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In reply to Pat Gunning: 
 
a) you and I stipulate the definitions of whig history and presentism differently. Because
there is no way to move the discussion of whig history forward when we work with different
definitions, I will just point out that between your broader definition and my narrower
one there is a large field of historical writings that we both think are appropriate. You
simply define them as whig history or "pure presentism", and I don't. My goal in
discussing whig history has been to uphold the critique of the type of historical writing
that Herb Butterfield called whig history in his masterful essay. I do not wish to
criticize some other types of history that you seem to want the term "whig history" to
include (see below for an example).
 
b) While you define whig history more broadly than I, you define presentism in a
relatively narrow way, . You say:
 
<<First, let us use the term "presentist" historian to refer to an historian who
implicitly endorses contemporary economics (the winners) in relation to the economics of
the past, without being concerned with whether contemporary economics is correct or
incorrect in relation to its predecessors or alternatives. The presentist implicitly
regards contemporary economics as correct but sees no need to prove this.>>
 
To me, this is only one type of presentism (and may well be a definition for me of a whig
historian!). For example, I would use the term "presentism" to refer also to what you call
a "counter-presentist" - - someone who regards contemporary economics as incorrect and
sets out to show why. I see that as being just as presentist as your "presentism."
Furthermore, why bother limiting presentism to one's views of contemporary economics? Why
must I be concerned about endorsing or refuting contemporary economics in order to be a
historian of economics? There are all kinds of present day concerns apart from
contemporary economics which might lead me to investigate questions in the history of
economics. Present day interests about everything from religion to earlier women's
writings could lead me to examine the history of economics.
 
I was deliberately vague in defining presentism (unlike "whig history") because I want to
use the term to cover a wide spectrum of issues. I don't think we can escape our present
day concerns when writing history. There are no "neutralists." But neither do we need to
think ourselves entirely trapped by our presentism.
 
c) You say that I would probably disapprove of <<a history of economics written by an
author who correctly argues that current (mainstream) discussants have gone off the track
because they disregarded a line of thinking that emerged in the past but that they
rejected.>>
 
Not so. I have always been very careful in my published historiographic work to
distinguish three types of historiographic work that I admire. Most contemporary work in
the history of economics is either historical or rational reconstruction. I have already
made my remarks about those in my earlier message. But a third type that I mention  is
what Richard Rorty calls "geistesgeschichte." Geistesgeschichte is the reconceptualization
of the history of the discipline in a way that reframes the key questions for the present-
day discipline, and rewrites the canon. Geistesgeschichte is written entirely from present
day concerns (or perhaps I should say future day concerns), and when well done is also
carefully attuned to past concerns. It will definitely not be a glorification of how we
arrived where we are today, but also need not be a call to the barricades. But
geistesgeschichte is extremely hard to write because it is written on the largest scale
and is open to the most criticism. (witness Phil Mirowski's More Heat than Light). And
when done poorly, it could well be the worst type of "whig history." I personally will
stick to the "easier" work of historical reconstruction.
 
(Re-reading that last paragraph and the quote I copied from your message led me to add one
final comment. I missed your use of the word "correctly" in the quote I used. Whether
someone who writes a geistesgeschichte is correct in their judgment that the contemporary
discipline has gone off-track somewhere is irrelevant. We won't know whether they are
correct until we evaluate their argument. And, of course, we may end up disagreeing on the
validity of their argument. There are several geistesgeschichtes that I disagree with, but
which I still think are good histories!).
 
Ross Emmett 
 
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