignores trade, as well as product and factor prices.[3]  
  
Part 3 of the second edition concludes with a chapter (12) on the   
impact of the U.S. immigration restrictions of the 1920s. Thomas   
observes that the legislation encouraged agricultural protectionism   
in Europe because redundant population, unable to move to the U.S.,   
was employed growing subsidized crops. Migrants were also diverted to   
Canada and South America, boosting output there. He contends that the   
restrictions played an important part in the process that ended in   
the world depression. But "it is an ill wind that blows nobody any   
good"; Thomas's final chapter (18) argues that black migrants from   
the South gained from the elimination of European competition. In the   
second edition he notes that white and black internal migration were   
inverse. The immigration restriction act of 1924 was followed by big   
increases in southern blacks in the North.[4] Conversely, "What the   
evidence suggests is that in the sixty years after the end of the   
Civil War the strong competition of white workers from abroad ... set   
a stern limit to the number of blacks who could obtain employment in   
the booming urban areas of the North and West, and consequently they   
suffered relative impoverishment" (p. 333). Jeffrey Williamson (2005)   
cites later literature to this effect, and discusses the corollary   
that the position of blacks deteriorated after 1970 because of   
competition from immigrants.  
  
Thomas's chapter 16 on migration and British regional growth   
introduces the wider world to Welsh "exceptionalism." This thesis   
allows the possibility of enlivening economic history syllabuses with   
questions such as "If Ireland had Wales' coal would New York now   
conduct a parade on St. David's rather than St. Patrick's Day?" In   
the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Wales absorbed   
immigrants at a rate not much less than the U.S. in the same period.   
Migration cycles for Wales were inverse to those of Scotland and   
England; Wales exported coal (measured by tonnage Cardiff was the   
largest port in the world by 1890), whereas English coal was for   
domestic consumption.[5] Whereas Ireland lost population absolutely,   
and Scotland lost natural increase by net migration, Wales gained   
from net migration and the population almost doubled between 1871 and   
1911.  
  
Taking issue with "exceptionalism," Dudley Baines (1985) has pointed   
out that the Welsh were more likely to emigrate than the English, and   
through England (Liverpool boasted the first real Welsh-language   
newspaper). He contends that the U.S. returns of the 1880s almost   
certainly classified the Welsh as English, and that internal   
migration does not seem to have been a substitute for emigration.   
Wales actually experienced a massive influx of English and others. In   
the 1870s and 1880s they may well have been assimilated, for the   
numbers of Welsh speakers rose in every decade to 1911, when there   
were more than a million (Davies 1994). But in the two decades before   
the First World War, foreign arrivals were too numerous to be   
absorbed culturally.  
  
Omitted from the second edition is a discussion of the wider   
consequences of the interwar regime shift for the "Atlantic   
community." In Chapter 14 ("The Atlantic Economy, Old and New") of   
the first edition, the focus is on the disruption of factor flows and   
the role of government transfers within national economies. The labor   
and capital movements, that allowed adjustment of "regional"   
economies despite the apparently irrevocable linking of exchange   
rates through the gold standard, and compensatory public spending,   
are suggestive of the later optimum currency area literature.  
  
Pursuing the greater role of government, Thomas analyzes the "brain   
drain" in the years after 1945 in chapter 17 of the second edition.   
Highly skilled labor migrated from poorer economies (often where they   
were trained at public expense) to richer countries. In the U.S.   
Brinley explains the phenomenon by the massive expansion of   
government expenditure, particularly research and development   
spending, together with inelasticity of skilled labor supply. In   
Britain by contrast, immigration of highly skilled personnel merely   
offset emigration to the U.S. and elsewhere.  
  
How much further has half a century of analysis and data construction   
taken us? General equilibrium modeling and econometric estimation   
have certainly added precision both to the questions and the answers.   
But Thomas's book continues to be worth reading thanks to his ability   
to identify and analyze empirically a range of important problems   
over 120 years or more of the Atlantic economy.  
  
  
Notes:  
1. I met Thomas in California in the early 1980s when I believe he   
was in demand to entertain the All-California group of economic   
historians with after dinner speeches. Among other nuggets he offered   
me was the optimum quantity of money to carry if obliged to walk in   
Berkeley after dark (as he was sometimes). He estimated that two 20   
dollar bills were sufficient to avoid being beaten up by frustrated   
muggers, while not imposing an intolerable burden on the budget. I am   
unsure as to whether this doctrine was ever tested.  
  
2. Jeffrey Williamson and collaborators (for example Hatton and   
Williamson 1998, and O'Rourke and Williamson 1999) have been   
particularly influential in this respect.  
  
3. The neglect of Ohlin's (1933) book is presumably because it was   
nominally about trade while Thomas was interested in factor mobility.  
  
4. Subsequently Hatton and Williamson (2006) constructed a   
counterfactual immigration rate and level in the absence of the   
legislation, showing that it accounted for about half of the   
reduction in labor supply and therefore for even more of the decline   
in unskilled labor force growth.  
  
5. Lewis (1960) analyzes a helpful model of such an export economy,   
in which today "coal" would probably be replaced by "tradable goods"   
and "building" by "non-tradable (capital) goods."  
  
References:  
  
Baines, Dudley. 1985. _Migration in a Mature Economy: Emigration and   
Internal Migration in England and Wales, 1861-1900_. Cambridge:   
Cambridge University Press.  
  
Davies, John. 1994. _A History of Wales_. London: Penguin.  
  
Hatton, Timothy J. and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 1998. _The Age of Mass   
Migration: Causes and Economic Impact_, New York: Oxford University   
Press.  
  
Hatton, Timothy J. and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2006. _Global Migration   
and the World Economy: Two Centuries of Policy and Performance_.   
Cambridge, MA; MIT Press.  
  
Lewis, J. Parry. 1960. "Building Cycles: A Regional Model and Its   
National Setting," _Economic Journal_ 70 (September): 519-35.  
  
Lewis, J. Parry. 1996. "Brinley Thomas, C.B.E., M.A., Ph.D., F.B.A.:   
Formerly Fellow of the University of Wales," _Economic Journal_ 106   
(July): 984-93  
  
Ohlin, Bertil G. 1933. _Interregional and International Trade_.   
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
  
O'Rourke, Kevin H. and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 1999. _Globalization   
and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy_.   
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
  
Williamson, Jeffrey G. 2005. _The Political Economy of World Mass   
Migration: Comparing Two Global Centuries_. Washington, DC: American   
Enterprise Institute.  
  
  
Director of the Welsh Institute for Research in Economics and   
Development and former President of the European Historical Economics   
Society, James Foreman-Peck has been Economic Adviser at H.M.   
Treasury concerned with micro-economic policy issues, particularly   
public service delivery and procurement. Other previous posts include   
Professor of Economic History at the University of Hull, Visiting   
Associate Professor of Economics at the University of California,   
Davis, and Fellow of St Antony's College, University of Oxford. His   
books include _A History of the World Economy: International Economic   
Relations since 1850_, _Public and Private Ownership of British   
Industry 1820-1990_ (with R. Millward) and _European Industrial   
Policy: The Twentieth Century Experience_ (edited with G. Federico).  
  
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Published by EH.Net (August 2006). All EH.Net reviews are archived at   
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