------------ EH.NET BOOK REVIEW --------------  
Published by EH.NET (June 2005)  
  
Graeme Donald Snooks, _The Collapse of Darwinism, or The Rise of a   
Realist Theory of Life_. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. xv   
+ 341 pp. $80 (hardcover), ISBN: 0-7391-0613-9.  
  
Reviewed for EH.NET by Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Business Studies,   
University of Hertfordshire.  
  
  
Graeme Donald Snooks -- an economist by training now at the Institute   
of Advanced Studies at the Australian National University --   
proclaims that Darwinism has failed in explaining both biological   
speciation and the development of human society. Alongside this   
apparently devastating critical blow against much of modern science,   
he also expounds his own 'theory of life.' This he claims can   
'completely ... as possible' explain developments and events such as   
speciation, the end of the dinosaurs, 'the dynamics of human   
civilization as well as the dynamics of nature,' 'why we are not   
smarter than we are,' and 'the future of life as well as its past'   
(p. 197).  
  
The book divides into three parts. The first two parts discuss   
Darwinism and its alleged collapse. The third part proposes his   
'dynamic-strategy view of life.' Snooks claims a scientific   
'breakthrough' establishing 'general laws that can explain the   
origins and dynamics of the real world' (p. 279). Scientific modesty   
does not seem to be his strongest suit.  
  
Much of Snooks' positive attempt to discover an alternative universal   
explanation of long-term dynamic change has been developed before, in   
no less than eight books published since 1993, in which he has   
previously discussed 'the forces of historical change,' 'longrun   
dynamics,' 'the sources of global change,' 'the laws of history,' 'a   
general economic and political theory,' and 'a general theory of   
economic development,' to cite phrases from their titles and   
subtitles.  
  
By elaborating his own view of appropriate scientific procedure,   
Snooks attempts both to undermine Darwinism and to develop guidelines   
to erect his own theory. His course of action is to present the   
wave-like patterns of development over millions of years as data, and   
then somehow to derive the 'laws' that explain these patterns.  
  
Given that Snooks bases both his negative critique of Darwinism and   
his positive attempt to build an alternative theory on his views   
concerning the correct scientific method, his views on the philosophy   
and methodology of science are discussed here. I shall then move on   
to discuss his critique of Darwinism and his alternative 'realist   
theory of life.'  
  
Snooks on Scientific Method  
  
Snooks is eager to find philosophical flaw in 'Darwin's method of   
theory building' (p. 33) and to proclaim that his own alternative   
theory is more scientific and realistic. He advocates 'realism' and   
the 'inductive, or historical, method' (p. 41).  
  
Snooks brushes aside the famous 'problem of induction,' which is seen   
as 'the absence of mechanical rules for generalizing from empirical   
data.' For Snooks, this problem is 'not as debilitating' as the   
problems with deductivism. But this is only part of the problem. Ever   
since David Hume, the problem of induction has not merely been   
recognized as the absence of rules for generalization, but the   
_impossibility_ of generalization through induction from any   
realizable number of observations. Ten million observations might   
confirm that 'all living grass is green,' but we can never be sure   
that somewhere there exists a blade of grass of a different color.  
  
Snooks ignores another problem with inductivism, widely elaborated in   
philosophy. This is that any empirical enquiry requires conceptual   
and theoretical preconceptions. In particular, imputations of cause   
and effect cannot be built on evidence alone. Consequently, some   
theory must precede empirical enquiry, and all factual investigation   
is theory-laden. Snooks seems unaware of all this.  
  
Instead he adopts a crude form of empiricism where 'science' must rid   
itself of all 'metaphysics' (pp. 27, 178, 220). Snooks writes:   
'Science is not a matter of "word games" but of experiment and   
empirical verification/falsification' (p. 91). He is evidently   
unaware that one of the major turns in the philosophy of science,   
associated partly with Karl Popper and Willard van Orman Quine and   
leading to the decline of logical positivism, was the reestablishment   
of the proposition that all science relies on ontological or   
metaphysical presuppositions.  
  
 From his vaguely defined methodological stance, Snooks criticizes   
Darwin's use of analogy. Snooks focuses on Darwin's account of how   
the breeder of domestic animal employs methods of deliberate   
selection to improve the stock. Darwin used this appeal to the   
analogy of 'artificial selection' to make his broader theory of   
'natural selection' understandable. Snooks seizes on this as 'the   
farmyard analogy' and repeats his description of Darwinism as 'the   
farmyard theory' ad nauseum.  
  
