Hugh Cameron has opened Pandora's box! Who among us has not filed away a
list or two of (what he considers to be) fallacies? Here is one of mine.
Mason Gaffney
Some Common Fallacies and Myths in Economic Discourse
"Satan deludes youth with beauty, the miser with gold, the leader with
power, the learned with false doctrine." -- H.G. Bohn
I. Generic Fallacies
G-1. Fallacy of Inverting Cause and Effect.
a. Fallacy that trade deficits result in capital inflows.
b. Fallacy that high rents result from high land prices.
G-2. Fallacy of Identification (identifying idea A with idea B, when they
are different). The Fallacy entails confusing the incidental with the
essential; connotation with denotation; myth with reality; etc. It entails
the stereotype or Gestalt or paranoid-"pattern" view of life, an enemy of
analysis and clear thought. The Fallacy of Identification really means
misidentification, or confusion. Block phrases often contain or foster this
Fallacy.
a. Example: identifying dissipation of rent (owing to open access
to lands, fisheries, etc.) with dissipation of monopoly profit (owing to
open access to markets).
b. Example: a tax that looks regressive at the national level, because it
is a local tax, becomes a block phrase, "theregressivepropertytax." In
result, policies are proposed that do not serve the ostensible end: in this
case, shifting to the sales tax, a very strange way to help poor people in
poor regions.
c. Fallacy of identifying (confusing) discontinuity with indivisibility.
d. Fallacy of identifying (confusing) Long-run Marginal Product (LMP) with
Marginal Net Product (MNP).
e. Fallacy of Identifying Scale with Efficiency, using the block phrase
"Largeefficientfirms."
f. Fallacy of identifying (confusing) "economic man" with "pecuniary man."
An economic man often sacrifices money for other values, e.g. leisure, the
desire to leave an intellectual legacy, welfare of grandchildren, honor and
glory, etc. Rationality is just a means to gratify desires that may be
sentimental.
G-3. Fallacy of Straining at Gnats while Swallowing Camels.
Example: saying the main cause of waste in government is the high salaries
of elected officials, including those who fight waste. This kind of thing
gets self-righteous and mean-spirited. It may be heard on Channel 9 at 7:30
PM, weeknights, along with other cheap shots.
G-4. Fallacy of False Parallels, irrelevant analogies ("pigs is pigs," even
though one of them is a guinea pig).
Example: fallacy that labor income is the same as land income, just because
each is called "income."
Rather, labor income is gross of costs of birthing, rearing, medical care,
education, care of the aged, and depreciation of and interest on these if
they are capitalized.
G-5. Fallacy of Absurd Overinterpretation,
Example: talk about conserving energy, or capital, and you hear this: "You
want us all to go back to the spinning wheel with Ned Ludd and Mahatma
Gandhi?"
G-6. Fallacy of Not Specifying Denominators (Ignoring the Base of Ratios)
a. Nation B is twice as urbanized as nation A; therefore A is twice
as rural as B. (False because B is only 2% urbanized.)
b. A bought half of B's remaining land; therefore A doubled his
acreage.
c. I can do 105 pushups; (I start counting at 100).
d. Rates on unstated bases: "the rate fallacy."
Example: GM's profits are 20% (of what? Sales, net worth, value of shares,
historical cost, etc.) Here, the Fallacy is compounded, usually, by fuzzy
definitions of "profit."
e. The "-ity" fallacy: vague use of productivity; parity;
profitability; intensity; rentability; durability; salability; usability;
etc. Add "-ity" intimidates the reader without adding weight to the root
word.
f. "Efficiency" (output/input) w/o specifying input.
g. Treating a closed system like an open one. Examples follow.
i. People entered a night club at a constant rate per minute. As the room
became more crowded, the fire marshal became less concerned because the %
rate of growth of the crowd inside kept falling.
ii. As Elmer approached 95, his life insurance premiums fell because each
year he added a lesser % to his life.
iii. After the home team gained 97 yards from its goal line, each
additional yard meant less because it was a lower % of the base.
(Obviously, in all three examples, one should relate changes to the low base
of what remains, rather than the high base of what went before.)
h. The Base Year Fallacy. Measuring fractional changes from a base year
that is chosen to strengthen your case.
Example. Farm "parity" prices (terms of trade, actually) are those that
obtained in the most favorable years in history, 1910-14.
Example. Your salary has risen 30% while mine rose only 20%. (But who says
they were correct to begin with?)
G-7. Fallacy of Composition (non-system thinking)
Example: "What's good for General Motors is good for the country" - (Charles
Wilson, ca. 1956). See also D-7, about advocacy of farm price supports.
Second Example. In planting an acre with orange trees, add a 40th stem.
The resulting tree will bear 50# of fruit.
Fallacy is to say the marginal product of the stem is 50# (you have to
subtract the reduced production, due to crowding, from the first 49 stems).
This is also the fallacy that the marginal product equals the average
product.
