I would like to make a comment about the argument presented in Michael  
Lusztig's, _The Limits of Protectionism_ that was recently reviewed by  
Anthony Patrick O'Brien.   
[http://eh.net/pipermail/hes/2004-December/002741.html] 
 
I write because the argument in Lustig's book appears necessarily  
convoluted. There appear to be serious difficulties with the argument  
presented, difficulties that were not addressed by O'Brien. 
 
Lustig begins with an apparent dichotomy, if legislators are held  
captive by special interests, why have legal changes in recent decades  
generally supported free trade, which apparently would hurt those  
special interest groups? 
 
To quote O'Brien, "In Lustzig's view legislators are corrupt, their  
votes for sale to the highest bidder, and so tend to favor protection.  
On the other hand, heads of government -- presidents and prime ministers  
-- favor liberalizing trade because they are either beneficent social  
planners or because they reap the political benefits of the more  
efficient economies that result from free trade." 
 
It seems this argument requires two distinct pools of politicians, those  
who run for offices in legislature and those that run for heads of  
government. 
 
Does this seem even remotely plausible? There would need to be one bad  
group of politicians and another good group of politicians. The division  
between bad and good politicians would also need to be synchronized with  
the division of politicians into those who favor protectionism vs. those  
who favor freer trade. 
 
Good politicians would always be selfless and support free trade. Bad  
politicians would always be captive of special interests and support  
protectionism. 
 
If you want to accept the public choice argument, wouldn't the logical  
conclusion be that the politician's votes are bought by the most  
powerful and wealthy interests, and that those interests on balance  
favor globalization? While some businesses or interest groups may favor  
protectionism, they are not as influential and powerful as those who  
favor new trading rules?  Thus, the politicians that run for and gain  
the highest offices are merely being paid by the most powerful interest  
groups. 
 
While the implications are much less pleasant for proponents of new  
trade rules, this at least seems to be an easier way of resolving the  
dichotomy presented by Lusztigs. 
 
Eric Hake