Snooks rightly observes that nature is not a farmyard, and thereby   
concludes that the 'farmyard analogy' is bound to be unrealistic.   
Given this general lack of realism with analogies, reasoning by   
analogy is generally suspect according to Snooks, and instead the   
scientist must appeal to the facts, using the 'inductive, or   
historical, method.' By assembling the facts and making appropriate   
generalizations, 'there is an endogenous regularity and   
predictability than can be persuasively modeled. But only if we   
abandon Darwinism in all its forms' (p. 196).  
  
Again this shows little awareness of the philosophy of science.   
Modern philosophers have established that metaphor and analogy are   
indispensable to scientific enquiry. When Snooks makes frequent   
appeals to 'realism' he shows no appreciation that realist   
philosophers of science that have been in the forefront in promoting   
this argument. But, for all its talk of 'realism,' Snooks makes no   
explicit use of modern realist philosophy.  
  
The Critique of Darwinism  
  
Mounting a critique of Darwinism is difficult because of the huge   
amount of material on the topic and because to some degree Darwinism   
itself has evolved as a doctrine. Faced with these problems, the   
critic would best proceed by addressing modern accounts that claim to   
identify the essence of Darwinism. Apart from the populist works of   
Richard Dawkins, which promote a particular and controversial version   
of Darwinism, where would we find such accounts of the meaning of   
Darwinism? By far the most important contributions to our   
understanding of the essence of Darwinism have come from   
philosophically inclined writers such as Daniel Dennett, David Hull,   
Ernst Mayr and Elliott Sober. But Snooks makes no use whatsoever of   
this relevant material.  
  
Instead, he assembles a picture of 'Darwinism' through a collage of   
selected quotations and personal presumptions. According to Snooks,   
the central propositions of 'Darwinism' include an idea of natural   
selection 'built on the totally untenable assumption that all   
organisms at all times and in all places attempt to maximize the   
number of their offspring' (p. 11). In addition: 'Every organism in   
the plant and animal kingdoms is somehow programmed to produce as   
many offspring as possible in all places and time. The resulting   
struggle for existence over scarce resources is always extremely   
severe' (p. 22). Furthermore, Darwin made an 'unrealistic' prediction   
of slow, continuous and gradual change (pp. 12, 251).  
  
Note the critical strategy here. When presenting what he regards as   
key Darwinian propositions, Snooks generally formulates them in an   
extreme form. He thus sees natural selection as based on the idea   
that organisms _always and everywhere maximize_ their offspring.  
  
However, modern formulations of the principle of selection, as in the   
works of Elliott Sober and George Price, make no use whatsoever of   
such an idea. Neither Darwin nor any other serious biologist ever   
entertained such a notion. Indeed, there is a large literature in   
modern (Darwinian) theoretical and empirical biology (by Timothy   
Clutton-Brock and others) that considers the trade-off between   
fecundity and survival. The resolution of this trade-off depends on   
the characteristics of the species concerned. Where parental care is   
less necessary or costly, species tend to produce large numbers of   
offspring. In other cases they devote resources to the care and   
survival of fewer progeny, rather than maximizing their number. In   
describing the maximization of offspring as the central Darwinian   
imperative, Snooks is plain wrong.  
  
Snooks dismisses the role of scarcity in Darwinian theory, with   
assertions such as: 'In reality genetic change associated with   
speciation ... only occurs when ... competition is minimal and   
natural resources are abundant' (p. 12). A problem here is that the   
concept of scarcity is often unrefined and we need to think more   
carefully what scarcity means. There is a big difference between   
global or absolute scarcity and scarcity in a local and immediate   
sense. A period of relatively abundant resources does not necessarily   
mean that they are immediately available to all individuals. Even   
with abundance, organisms must struggle to obtain and process   
resources. It is in this sense that the Darwinian notions of scarcity   
and struggle are relevant and general, and survive Snooks' rebuttal.  
  
