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[NOTE: The following four messages were posted on Eh.Res in response to my  
cross-posting of the Polanyi messages. I have compiled them into one  
message here.-- RBE] 
 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
Part of what Polanyi was focusing on was the role of markets for LABOR, 
not just commodities.  In every society in which the main dividing line 
was between free man and bonded man (slave or serf), the role of the labor 
market in assigning status to individuals, and life-chances to families, 
was minimal. 
 
One can find examples in Ancient Greece, in Rome, in Florence, in 
Muscovy, and throughout Japan, China, and Europe, of INDIVIDUALS who made 
fortunes in commerce and rose in society.  But one cannot find, prior to 
the 19th century, any society in which the MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION'S 
STATUS AND LIFE-CHANCES WERE DETERMINED BY THEIR SUCCESS IN A FREE MARKET 
FOR LABOR. One has to find societies in which serfdom and slavery were 
absent, in which hereditary nobles played no significant role, and in 
which not only urban, but rural markets, were so developed that commercial 
farmers predominated over peasants (who bought and sold regularly, of 
course, but who did not depend mainly on labor markets for their income.) 
 
So if, in reading Polanyi, one takes his assertion to mean that there was 
never a society in which free labor was the dominant mode of acquiring an 
income prior to, say, mid-to-late 19th century Britain, he was 
unproblematically right. 
 
There is a separate question of whether labor markets should be considered 
the dominant factor in assessing whether MARKETS as such dominated the 
economy, but for Polanyi (as well as for MI Finley and Karl Marx), labor 
was the heart of the economy, and the dominance of free labor was THE 
distinguishing feature of modern economies. 
 
Regards, 
Jack A. Goldstone 
 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
Polanyi's [and Finley's] theses on no-market organization  in TRADE AND 
MARKETS IN THE EARLY EMPIRES have long since been totally disconfirmed by 
one and all aracheological digs and analyses. 
 
Interestingly enough, Polanyi himself seems to have seen the error of his 
earlier ways when he wrote [published post-humously in 1975 and 1977, the 
latter in the already cited LIVELYHOOD OF MAN] "throughout, the external 
origin of trade is conpicuous; internal trade is largely derivative of 
external trade....Acquisition of goods from a distance may be practiced 
by a trader either from  [status motive] ...or for the sake of gain 
[]rpfit motive] .... There are many combinations of the two". 
 
I submit that however that Polanyi's GREAT TRANSFORMATION has also been 
disconfirmed. It never took place, asnd certainly not  in or because of 
Europe in the late 18th - 19th centuries. In fact, Europe was a late-comer 
in all this commercialization, etc. which had long since reigned all over 
Asia. 
 
[NOTE: Frank's argument regarding the eurocentricism of economic history  
was recently discussed in depth in a Eh.Res forum. -- RBE] 
 
Micheal P: you better look again [and iu offer to send you edvidence]. 
but glad to find you off your accustomed PEN-L stamping grounds. 
 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
I'm a complete outsider to this topic (I do trade theory and political 
economy), but I read with interest the brief debate about whether there 
was a real "market economy" in pre-modern times.  Someone suggested that 
although grain prices (for example) clearly fluctuated in the "market," 
market prices may not have reached very far into the economy since most 
grain didn't pass through a cash process.  The natural conclusion one 
might draw from this argument is that the ratio of cash transactions to 
non-cash spending gives some measure of the importance of the market. 
 
I find this questionable on a number of levels.  I can easily imagine a 
situation in which the residual market (the cash sector) and the non-cash 
sector (barter and home production/consumption) are intimately connected 
in some sort of simultaneous equations process.  In this reading, all 
demands and all supplies affect, and are affected by, market prices.  The 
ratio of cash to non-cash transactions thus becomes an irrelevant 
artifact.  On the other hand, if pre-modern economies were extreme 
examples of a dual-economy, then the ratio might be a more valuable 
indicator of something.  But this requires some implicit assumptions that 
may not be tenable.  In such an economy  values (not prices) in the 
hinterlands must be disconnected from prices in (urban) markets by more 
than simple transportation costs.  My gut-level intuition suggests this is 
not the case in the mediterranean economy. 
 
David H. Feldman 
College of William and Mary 
 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
Michael P. Lynch wrote: 
 
> Aside from Moses Finley [no small aside], I know of no historian or 
> economist who finds Polanyi's thesis credible. 
 
In fact there are some (eg Matthew Johnson's, The Archaeology of 
Capitalism, 1996) who would argue that even the high medieval economy was 
socially driven. However, most scholars would emphasise the increasing 
penetration of money in the economy of this period (e.g. R.S. Lopez, The 
Commercial Revolution of the Middle ages, 950-1350, 1976). The idea that 
the early medieval economy was not market-led has a long respectability- 
see George Duby's reworking of Mauss (The Early Growth of the European 
Economy: warriors and peasants from the seventh to tenth centuries, 
1979). There are  problems with Polanyi's thesis especially with his idea 
of a transition from a socially embedded  to a market economy. The idea of 
a socially embedded economy is surely an important one but are not all 
economies socially embedded to some degree. As the French marxist 
historian Guy Bois has pointed out factories can't exist without a 
conducive legal and political framework. Even in the modern economy gifts 
(e.g. inheritance) play a major role in wealth creation. I think that a 
study of the public building of modern Paris would be a poor guide to the 
French economy, reflecting rather the ambitions of its Presidents, I 
particularly like Barbara Rosenwein's idea of a spectrum from gift to 
market economy rather than an abrupt transition with most economies having 
elements of the 'other' within them. (see her: To be the Neighbour of St. 
Paul: the social meaning of Cluny's property 909- 1049, 1989). Her study 
of the Cluny charters suggests a jump along the spectrum in the 10th 
century. Until this point land was given to cement social relationships, 
rather than sold. However, by the year 1000 an inflationary land market 
was emerging where land was bought and sold in order to build and sustain 
power. The discovery of silver in the Harz Mts. of Saxony in the 960s and 
subsequent rise in the availability of money, was probably a key element 
in the precise chronology though it would be foolish to argue for a 
monocausal explanation. The idea of an embedded economy found in the work 
of Polanyi and  Mauss remains a useful one. Nevertheless we don't have to 
take on board every nuance of the Great Transformation. 
 
Paul Courtney, Leicester, UK  
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