Third Example: a 57th fishing boat joins the fleet and catches 350 tons.
This is its marginal product.
This fallacy equates MP with AP; overlooks "tragedy of commons," etc.
G-8. Fallacy of Partial (usually Selective) Constraint.
Example: fallacy that cheap money causes people to build on land
more intensively. Rather, they buy more land, lowering intensity. Cheap
money also helps one build, but its comparative advantage is in buying land,
whose carrying cost is mainly interest (no depreciation).
Example: fallacy of stressing that "capital gains" during inflation
are phantom income that should not be taxed, while ignoring other kinds of
phantom income (like interest on savings accounts). It is worse when the
advocate also ignores real, but untaxed income that results from fall in the
real value of debt, and of deferred taxes (notably, taxes on capital gains
themselves).
Example: fallacy that property tax should be abated to spare rich
widows, on welfare grounds, ignoring poor widows who rent and need welfare
from property taxes on rich widows, and others.
Example: fallacy that wealthy people use less energy because they have the
capital to insulate houses. Rather, they buy bigger houses. Also,
similarly, to stress that cheap credit lets one conserve energy by
insulating a 5-rm house, ignoring that it also lets one move to a 7-rm house
and use more energy.
Analogy: selective, partial Bible fundamentalism, in which a
"Christian" is one, and only one, who would punish homosexuality and
abortion. At the same time, another person who cites Bible passages urging
forgiveness of sins, redistribution of wealth, forgiveness of debts, the
evils of avarice and "laying field to field," the unlikelihood of rich
people getting to heaven, driving money-changers from the temple, etc., is
an atheist and communist.
G-9. Fallacy of "Ahistorical" Theorizing, and other theorizing that runs
contrary to observable facts. This is "Economics without Man" (Horace
Gray). It deludes you into thinking people behave like pieces on a chess
board, following arbitrary, simple rules that may be assumed before the
analysis begins, and seem to give determinate answers to indeterminate
problems.
Example: equating opportunity cost and cash cost as economizing incentives.
This is perhaps an improvement over the reverse fallacy, that is treating
o.c. as = 0, but in their false pride, preening themselves on refuting the
first fallacy, micro theorists fail to observe how humans actually behave,
how credit rationing works, and how cash drains lower the liquidity, income,
and wealth of the payor.
This error is especially misleading w.r.t. land, whose hoped-for price
increments offset opportunity cost of holding.
G-10. Fallacy of Counterfeit Wisdom through Hedging (Cf. 11, Fallacy of
Reifying Metaphors.)
Many grant-needing institutions, dominated by nervous treasurers, develop a
recognizable style of hedging, perfected through lifelong habituation to
bureaucratic gobbledygook. They want to show they have covered all the
bases, see the merits and demerits of every proposal, and are committed to
none. Combine this hedging (aka ass-covering) with reifying metaphors,
mixing metaphors, backing and filling, larding with incontrovertible
bromides and tautologies, reliance on empty words and repetition, avoidance
of offending anyone or specifying anything, and you get the following mush,
cited from an actual Report of a well-known Institute.
.".. demand for real estate products ... snowballed into a wave of
speculative overbuilding ... (Later,) the speculation-fueled binge gave way
to stagnant markets and soaring vacancy rates. ... with effects on the
fabric of society itself.
Economic analysts differ on the relative importance of the real estate cycle
to the economic performance of metro regions. A convincing case can be
made, however, that the boom-bust cycle may make some places overpriced in
relation to other, less expensive places. This in turn affects others.
The boom created massive numbers of jobs, income, and great wealth ... . It
also destroyed the cost structure, and later was responsible for the loss of
thousands of jobs ... Other jobs depended on those; these jobs, too,
vanished as the bust wiped out these largely ephemeral gains.
Many believe that the rationale for public attempts to regulate the
boom-bust dynamics of land and real estate markets is fairly
straightforward. Others are reluctant to see government intervene in the
market. Either way, regulatory activities have important effects ...
Unstable revenue flows make budget planning difficult. ... Yet a variety of
techniques ... all hold some promise of dampening (sic) boom-bust cycles
within existing frameworks of governance.
... the more information that elected officials, planners, developers, and
citizens have about market conditions and growth trends, the more likely it
is that policies can be developed to accommodate growth without a
speculative boom ...
Some believe ...; others, less optimistic, believe ... There are drawbacks
and limitations, however, ... In contrast with the argument that land-use
regulation is a panacea for problems rooted in the boom-bust cycle, X
suggested that controls are not directly useful for regulating real estate
market cycles. At best, these tools have little or no effect; ...
Ultimately, the choice is a political one ...
It has been argued that impact fees increase the "economic efficiency" of
each development decision ... Yet, imposing such fees may or can increase
housing costs. "A" asked ... ? In contrast, "B" maintains ... It is
generally agreed that land use planning for urban service areas will
stabilize real estate markets if .... It can be a daunting task, however,
...
