------------ EH.NET BOOK REVIEW --------------
Published by EH.NET (January 2005)
Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, _The Not So Wild, Wild West:
Property Rights on the Frontier_. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2004. xii + 263 pp. $24.95 (hardcover), ISBN: 0-8047-4854-3.
Reviewed for EH.NET by Frank D. Lewis, Department of Economics,
Queen's University.
Implicit in economic transactions is the understanding that the
parties will fulfill the terms of the exchange to which they have
agreed. Government is often the agent that enforces contracts, but
where government is weak or non-existent, other enforcement
mechanisms may emerge. The use of common property resources also may
require an authority, whether a government entity or a substitute, to
help ensure that the exploitation of the resource does become a
"tragedy of the commons."
Economic activity on the U.S. frontier during the nineteenth century
took place in an environment where government was largely absent.
Nevertheless, the West, as described by Terry Anderson and P J. Hill,
was not nearly as "wild" as has been depicted by some historians and
by Hollywood. According to Anderson and Hill, the key to the
successful and, by and large, peaceful enforcement of contracts, as
well as the generally peaceful exploitation of what at the outset
were common access resources, was the emergence of a set of rules,
both formal and informal, that assigned property rights to agents
operating in this new economy. Drawing on their own work and the work
of others, Anderson and Hill illustrate how participants in the
frontier economy avoided conflict, always a negative sum game, while
securing the property rights that promoted the optimal resource
exploitation. The stories that fill this book -- and despite a few
references to statistical and econometric work, Anderson and Hill do
present them as stories -- describe the practical problems that
confronted those on the frontier, and the often ingenious ways they
had of solving them.
Despite the lack of a formal government structure, Native Americans
developed a range of property rights to resources that they jointly
exploited. Following in the tradition of Harold Demsetz, Anderson and
Hill emphasize the comparison between the cost of establishing a
property right and the benefit of that right to the Native economy.
Bison, for example, were so numerous until the nineteenth century
that there was little advantage to assigning rights to them; but once
groups of Natives jointly hunted the animals, often using buffalo
jumps, a method that required coordinated action, rights to the meat
and hides were specified even to the extent of allotting larger
shares to those who took on more important or more dangerous roles.
By contrast, salmon were at serious risk of over-harvesting because
of the comparative ease with which they could be fished once they
entered the rivers or streams that led to their spawning grounds.
Tribes in the Pacific Northwest reacted by establishing property
rights to the salmon runs even to the level of the family, a system
that promoted conservation of the stocks.
European settlers to the frontier were faced with much the same
problem that had long confronted Native Americans -- the lack of a
central authority to assign and enforce property rights. From 1840 to
1860, nearly 300,000 traveled overland to Oregon, California and
Utah, most by wagon train; and to fill the government void each group
adopted a set of rules, a "constitution-like agreement," that
specified the terms of the passage. For example, individuals often
combined their property, such as cooking materials, while on the
trail, but they retained ownership and these goods were remitted once
the train reached its destination. The emigrants themselves created
and enforced the contracts and, as Anderson and Hill describe it, the
result was a large relocation of population that was relatively free
of conflict.
The cattle drives of the late nineteenth century required contracts
between cattle owners and drovers that addressed the problem of
monitoring. And where there was the more serious problem of contact
with farmers, means were found to avoid violence. Cattle-trader
Joseph McCoy, went to great lengths to ensure peace with the
residents of Salina, Kansas and others close to the cattle route by
compensating them for losses and offering other benefits. The
potential for violence among Europeans was perhaps greatest during
the initial years of gold mining. Yet even the 1859 discovery of the
Comstock Lode in Nevada was largely peaceful. At first, there were a
variety of privately-enforced regulations; but ultimately, as issues
became too complex, disputes were increasingly brought to territorial
courts. As well, the Nevada legislature became involved, passing 47
mineral-rights laws between 1861 and 1866.
Anderson and Hill's history of the West also includes the development
of water rights, where they give more emphasis to the role of
government, a role that was not always positive, especially as it
related to irrigation projects. There is a provocative account
(though I find it persuasive) of the near extinction of the bison;
and a discussion of federal land policy. And throughout, the common
thread is the implications of property rights.
_The Not So Wild, Wild West_ was developed in part from an economic
history course the authors taught at Montana State University, and it
should have special appeal to undergraduates. It is entirely
accessible and often quite delightful. At the same time, those who
adopt the book might wish to present students with other, more
nuanced, interpretations. Anderson and Hill make a strong case that,
in the absence of a government authority, property rights regimes
emerged that allowed for the functioning, at least at some level, of
a variety of frontier institutions. But how efficient were these
institutions? Could a government authority have improved efficiency?
Did the lack of a strong central authority seriously hamper some
aspects of development? How much violence was there on the frontier?
The historical examples in _The Not So Wild, Wild West_ seem to
provide answers to these questions; but, given the selective nature
of the evidence and the way the evidence has been interpreted, the
appeal of the book -- and it is an appealing book -- may lie less in
the authors' conclusions than in their ability to provoke a lively debate.
Frank D. Lewis is editor (with David Eltis and Kenneth Sokoloff) of
_Slavery in the Development of the Americas_ (Cambridge University
Press, 2004). Recent articles include "Survival through Generosity:
Property Rights and Hunting Practices of Native Americans in the
Subarctic Region," in _Land Rights, Ethno-Nationality, and
Sovereignty in History_, edited by Stanley Engerman and Jacob Metzer
(Routledge, 2004).
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Published by EH.Net (January 2005). All EH.Net reviews are archived
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