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Date: | Fri Mar 31 17:18:52 2006 |
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I agree with Evelyn that there are special feminist
applications of economic theory. Her point is that
females, in general, have preferences (and/or
perceived opportunities) that differ from males. There
are also presumably male applications of economic
theory. If this is all there is to feminist economics,
then one could specialize in this subject by first
learning economic theory and then learning about the
special preferences or perceived opportunities of
females. The same would presumably be true of a
Chinese economics and a ghetto economics. As I recall,
development economics is sometimes presented partly as
an application of economic theory to the special
tastes and perception of opportunities of people in
less developed areas. But isn't there something else?
Do females have different choice-making techniques?
Are they more or less "entrepreneurial" than males?
More or less technical? More or less inclined toward
non-market interaction?
Regarding Roy's response to Larry, it is easy to
define "better" in the hard sciences because we can
measure without attaching values. We can easily find
out whether a Ferrari can travel faster than the
Toyota or farther on a tank of petrol. In social
science, we must choose values in order to define
"better." Traditionally the values in economics have
been broadly utilitarian. This is why the economists
of the late 19th century developed a model of a market
economy in which the value of a thing or action can be
traced to the wants of individuals in the role of the
consumer, via opportunity costs perceived by
individuals in the role of the entrepreneur who know
how to produce goods. This model dominates the
textbooks today, which suggests that economists still
adhere to broadly utilitarian values.
Of course, it is possible to develop an economics
based on different values. For example, people could
propose that government policy X would be more likely
to achieve eternal bliss according to the words in the
Holy Book or in the writings of a revered ancestor.
The logic and relevance of such an argument could be
evaluated in the same way that economists evaluate the
logic and relevance of arguments that policy X is in
the interest of individuals in their role as
consumers. But what is the point? Are there other
standards for defining "better" that could compete
with utilitarianism that are not merely modifications
of it or supplements to it? Would an economics that
completely neglected consumer utility be economics?
Pat Gunning
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