SHOE Archives

Societies for the History of Economics

SHOE@YORKU.CA

Options: Use Forum View

Use Monospaced Font
Show Text Part by Default
Show All Mail Headers

Message: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]
Topic: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]
Author: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]

Print Reply
Subject:
From:
[log in to unmask] (Michael J. Oliver)
Date:
Fri Mar 31 17:18:40 2006
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (81 lines)
----------------- HES POSTING ----------------- 
Brad Bateman and others are right to highlight the problems associated with 
defining the word 'monetarism'. Because of this, considerable care needs to 
be taken when describing what happened in the UK under Margaret Thatcher as 
a 'monetarist experiment'. 
 
For instance, in spite of the instinct of Lady Thatcher, the authorities 
never attempted to control the supply of money by controlling the reserve 
base of the banking system (as the North American and Swiss schools of 
monetarism argued they should), and they only paid lip service to 
controlling the demand for money. They did attempt some control over the 
counterparts of broad money through overfunding, but this led to all sorts 
of problems. Operating on the counterparts of broad money is peculiar to 
the UK and is best considered as a supplement to demand-side control. 
 
In short, as I have argued in a recently published book written with Gordon 
Pepper ("Monetarism Under Thatcher: Lessons for the Future", Edward Elgar 
and Institute of Economic Affairs, 2001), the experiment in the 1980s was 
mainly an exercise in political monetarism. 
 
Perhaps a fifth area of investigation (following Robert Leeson's existing 
four) is to determine whether the implementation of monetarism anywhere in 
the world has ever matched Friedman's expectations. Unlike Keynes, who did 
not live to see some of the atrocities his disciples carried out in his 
name, Friedman has had many opportunities to comment on some of the 
practical implementations of monetarism. 
 
Consider the case of the UK. There is one important piece of evidence that 
Friedman gave to the Treasury and Civil Service Committee's, "Memoranda on 
Monetary Policy" in 1980, when he was very clear that he was unimpressed 
with the decision by the UK authorities to use fiscal policy as a means of 
influencing interest rates for a given money target: 
 
'I could hardly believe my eyes when I read, in the first paragraph of the 
summary chapter [of the Green Paper "Monetary Control"], 'the principal 
means of controlling the growth of the money supply must be fiscal policy - 
both public expenditure and tax policy - and interest rates'. Interpreted 
literally, this sentence is simply wrong. Only a Rip Van Winkle, who had 
not read any of the flood of literature during the past decade and more on 
the money supply process, could possibly have written that sentence.' 
 
Friedman's reservations were also shared by other monetarist economists, 
who supported monetarism in principle, but were dismayed to find that the 
Thatcher government merely intended to continue the political monetarism of 
the previous (Labour) administration, rather than undertake a radical 
reform and implement monetary base control (a la Friedman). Many of these 
initial supporters in the UK were also turned off monetarism by the savage 
recession that accompanied the first two years of the Thatcher government. 
In the UK case, it is also worth investigating why some key economists, who 
had excellent monetarist credentials, were shunned in 1980 when they argued 
that monetary policy was too tight. Equally, why monetary base control was 
never implemented in the UK is a fascinating story, and is probably largely 
the result of the vested interests of the UK banking system. 
 
As for the US monetarist experiment under Paul Volcker - as another 
contributor has already noted - this is a misnomer. Monetarism under 
Volcker was also demand-side control of the monetary base. The Fed had 
developed an equation for bank reserves and used it to forecast banks' 
demand for reserves. They then altered interest rates by the appropriate 
amount to bring banks' demand for reserves into line with the target for 
reserves. Because of the lag before changes in the Federal Funds rate 
affects banks' demand for reserves, the mechanism was bound to be unstable 
and wild fluctuations in both interest rates and reserves could be 
expected. Poole (1982) gives an authoritative description. 
 
On a final note, there is often loose talk (and writing!) that describes 
everything that Lady Thatcher did in the economic sphere as 'monetarist'. 
This is simply not the case, and the term 'economic Thatcherism' or 
'Thatcher's economics' is far better (although more clumsy). On the 
economic front, the 1980s were a time when a cocktail of political 
monetarism, supply-side economics and public choice theory was applied to 
the UK economy. 
 
Michael J. Oliver 
Bates College 
 
 
------------ FOOTER TO HES POSTING ------------ 
For information, send the message "info HES" to [log in to unmask] 
 

ATOM RSS1 RSS2