------------ EH.NET BOOK REVIEW -------------- 
Published by EH.NET (September 2004) 
 
Pierre Force, _Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy ofEconomic 
Science_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. ix +279 pp. 
$65/=A345 (hardcover), ISBN: 0-521-83060-5. 
 
Reviewed for EH.NET by Gloria Vivenza, Facolt=E0 di Economia,Dipartimento 
di Economie Societ=E0 Istituzioni, Universit=E0 di Verona,Italy. 
 
 
In the past few decades, a growing literature on Adam Smith as 
moralphilosopher has been added to the rich series of studies devoted 
toSmith as economist; the result has been a renewed attention to theproblem 
of the relationship between Smith's two main works. 
 
Pierre Force, Professor of French at Columbia University in New York,a 
scholar with a literary training and author of works on Pascal 
andMoli=E8re, tackles in this book a subject which is both ambitious 
andsomeway limited. Ambitious for the self-evident relevance of 
theargument; limited by relying perhaps too much on Albert Hirschman's_The 
Passions and the Interests_ as a source of inspiration. Thewell-known work 
is proclaimed to be the author's "greatestintellectual debt," but sometimes 
one would appreciate that it may beless present. In what follows, I will 
limit myself to examining oneaspect of Force's interpretation of Smith's 
thought, namely itsconnection with the classics -- although this means that 
myillustration of the work will not be exhaustive. 
 
The main purpose of the volume is to single out the "firstprinciples" of 
Adam Smith's system in order to investigate if thecommon opinion grounding 
the _Wealth of Nations_ (WN) onself-interest can stand the test. To effect 
this check the authorengages in a thorough analysis of the philosophical 
and psychologicalbases of the _Theory of Moral Sentiments_ (TMS), compared 
with thoseof two authors on whose work Smith expressed some 
reservations:Mandeville and Rousseau. 
 
Some key concepts are examined at the beginning: the opening passagesof TMS 
are related to a passage of Mandeville where it is claimedthat everyone, 
even a criminal, feels piety in front of an atrociousscene. The 
disinterestedness of Mandeville's pity and of Smith'ssympathy leads Force 
to connect the latter with the former, becausehe reduces Smith's concept of 
pity to "an empirical illustration ...of the psychological phenomenon that 
Smith subsequently proposes tocall sympathy" (pp. 15-16). In the 
immediately following pages,"pity" and "sympathy" are used almost 
interchangeably. Now, acomparison can be made between homogeneous objects: 
I think itinappropriate to connect Mandeville's "pity" and Smith's 
"sympathy."Smith would have accepted Mandeville's definition of pity 
andcompassion as "fellow-feeling and condolence for the misfortunes 
andcalamities of others" (quoted at p. 15), but he makes clear that 
tohimself "sympathy" is something _more_ than pity. Although he isaware 
that the original meaning of sympathy is participation in theothers' pain 
or sorrow, he says that he wants to use the term toindicate "our fellow 
feeling with any passion whatever," using "pityand compassion" only for the 
sympathy with the sorrow of others (TMSI.i.1.5, cf also I.iii.1.1). Given 
the asymmetry in Force'scomparison, it is not surprising that he is obliged 
later to considercounterintuitive, straining or paradoxical the passages 
where Smithsays that we sympathize more easily with the joy than with the 
sorrowof others (pp. 165 and 168). 
 
In the book, the history of the idea of self-interest is illustratedby 
opposing an "interest doctrine" of Epicurean-Augustinian origin,based on 
the concept that every human action is self-interested evenif seemingly 
unselfish (altruism may be an autogratification, so tospeak), to an 
"harmony of interests doctrine" of Stoic origin whichpresupposes a concord 
of interests between individual and society. 
 