Turning to the notion that Darwinian evolution is necessarily   
gradual, as Darwin himself emphasized, Snooks ignores recent   
discussions of the apparent dilemma between punctuated equilibria and   
(Darwinian) gradualism, by Dawkins and others. The dilemma turns out   
to be apparent rather than real, first because in accounts of   
punctuated change, even the more rapid spurts of evolutionary change   
take place over hundred of thousands of years, and second, because   
there is nothing in Darwinian theory that upholds that evolution   
always has to occur at constant speed. Contrary to Snooks, long   
periods where natural selection operates with little net effect on   
the characteristics of a species are entirely compatible with   
Darwinian theory. Obversely, Darwinism can readily accommodate period   
of more rapid evolutionary change, whether caused by exogenous   
environmental shocks or endogenous processes of positive feedback.  
  
Addressing later versions of Darwinism, Snooks deploys the catch-all   
description of 'neo-Darwinism' but concentrates almost entirely on   
the gene-centered and sociobiological versions, with their concepts   
of the 'selfish gene' and the 'genetic leash.' Snooks thus writes of   
'neo-Darwinism's exclusive concern with genetics' (p. 11). We are   
presented with generalized caricatures such as: 'According to   
Darwinism, individuals in nature and, by implication, in human   
society are merely mindless robots when it comes to procreation' (p.   
25). Or again: 'All Darwinians have difficulty in reconciling   
competition, which is supposed to drive evolution, and cooperation,   
which holds societies together' (p. 60). Or finally: 'the   
neo-Darwinists ... insist that it is our genes that decide behavior'   
(p. 201).  
  
But Darwin never said that evolution was blind. Instead he emphasized   
deliberation and cunning. Furthermore, although the reconciliation of   
competition with cooperation has interesting technical problems, it   
was upheld by Darwin himself and has pride of place in the modern,   
rigorous theory of group selection, developed by writers such as   
Joseph Henrich, Elliott Sober, and David Sloan Wilson. Finally, few   
'neo-Darwinians' allege that genes actually 'decide' behavior.   
Sociobiologists such as Edward Wilson actually propose that genes   
help to determine the repertoire of behavioral possibilities and   
other factors do the deciding.  
  
In concentrating on gene-centered accounts of Darwinism, Snooks   
largely ignores the modern literature on cultural and institutional   
evolution, where transmission takes place at levels other than that   
of the gene. He thus neglects the earlier work of Thorstein Veblen,   
and omits modern Darwinian theories of 'coevolution,' or 'dual   
inheritance' by Robert Boyd, William Durham, Peter Richerson and   
others.  
  
Snooks claims that Darwinism focuses on outcomes, whereas his own   
theory concentrates on processes. Again this is a monstrous   
distortion of Darwinism. As Veblen recognized long ago, the very   
essence of Darwinism is the causal explanation of process. And as   
Dennett elaborated in his 1994 book on _Darwin's Dangerous Idea_, the   
revolutionary character of Darwinism resides largely in its   
_algorithmic_ theory involving step-by-step explanations of process.  
  
Snooks rarely retreats from his extreme caricatures of 'Darwinism'   
and 'neo-Darwinism.' In one statement where he does so, he describes   
'the core' of his 'disagreement with Darwin' in the following terms:   
'An individual's role in life is a function of its contribution to   
the _strategic pursuit_ ... Individuals specialize according to   
comparative advantage and cooperate in their society's strategic   
pursuit in order to maximize the probability of their survival and   
prosperity' (p. 64). Remarkably there is nothing in this statement   
that undermines the assertions of Darwin or Darwinism. The idea of   
organisms adopting strategies for survival and fitness is central to   
Darwinian biology. Overall, Snooks is chasing a phantom Darwinism   
that exists in his imagination rather than in reality.  
  
The New Laws of Life  
  
Snooks' alternative is described as 'the dynamic-strategy theory of   
life.' (Strange, because Darwinism embraces both dynamism and   
strategy.) This includes the foremost proposal of 'the competitive   
driving force of individual organisms to survive and prosper.'   
(Strange, but this sounds much like Darwin's 'struggle for   
existence.')  
  
Snooks goes on to propose that organisms adopt 'dynamic strategies'   
in response to their circumstances. Such 'strategies' include genetic   
change, technological change, family multiplication, commerce and   
conquest. The 'constraining force' is the 'eventual exhaustion' of   
the dominant adopted strategy. To this he adds the possibility of   
'random' exogenous shocks.  
  
