====================== HES POSTING ================== 
 
EH.NET BOOK REVIEW 
 
Published by EH.NET (July 1997) 
 
William J. Barber, _Designs Within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 
Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933-1945_. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.  ix + 178 pp.  $44.95 (cloth), 
ISBN: 0-051-56078-0.  
 
Reviewed for EH.Net by Michael V. Namorato, Department of History, 
University of Mississippi.  <[log in to unmask]> 
 
 
        _Designs Within Disorder_ is William Barber's sequel to his 
earlier work on economic thinking in the 1920s, entitled _From New Era to 
New Deal: Herbert Hoover, the Economists, and American Economic Policy, 
1921-1933_ (New York, 1985).  Similar to his earlier study, _Designs 
Within Disorder_ concentrates on what economists were saying during the 
New Deal, how Franklin D. Roosevelt listened to and responded to their 
suggestions, and the ultimate impact these economic thinkers had on 
long-term federal economic policy.  In the case of Franklin Roosevelt, 
Barber believes that professional economists had a president who was 
willing to listen to them and who was a "consumer" of what they had to 
offer.  Although not a great economic thinker, Roosevelt himself, in 
Barber's opinion, was "an uncompromising champion of consumer sovereignty"  
(p. 1).  He provided those with more learning and understanding of 
economic matters an opportunity to develop their ideas.  Roosevelt's 
Washington, in short, was a "laboratory affording economists an 
opportunity to make hands-on contact with the world of events" (p. 2).  
After much experimentation, the end result was an "Americanized version of 
Keynesian macroeconomics" which became part and parcel of governmental 
policy by the end of the 1930s.  In this sense, the Rooseveltian years 
were "a watershed in economic policy and in economic thinking" (p. 3). 
 
        To make his case, Barber details how economists affected Franklin 
Roosevelt throughout his years in office.  Beginning with the 1932 
campaign, Barber argues that Roosevelt's Brains Trust would not have 
received the endorsement of the American Economic Association.  What Adolf 
Berle, Rexford Tugwell, and Raymond Moley had in common besides 
"geographical proximity" was their commitment to using the federal 
government to address the economic crisis caused by the Great Depression. 
Providing rather traditional and highly questionable critiques of what 
Berle and Tugwell particularly were saying, Barber makes it clear that 
these individuals were anti-Brandesians in their approach and thinking. 
Perhaps more significantly, the author spends a considerable amount of 
time examining what the Cornell group (George Warren and F.A. Pearson)  
were calling for in regards to inflationary policies and what Irving 
Fisher wanted to accomplish with his theories of reflation.  Fisher, in 
fact, not only did not approve of the Brains Trust and their 
recommendations but he also was quite happy with Roosevelt's bombshell 
message to the London Economic Conference.  Instead, as Barber details, 
Fisher called for a managed currency, breaking away from the gold 
standard, and implementation of the Thomas amendment to the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act.  As for Franklin Roosevelt in the midst of these divergent 
economic theories, Barber believes that the president showed "antipathy 
towards the respectable economic thinking throughout 1933" and supported 
structural interventions in industry and agriculture and in his monetary 
experimentation. 
 
        Barber next turns his attention to the ideas of individuals like 
Leon Henderson (National Recovery Administration), Leverett Lyon, Isador 
Lubin (Commissioner of Labor Statistics), and Gardiner Means.  His 
analysis of the National Recovery Administration and Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration is fairly traditional and his conclusion that 
Roosevelt wanted to find a way to sustain governmental interventionism in 
the economy with judicial approval is far from original in theory or 
conception.  The author does much better in explaining the differences 
between the theoretical ideas of John M. Keynes and Irving Fisher, 
although their impact on Roosevelt is lost in the argument itself.  Barber 
feels that the president was and remained "a fiscal conservative at heart"  
anyway (p. 88).  Barber argues that with the recession of 1937-1938 the 
debate between the structuralists (a la Berle/Tugwell) and the monetarists 
(a la Fisher and the Cornell Group) re-appeared.  Despite Fisher's strong 
case for 100 percent reserves, Roosevelt was more concerned with adding an 
income orientation to macroeconomic policy with fiscal activism as a key 
ingredient (p. 115).  
 
        Finally, in his last chapters, Barber takes his argument through 
the later 1930s, World War II, and the immediate post-war era.  Seeing 
Harry Hopkins' appointment as Secretary of Commerce as a turning point 
towards official acceptance of Keynesianism, Barber details how Hopkins 
brought in young academics sympathetic to this approach, how the president 
barely tolerated Thurman Arnold and his anti-trust movement, and how 
people like John K. Galbraith in the Office of Price Administration helped 
to mobilize America's wartime economy.  In the end, however, individuals 
like Galbraith left the New Deal.  In fact, Barber concluded that the Full 
Employment Act was more of a victory for the opponents of the Keynesian 
approach than one would have suspected.  Still, Keynesianism took hold 
after 1945 only after it had infiltrated the universities (p.  171).  
         
        How does one assess _Designs Within Disorder_?  On the positive 
side, Barber has provided a very interesting perspective on the importance 
of economic ideas and their champions/proponents at a critical moment in 
American history.  His coverage of the period, 1929-1947, is also very 
thorough.  He shows clearly how some economists perceived the _General 
Theory_ of Keynes and what reaction it received within and outside of the 
New Deal.  And, most importantly, Barber provides a very detailed and 
lucid exposition of Irving Fisher's ideas.  Yet, just as there are strong 
points in the study, there are some serious shortcomings.  Barber's use of 
primary sources is limited at best.  He tends to take too many ideas and 
quotes out of secondary works, some of which are rather dated.  He also 
has a tendency to reiterate traditional interpretations almost without 
question.  This is particularly true in his characterization of New 
Dealers such as Rexford Tugwell.  However, the more serious problems deal 
with the individuals on whom he concentrates.  Barber spends almost all of 
his time on individuals who were either on the outside of the New Deal 
looking in or who were on the inside of the New Deal but not very 
influential. The best example here is Irving Fisher.  While the author's 
analysis of Fisher is quite good, the fact remains that Fisher never had a 
role or position within the New Deal nor did any New Dealer in a position 
of authority even listen to him.  Barber, moreover, fails to recognize the 
changing political environment within the New Deal itself.  He never even 
mentions individuals like Ben Cohen or Thomas Corcoran and the impact they 
had on the president, especially in the way they filtered people and ideas 
that they wanted Roosevelt to meet or hear about.  Finally, Barber credits 
Roosevelt with so much in terms of providing economists with an 
opportunity to influence policy, but the president himself is seldom even 
mentioned, no less analyzed in terms of his own thinking on what these 
economists were telling him and his close advisors.  Somehow, Roosevelt is 
lost amidst the intellectual environment that Barber has created.  
 
        Nevertheless, although these shortcomings are serious, they do not 
negate the overall contributions that _Designs Within Disorder_ make. 
William Barber has written an interesting work on the importance of 
economic thinking during the Great Depression years.  In so doing, his 
efforts remain worthwhile. 
 
Michael V. Namorato 
Department of History 
University of Mississippi 
 
Michael V. Namorato is author of _Rexford G. Tugwell: A Biography_ (1988). 
 
 
Copyright (c) 1997 by EH.Net and H-Net, all rights reserved.  This work 
may be copied for non-profit educational use if proper credit is given to 
the author and the list.  For other permission, please contact 
[log in to unmask] (Robert Whaples, Book Review Editor, EH.Net.  
Telephone: 910-758-4916. Fax: 910-758-6028.)  
 
============ FOOTER TO HES POSTING ============ 
For information, send the message "info HES" to [log in to unmask]