The connection between Epicurus and St Augustine is achieved by meansof 
Gassendi, obviously; and perhaps does not take enough intoconsideration the 
rich seventeenth-century literature which stressedEpicurus' religiousness. 
The problem naturally is that Epicureanphilosophy was considered atheist, 
but really it would be better tosay that it was inconsistent with 
Christianity. This is why thecomparison between Epicurus and St Augustine 
is perplexing, despitethe author's warning in proposing it. His frequent 
use of words like'neoStoic' and 'neoEpicurean' makes it clear that he 
alludes to themodern developments of the ancient doctrines; and he is 
certainly notwrong in searching for a relationship between them and 
Christianreligion: but the problem was just that. It is impossible for 
ancientphilosophies to come to terms with concepts like original sin 
orGod's grace. For the Stoics, medieval and modern thought hadestablished a 
similarity (though more seeming than real) with aconcept of Providence; but 
the Epicureans, although they did not denythe gods' existence, notoriously 
believed that they were notinterested in human affairs: a position which 
for Christian religionwas perhaps worse than atheism. 
 
Pierre Force recalls that the "first principle" of the Epicureans 
ispleasure, whereas for the Stoics it is virtue; nonetheless, it 
seemseasier to connect Christianity with Epicurean hedonism than withStoic 
virtue. Why so? The true reason is that Stoic virtue can dowithout God and 
His grace; but this criticism could be made only bySt Augustine, obviously 
-- the Epicureans were not so different fromthe Stoics under this aspect. 
To reconcile the ancient doctrine withChristian principles it was necessary 
to distort Epicurus' pleasureby identifying it with virtue and love for 
God; just as the Stoics'cosmic order was interpreted in terms of divine 
Providence. These"compromises" had certainly a long tradition and were well 
alive inSmith's time; I feel it unnecessary to add a new one by 
connectingEpicurus with St Augustine. 
 
Space does not allow an accurate report of Force's argumentation. 
Heconsiders Smith's position Stoic for its consistency with the"harmony of 
interests doctrine" connected with a providential design;and Smith's 
adherence to "propriety" instead of "prudence" confirmshis anti-Epicurean 
stance. Force thinks that many problems aroused bySmith's works come from 
the fact that his Stoicism has been analyzedwith Epicurean instruments, 
namely the interest doctrine. 
 
The basic elements of Smith's psychology are examined in closeconnection 
with Rousseau's thought (also D. Winch should beconsidered an intellectual 
debt), but not only: on this point myreview cannot do justice to the book. 
The main character of Force'sanalysis seems to me an attention to 
ambivalence in Smith's mainconcepts: sympathy is a natural instinct, but it 
involves reasonsince it is a form of identification with another person; 
the desireof bettering our conditions although treated as innate 
andinstinctive is also rational; even the self-love of WN is considereda 
motive only because it is used as an argument to _persuade_ toexchange. 
What we have of selfishness obeys God's or nature'srational design. Force's 
strategy consists in stressing the rationalcalculation in self-interest, 
rather than its instinctual aspect; andthe same happens to all human 
propensities which characterizeeconomic behavior. 
 
That Smith integrates instinctive tendencies and reason I cannot butagree; 
Force however seems oriented towards reducing the role ofnatural instincts 
and ruling out the "selfish hypothesis" even fromeconomic conduct. For 
instance, "vanity," not self-love is the motiveof our efforts for bettering 
our conditions; a desire which Forcedescribes as exclusively addressed to 
gain the others' considerationand esteem rather than to improve material 
condition (wealth is asource of approbation, and as such it is sought for). 
Thisinterpretation is grounded on a single passage in TMS 
(I.iii.2.1)frequently repeated, and seems to be caused mainly by the 
necessityto find in Smith a correspondent to Rousseau's amour propre. 
 
