------------ EH.NET BOOK REVIEW -------------- 
Published by EH.NET (January 2005) 
 
Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, _The Not So Wild, Wild West:  
Property Rights on the Frontier_. Stanford: Stanford University  
Press, 2004. xii + 263 pp. $24.95 (hardcover), ISBN: 0-8047-4854-3. 
 
Reviewed for EH.NET by Frank D. Lewis, Department of Economics,  
Queen's University. 
 
 
Implicit in economic transactions is the understanding that the  
parties will fulfill the terms of the exchange to which they have  
agreed. Government is often the agent that enforces contracts, but  
where government is weak or non-existent, other enforcement  
mechanisms may emerge. The use of common property resources also may  
require an authority, whether a government entity or a substitute, to  
help ensure that the exploitation of the resource does become a  
"tragedy of the commons." 
 
Economic activity on the U.S. frontier during the nineteenth century  
took place in an environment where government was largely absent.  
Nevertheless, the West, as described by Terry Anderson and P J. Hill,  
was not nearly as "wild" as has been depicted by some historians and  
by Hollywood. According to Anderson and Hill, the key to the  
successful and, by and large, peaceful enforcement of contracts, as  
well as the generally peaceful exploitation of what at the outset  
were common access resources, was the emergence of a set of rules,  
both formal and informal, that assigned property rights to agents  
operating in this new economy. Drawing on their own work and the work  
of others, Anderson and Hill illustrate how participants in the  
frontier economy avoided conflict, always a negative sum game, while  
securing the property rights that promoted the optimal resource  
exploitation. The stories that fill this book -- and despite a few  
references to statistical and econometric work, Anderson and Hill do  
present them as stories -- describe the practical problems that  
confronted those on the frontier, and the often ingenious ways they  
had of solving them. 
 
Despite the lack of a formal government structure, Native Americans  
developed a range of property rights to resources that they jointly  
exploited. Following in the tradition of Harold Demsetz, Anderson and  
Hill emphasize the comparison between the cost of establishing a  
property right and the benefit of that right to the Native economy.  
Bison, for example, were so numerous until the nineteenth century  
that there was little advantage to assigning rights to them; but once  
groups of Natives jointly hunted the animals, often using buffalo  
jumps, a method that required coordinated action, rights to the meat  
and hides were specified even to the extent of allotting larger  
shares to those who took on more important or more dangerous roles.  
By contrast, salmon were at serious risk of over-harvesting because  
of the comparative ease with which they could be fished once they  
entered the rivers or streams that led to their spawning grounds.  
Tribes in the Pacific Northwest reacted by establishing property  
rights to the salmon runs even to the level of the family, a system  
that promoted conservation of the stocks. 
 
European settlers to the frontier were faced with much the same  
problem that had long confronted Native Americans -- the lack of a  
central authority to assign and enforce property rights. From 1840 to  
1860, nearly 300,000 traveled overland to Oregon, California and  
Utah, most by wagon train; and to fill the government void each group  
adopted a set of rules, a "constitution-like agreement," that  
specified the terms of the passage. For example, individuals often  
combined their property, such as cooking materials, while on the  
trail, but they retained ownership and these goods were remitted once  
the train reached its destination. The emigrants themselves created  
and enforced the contracts and, as Anderson and Hill describe it, the  
result was a large relocation of population that was relatively free  
of conflict. 
 
The cattle drives of the late nineteenth century required contracts  
between cattle owners and drovers that addressed the problem of  
monitoring. And where there was the more serious problem of contact  
with farmers, means were found to avoid violence. Cattle-trader  
Joseph McCoy, went to great lengths to ensure peace with the  
residents of Salina, Kansas and others close to the cattle route by  
compensating them for losses and offering other benefits. The  
potential for violence among Europeans was perhaps greatest during  
the initial years of gold mining. Yet even the 1859 discovery of the  
Comstock Lode in Nevada was largely peaceful. At first, there were a  
variety of privately-enforced regulations; but ultimately, as issues  
became too complex, disputes were increasingly brought to territorial  
courts. As well, the Nevada legislature became involved, passing 47  
mineral-rights laws between 1861 and 1866. 
 
Anderson and Hill's history of the West also includes the development  
of water rights, where they give more emphasis to the role of  
government, a role that was not always positive, especially as it  
related to irrigation projects. There is a provocative account  
(though I find it persuasive) of the near extinction of the bison;  
and a discussion of federal land policy. And throughout, the common  
thread is the implications of property rights. 
 
_The Not So Wild, Wild West_ was developed in part from an economic  
history course the authors taught at Montana State University, and it  
should have special appeal to undergraduates. It is entirely  
accessible and often quite delightful. At the same time, those who  
adopt the book might wish to present students with other, more  
nuanced, interpretations. Anderson and Hill make a strong case that,  
in the absence of a government authority, property rights regimes  
emerged that allowed for the functioning, at least at some level, of  
a variety of frontier institutions. But how efficient were these  
institutions? Could a government authority have improved efficiency?  
Did the lack of a strong central authority seriously hamper some  
aspects of development? How much violence was there on the frontier?  
The historical examples in _The Not So Wild, Wild West_ seem to  
provide answers to these questions; but, given the selective nature  
of the evidence and the way the evidence has been interpreted, the  
appeal of the book -- and it is an appealing book -- may lie less in  
the authors' conclusions than in their ability to provoke a lively debate. 
 
Frank D. Lewis is editor (with David Eltis and Kenneth Sokoloff) of  
_Slavery in the Development of the Americas_ (Cambridge University  
Press, 2004). Recent articles include "Survival through Generosity:  
Property Rights and Hunting Practices of Native Americans in the  
Subarctic Region," in _Land Rights, Ethno-Nationality, and  
Sovereignty in History_, edited by Stanley Engerman and Jacob Metzer  
(Routledge, 2004). 
 
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