Subject: | |
From: | |
Date: | Fri Mar 31 17:18:53 2006 |
Content-Type: | text/plain |
Parts/Attachments: |
|
|
Anthony Waterman wrote:
> What is 'methodological individualism'? As I understand it, it is the
> working assumption that human social phenomena may be explained without
> remainder as the outcomes of action by individuals: and that any additional
> explanans (e.g. 'collective' plans, intentions etc., 'laws of history',
> 'general will' and so forth) are redundant.
> [snip]
> Why are we quarrelling about this? And how could it possibly need a defence?
My impression of the discussion over the working assumption of
individualism is about the degree to which 'the individual' is taken as
sui generis. Anthony Giddens addresses the question in "Critical Notes:
'Structural Sociology' and Methodological Individualism,"_The Constitution
of Society_ (207-221); his structuration theory is an effort to think
through the relationship between the individual and social structures.
A football team is a good illustration, I think, of how imbrication in
social structures involves a collective intention. The form of the
intention of the team is supplied by the rules of the game, the techniques
of play, etc. A team only becomes actualized, though, when the
individuals fully take on the team's intentions (to gain yardage, score
touchdowns, etc.) as being also their own personal goals to the extent
that they act as players to do what is necessary for the game. What
"collective" means in this usage is "shared"; it is not a group mind in an
organic sense, but in a communicative sense of the players' interactions
with each other. It's a type of division of labor for a common purpose.
Paul Turpin
|
|
|