Smith notoriously maintains that it is nature's (useful) deceptionwhich 
brings us to admire wealthy people: by this conclusion herepudiates the 
'philosophical' contempt previously expressed fortaking pains in order to 
acquire a position. That this 'deception' isa cause of the "corruption of 
our moral sentiments" (TMS I.iii.3.1)is evident to Smith, but nonetheless 
it is also evident to us that heconsiders it useful for maintaining the 
distinction of ranks and theorder in society, let alone for stimulating 
man's activity. We maydiscuss if it is true that Smith does not distinguish 
between"economic concerns ... and the symbolic goal of securing esteem 
andconsideration" (p. 180): after all, he wrote that the "accommodation"of 
the industrious peasant is much better than that of the Africanking -- and 
there is no doubt that the latter received more esteemand consideration 
than the former, at least in his own socialmilieu.1 But vanity can only be 
originated in a passive sympathy, soto speak (the desire for _receiving_ 
sympathy); and to be the objectof sympathy in this sense is only possible 
through that generaldisposition which mankind has to sympathize with joy 
(and wealth)that Force finds difficult to explain. 
 
As regards Smith's position about passions and interests, I do notknow 
whether he was aware to speak of them "not as antonyms, but 
asnear-synonyms" (p. 157). It would not be strange, individualinterests 
_were_ egoistic passions in much of the traditionalliterature. The 
alternative "passions _versus_ interests" was bornlater, although there is 
something true in Stephen Holmes'observation that "the attempt to repress 
violent passions byappealing to material interest" is not so modern and 
untraditional asHirschman represents it.2 
 
Smith dealt straightforwardly with the problem: he did not shareHutcheson's 
opinion that self-interest spoils the merit of an action.He affirms that 
self-love can be the motive of a virtuous action, andthat a man who does 
not give "the proper attention to the objects ofself-interest" (TMS 
VII.ii.3.16) has to be disapproved. Smith'sapproach is to give moral 
dignity to self-interest, giving it theright place among human motivations, 
rather than to remove it fromthe explanatory principles of economic 
behavior. The fact that'Epicurean' prudence must be employed to better 
one's conditiondepends on the fact that it is the best means for this; it 
is avirtue, although a minor one, and nothing gives occasion, in 
Smith'sdescription, to infer that the prudent man's desire to improve 
hiscondition is originated in vanity rather than in the care of himself. 
 
So I do not think that Smith rejects Epicureanism so thoroughly asPierre 
Force believes; probably because I find that Smith'sEpicureanism is near 
enough to the (ancient) source, not interwovenwith St Augustine's doctrine 
as proposed in the book. 
 
Despite the narrowness of this review, Force's book has the merit 
ofillustrating the wide ranging relations of Smith's thought to that ofmany 
other modern authors. Sometimes, however, this seems toovershadow Smith's 
originality. An instance of this is the treatmentof Smith's 
'republicanism,' which is a matter too debated byscholarship to be dealt 
with here. Force's interpretation, however,avoids the main issues usually 
connected with the problem: therelationship between 
republican/jurisprudential paradigms, betweenvirtue and duty, rights and 
virtues, and so on. It seems that Smith'srepublicanism simply derived from 
his sharing of Rousseau's criticismof modern commercial society, with 
rejection of the reason of statetheory and of the countervailing passions 
doctrine. 
 
I am certainly willing to admit that Rousseau was an importantinterlocutor 
for Smith as Pierre Force maintains. But Smith had noneed to "appropriate" 
another's view, not even if the other was agreat mind like the philosopher 
of Geneva. 
 
Notes: 
 
1. I had already written these words when I read J. Hurtado 
Prieto's"Bernard Mandeville's Heir: Adam Smith or Jean Jacques Rousseau 
onthe Possibility of Economic Analysis," _European Journal of theHistory of 
Economic Thought_, 11:1, 2004, p.21. The article, thoughreaching different 
conclusions, shares Pierre Force's (and others')approach of analyzing the 
relationship of Smith's thought withMandeville's and Rousseau's. 
 
2. S. Holmes, "The Secret History of Self-Interest," in 
_BeyondSelf-Interest_, edited by Jane J. Mansbridge, Chicago, 1990, p. 340. 
 
 
Gloria Vivenza's recently published works include _Adam Smith and 
theClassics_, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
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