[Start of a new thread from message http://eh.net/pipermail/hes/2005-May/002988.html ]  
  
I find puzzling that nobody has challenged Roy's dogmatic assertions about what makes good
history of economics. While I am not entirely unsympathetic with some of the underlying
methodological sentiments, I am baffled by the lack of tolerance they express. Let me
note, first, that most of Roy's comments are appeals to authority. These should have a
more limited place in a reasonable discussion then he appears fond of. Second, while Ted
Porter may "regard" the "idea of a precursor" as a "category mistake" [it warms my
philosophic heart to see that quintessential analytic philosopher, Gilbert Ryle, have such
an enduring influence on methodology of other disciplines] in "the history of science" [no
doubt, if he is quoted accurately, Porter meant the "study of the history of science" or
"writing about the history science"], it can sometimes be quite useful, if not
entertaining, to learn about a (if not "the") precursor of a *concept*. Even though I am
very familiar with the intellectual
 pedigree of Porter's writings, it seems to me baffling that Porter (or Roy) would think
that the notion of a precursor could not find a home in the study of the intellectual
efforts of various societies. The projects by Koyre and Isaiah Berlin are, if not mine,
still highly stimulating to read. (The same goes for Schumpeter or, the still vital,
Blaug.) There are many different ways to shed light on scientific/disciplinary practices
and their conceptual tool-kits, present or past. For example, Kuhn's arguments about
incommensurability have not prevented the continued study (by historians and philosophers)
of the relationship between pre-Einsteinian or post-Einsteinian space-time theories. In
some quarters, John Earman has been thought to have decisively refuted Kuhn's arguments
(back in 1977, Journal of Philosophy). In my humble view, Earman shows (in the language of
economics) that there are significant trade-offs if we try to hold a concept constant when
we attempt to translate
 between two different theories.   
   
Moreover, why should economics belongs to the history of science and not, say, the history
of political thought or philosophy? I suspect it is only if one accepts i) the continued
vitality (and plausibility) of a normative/positive distinction in economics [and, if you
forgive one ad-hominem: how a follower of Kuhn -- recall theory-ladeness of observation --
can accept this particular distinction is beyond me], and ii) that economics aims at and
produces "knowledge" can this claim be defended. I admire the attempts by Roy (and some of
his intellectual cohorts in HES) to legislate a definitive answer on this issue. But I am
afraid that I am not yet persuaded that Roy (or Ted Porter) have offered a normative
account that the history of economics is and ought to be regarded as a history of science,
even if some of the tools popular in at least one segment of history of science may well
be illuminating when applied to history of economics (and the history of political
economy). It is
 worth nothing that within the history of science, Ted Porter's methodological strictures
have already started to show diminishing returns if only because so many of his peers who
share his approach to history of science seem to lack the technical knowledge to
understand and describe their subject matter not only as a material culture, but as
science. By contrast the very recent Cambridge Companion to Newton (edited by I.B. Cohen
and George Smith), shows that even very old-fashioned history and philosophy of science
can teach us lots of important stuff on that evergreen, Newton.
   
But let me note on an end of tolerance. Sometimes we should focus on "contextualizing a
term;" other times, we should thrace the concept with less regard to context. What makes
the study of history of economics (and political economy) to this partial outsider so
fascinating, is precisely that very different approaches to it can flourish and still
converse with each other.  Shameless plug: (the noted, and I believe, well-regarded
historian of economics) Leon Montes and I have been editing a forthcoming (Routledge)
collection of papers on New Voices on Adam Smith. Our contributors come from many
different disciplines: Economics, History, Philosophy, Women's Studies, Political Theory,
Science Studies, Environmental Ethics, Sociology, and English Literature, as well as
different countries: US, Chile, Columbia, Scotland, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, and
Italy. (Incidentally, Montes' contribution to the volume offers a subtle and deflationary
account of the differing notions of an
 equilibrium in Newton, Adam Smith, and later economic theory.) This diversity enriches us
all. Come on, Roy, relax and enjoy it, too.
   
Warmest,  
Eric Schliesser