----------------- HES POSTING ----------------- 
Pat, 
 
I'm a bit late getting started today, and at random I started with your 
posting. 
 
I would agree with you that for the most part, it is very difficult to 
enter the "club of economists" if you don't accept the reality of the 
utility conception of motivation. 
I manage to slip by the gate keepers.  Why would I raise any question about 
the issue?  Well, there is a distinguished linage of folks who have raised 
questions about this.  Joan Robinson for one,  Keynes for another, and then 
there is Veblen.  According to L. Robbins only the ignorant and the 
perverse entertain any such doubts, but I don't see that one needs to be 
ignorant to have doubts.  Perverse, well maybe. 
 
The standard version of choice theory has been the marginal utility fable. 
But, the fable generates some persistent anomalies-- the Giffen paradox for 
example. I've developed an alternative choice model using control theory 
that explains the Giffen paradox, and a number of other anomalies.  (The 
compensated demand function, contrary to common belief doesn't solve the 
Giffen issue.)   And, under most circumstances a control theory price 
theoretic model generates results that are very similar to, but not 
precisely,  those of orthodox price theory.  That is, _most_ demand 
functions slope downward. 
 
Control theory has in the last decade or so become one of the theoretical 
foundations of biology.  So, if we give any credit to Marx, Marshall and 
Veblen who suggested that the future of economics would be connected to 
developments in biology, it would be natural to suspect that control theory 
might have fundamental implications for theoretical economics. 
 
The usual test for a new conception is first does it explain an interesting 
anomaly, and then does it provide an explanation for the "normal cases" 
which are thought to be adequately explained by the existing theory. 
Control theory appears to do so. 
 
Bill Williams 
 
 
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