Anthony Waterman wrote:
> Individual football players 'really exist', and they have
> 'desires, interests and passions' that may be gratified by
> the victory of their team over another. The team does not
> 'really exist', which is why I called it an abstraction.
> Useful, but dangerous when used anthropomorphically.
I try to imagine some arguing that while the individual
planks really exist, the ship does not, and while speaking
of this abstraction "ship" can be useful, it is dangerous
when used plankomorphically.
If your point were just that we should not confuse the
category 'team' with the category 'player' (or the category
'ship' with the category 'plank'), nobody would object of
course. But you are asking for *much* more.
Anthony Waterman wrote:
> If, in order to make my (Paley's) point I have to concede
> 'rationality' to dogs, so be it. What I do not want to do
> is to ascribe it to the pack.
I was about to retort that your wants are really beside the
point, but then I realized that you may disagree. ;-)
You clearly consider the postulate of some conscious
experience, like "want", to be prerequisite to any
ascription of "intent". (Economists are so in love with
metaphysics!) An aggregate of cells can, for mysterious
reasons, produce qualia. You apparently want to restrict
the use of the language of intentionality to cases where
certain qualia are present. For example, I deduce from your
discomfort with the idea of a deer-seeking wolf pack that
you must be very uncomfortable with the idea of a heat-
*seeking* missile, for example---regardless of whether
I might find that a useful description when trying to escape
it. And whether I am allowed to observe that a frog tried
to catch a fly but failed, I suppose, must depend on whether
there was hidden within that froggy bundle some
consciousness experience, however dim, of "trying". And the
neoclassical theory of the firm must be a great puzzle: will
you let may speak of this abstraction *choosing* an
appropriate input mix, or is all such talk "dangerous"?
Cheers,
Alan Isaac
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