Snooks thus claims 'an observable pattern and an existential meaning'   
to all life: 'The rise and fall of species and of dynasties, the   
great genetic and technological revolutions, the great dispersions,   
civil wars, world wars, and extinctions are all part of a whole. They   
are the outcome of individual organisms attempting, through the   
pursuit of a range of dynamic strategies, to gain access to resources   
so as to survive and prosper' (p. 217). Again there is some   
resemblance to Darwinism here. However, what is lacking in Snooks'   
statement, but is found in Darwinism, is a method of explaining why   
organisms choose one strategy rather than another. In Darwinism this   
involves the principle of selection, not only of genes, but also --   
much more importantly in the human context -- of culturally   
transmitted dispositions. Indeed, in general, Snooks' 'breakthrough'   
theory bears some resemblance to the Darwinism he dismisses but is   
inferior to Darwinism in lacking a framework for reaching a full   
causal explanation of all the steps in the process. Snooks writes of   
'the _strategic desire_ of mankind for survival and prosperity' (p.   
102), but provides an inadequate causal explanation of this desire,   
and of the strategic choices that result. Darwinism attempts to fill   
this gap.  
  
The causal gap is exemplified in statements such as the following:   
'Intelligence was a response to strategic demand generated by those   
individuals who were pioneering the exploitation of strategic   
opportunities opened up by the demise of the dinosaurs' (p. 184).   
This statement lacks an account what caused the 'response.' Pointing   
to a strategic need does not answer this question, unless we admit an   
untenable functionalism where things happen somehow in response to a   
systemic need for them to occur.  
  
On the partial resemblance of Snooks' theory to Darwinism, consider   
his account of 'the law of motivation in life,' which 'states that   
the constant preoccupation of organisms throughout the history of   
life is the struggle to survive and prosper _under varying degrees of   
scarcity_' (p. 283, my emphasis). Scarcity is again rehabilitated in   
Snooks' remark that 'decisionmaking is based on the need to economize   
on nature's scarcest resources -- intelligence' (p. 202). Snooks here   
seems to have forgotten his earlier invectives against Darwin's   
presumption of omnipresent scarcity.  
  
Snooks gets so carried away with his new 'laws of life' that he   
rehearses them in circumstances where the empirical evidence is   
inadequate, against his own invocation of the principle of induction.   
He dismisses theories of dinosaur extinction involving the impact of   
asteroids or comets. Instead, he argues that 'unsustainable pressure   
was placed on available natural resources, and there was an   
increasing degradation of the global environment, a loss of   
ecological balance, and a widespread adoption of the conquest   
strategy. This led to a "world war" between the various species of   
the dinosaur dynasty. It was a struggle to the death' (p. 180). This   
is clearly an example of highly speculative and incomplete   
theoretical explanations getting way ahead of all the available   
evidence.  
  
Conclusion  
  
What is scarce in this volume is a good dose of intellectual   
humility. Apart from its grand ambition to demolish one great theory   
and replace it with another of equivalent standing, it is often   
rambling and repetitive. Even on his own ground of economics, it   
makes significant errors. For example, we are told that T. R. Malthus   
'advocated a policy of unfettered competition at home and abroad' (p.   
9). In fact, Malthus opposed laissez faire and supported the   
protectionist Corn Laws. We are told that J. R. Commons in 1934 made   
a distinction between organizations and institutions (p. 271), which   
is also untrue.  
  
In proclaiming its theoretical collapse, Snooks predicts that the   
current 'popularity of Darwinism will be short-lived' (p. 8). I am   
often reluctant to make predictions, but I hazard three here, for the   
next twenty years. I predict that Snooks will continue, at most, to   
have a minimal impact with his ideas in reputable, refereed, academic   
journals. I predict that Snooks' 'theory of life' or 'laws of life'   
will be largely unvisited and eventually forgotten. I predict that   
Darwin's reputation as one of the greatest thinkers in the last two   
hundred years will be preserved, if not enhanced.  
  
  
Geoffrey M. Hodgson is editor-in-chief of the _Journal of   
Institutional Economics_, and author of _The Evolution of   
Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Darwinism in American   
Institutionalism_ (Routledge, London, 2004).  
  
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