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From:
[log in to unmask] (Ross B. Emmett)
Date:
Fri Mar 31 17:19:13 2006
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=================== HES POSTING ===================== 
 
NOTE FROM ROSS EMMETT: The following query was recently sent to me on the  
"Ask the Prof" service. I sent the query to three contemporary economic  
methodologists. The first to respond was Roger Backhouse; the other two  
(Bruce Caldwell and Wade Hands) sent responses that basically built upon  
Roger's response. Here are the original query and all three responses.  
Comments and questions which elaborate/challenge/expand/etc. the  
responses are welcome: 
 
++++++++++++++ 
 
ORIGINAL QUERY:  
 
Why is it that what Blaug call 'mainstream orthodox economics' is 
dominated by logical positivism?  Did Ricardo leave such a lasting 
impression that his methods have dominated for so long? Which economists 
were most influencal in the formation of the deductive economics 
methodology? 
 
++++++++++++++ 
 
[From Roger Backhouse] 
 
Bruce [Caldwell] is much better qualified to answer this than I am, but I  
would start by questioning the assumption that mainstream economics is  
dominated by logical positivism. LP is a very specific philosophical  
doctrine, developed in the 1930s, and I am sceptical about whether it  
dominates modern economics. Even the received view in the philosophy of  
science in the 1950s (and which inflenced economists such as Machlup) was  
not the same as LP. The term positivism is used in very many ways, only  
one of which is LP, and it is a term bedevilled by confusion. 
 
Being more specific, LP is a form of empiricism, in which the empirical 
foundations of theory are very important. Even to state this is to point 
out a big contrast with much modern economics. 
 
Having said this, there are features of modern economics that relate to 
the idea that it is influenced by LP - the separation of positive and 
normative questions, the idea that theory should relate to observable 
propositions. Here, one presumably has to find an explanation in the 1930s 
and the work of Hicks and Samuelson, which has been so influential. Their 
work is contemporaneous with the heyday of LP, but I do not know enough of 
their biographies to know whether there was a connection. Hicks's 
attitudes were influenced by Pareto, whose main work predates LP by 
several years. To understand Samuelson and Friedman, one needs to consider 
Henry Schultz and debates in the 1920s and 1930s over demand theory. If 
one were looking for philosophical roots it would be possible to find them 
in pragmatism (James and Dewey) as much as, if not more than, in LP. As 
for why the work of Hicks and Samuelson became so influential, that is a 
big question that I would not wish to answer briefly. So many things 
changed in economics between, say, 1930 and 1960 that I would be hesitant 
in providing a very simple story. 
 
Roger E. Backhouse 
Department of Economics 
University of Birmingham 
Email:   [log in to unmask] 
 
+++++++++++++++ 
 
Roger has sent me a copy of his reply, with which I agree and to which I 
have little to add. The inquirer may consult my _Beyond Positivism_ if he 
would like references to flesh out Roger's point that logical positivism 
is but one of the positivisms, and not as particularly important one for 
understanding economists' practice (though obviously the various 
positivist incarnations have influenced our rhetoric or our claims about 
our practice).  Blaug's _The Methodology of Economics_ discusses the 
methodological views of classical economists like Ricardo. But surely if 
one wants to understand why late 20th century economics is so deductive, 
one would look (as Roger suggests) at the influence of the Lausanne 
school (Walras and Pareto) via Hicks and Samuelson (see Weintraub on the 
Pareto kreis at Harvard in his _Stabalizing Dynamics_), and then the 
Wald, Karl Menger, Morgenstern et. al. influences regarding g.e. theory 
and game theory.  People like these, rather than Ricardians, are the more 
likely sources (except for Ricardo's influence via Sraffa on that 
particular version of post-Keynesianism).  
 
Bruce Caldwell 
Department of Economics 
University of North Carolina, Greensboro 
<[log in to unmask]> 
 
+++++++++++++++++++ 
 
Roger send me his comments and I think I would only disagree with one 
point.  I do think positivist ideas -- in a very broad and general way -- 
did influence the way that Samuelson et. al. thought about science (see my 
entry on "positivism" in the HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY).  This is 
not to say that their economics was consistent with, or that they even 
knew much about the details of, logical positivism (as Roger correctly 
says: "a very specific philosophical doctrine'), but rather that it formed 
a very general backdrop for what they viewed as "scientific" activities.  
They were "positivists" in the sense that most 19th century Americans were 
"Christians"; these can be true statements and yet have very few 
behavioral implications.  I think Samuelson, Cowles' people, Hicks, etc. 
are all different in this regard than Friedman, Knight, and other Chicago 
types. 
 
D. Wade Hands 
Department of Economics 
University of Puget Sound 
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