A provision of this sort would benefit local governments but might anger
taxpayers. Another possibility would be ... However, the results have
been mixed ...
The most important step is to avoid raising the tax in booms ... but the
effect may be marginal ... would have a limited effect ... It remains
unclear, moreover, how such a tax can be structured to do its regulatory
work while also being politically acceptable. In Z's opinion, (this tax)
set high enough to influence behavior would probably be unpopular with
voters. ... it ignores several problems. ... downturns are precisely the
wrong time ... to impose tax burdens any higher than necessary.
Clearly, it is desirable ... to avoid ... taxes that respond to construction
and new development activities. ... development exactions can be an
integral part of such a long-range approach to finance.
One factor that can trigger a speculative boom is overstimulating
development ... Such conditions can create problems ... The development
industry may act as a flywheel ... such a spiral ... may lead to a collapse.
Growth coalitions orchestrate the scope and pace of development ... This
raises questions ...
The ebb and flow of the cycle ... prices increase steeply and quickly then
crash dramatically ... in areas with rapid growth. ... these growth
pressures then interact with constraints on land supply, and with
psychological dynamics to produce the boom-bust profile. The dynamics of
the boom-bust market can become a major factor in driving regional economies
both upward and downward, ... and can undermine fiscal health.
Conclusion: Ultimately, metro form is the result of complex interactions of
an ever-changing economy , ... We must envision new relationships among
these elements and make new choices."
[Does that make it all perfectly clear? Have you learned anything at all
from all that? Have you any idea what these experts recommend? Not
surprisingly, the author hides behind the Institute and does not identify
himself. Why should he? He has not specified anything else.
G-11. Fallacy of Reifying Empty Metaphors.
What follows is taken from two actual articles. Economic writing is full of
this stuff, as reporters try to sound worldly-wise about matters neither
they, nor their interviewees, understand. When their readers are done, they
will not understand, either.
a. "Tough fiscal measures; favorable balance of trade; bite the bullet; the
economy would climb out of the recession to a growth rate that would get
industry moving; the upturn has been sluggish; global recession threatens to
undermine our economic take-off by hitting exports and keeping prices
subdued, dampening (sic) activity and boosting unemployment; markets are
skittish; jittery markets want to see action; high demand sucked in imports
and caused a blowout, so the government had to drive interest rates through
the ceiling to dampen (sic) demand; ditching the cuts would throw a wrench
into relations with unions; we must implement tougher arrangements;
government may pull a rabbit from the hat, sending a signal to markets;
government has yet to cut spending to the bone - it needs to set out a plan
with flesh about the bones."
b. "The economy is on a roll; how to rein it in before prices spiral out of
control; having unleashed many of the nation's communist fetters, Chinese
leadership now must tame its firebreathing, unruly dragon of an economy
without putting it back in chains; cool inflation by clamping down on
credit; controls were eased to funnel money to state-owned firms that were
drowning in red ink; the situation is by no means encouraging; chaos has
appeared; banning profiteering; they are only a temporary salve for the
economic woes; the rusting state sector is hemorrhaging red ink; inefficient
enterprises are due to be bailed out or allowed to go bankrupt; the solution
to the dilemma is macroeconomic fine tuning; the government needs
macroeconomic tools."
If you use metaphors, stick with one or two. A metaphor is effective when
it calls up a physical image that can serve as a reasonable analogue to what
you are really talking about. When you mix them, it shows they are just
empty words you picked up from someone else. Try to create your own, from
your own experience and observation: then they'll be original, and have
impact, just as the tired clich�s did when they were new.
G-12. Fallacy of Compartment-mindedness.
Toleration of contradictions by assigning them to different compartments
(e.g., Micro and Macro). Holding two contrary views at the same time.
Failing to seek consistency in one's beliefs, to reconcile and compose
contradictions. (Orwell called this "double-think.")
Example from capital theory. Many will say that the PIPO model, as used by
B�hm-Bawerk and Wicksell (the "grape juice model" of a macro-economy) only
applies to grape juice, and things like it. With other capital, other
principles apply. This leads to fallacy that the period of production, or
of investment, is indefinable, unmeasurable, and/or meaningless. Worse,
leads to the fallacy of the disappearing inventory (F-6), where
"normalizing" or staggering investment cycles makes input and output
simultaneous.
G-13. Fallacy of the Unrecognized Self-necessitating Policy or Action.
Some examples follow.
a. Condemning land for a rail station, using a price that is inflated by
the prospect of the station's being built. (You think I'm making this up?
This is exactly how S.P. squeezed $84.7M out of Southern California Metro
Transit Authority (MTA) for the Union Station in L.A., in 1984.)
b. One absentee landowner performs the service of bearing the financial
burden of ownership for the tenant. However, as a social and public policy
matter, this overlooks that absentee owners collectively provide extra
investment demand that pushes up the price of land. The higher price is out
of reach of tenants, which is what keeps them tenants. Such a "service"
vouches for itself; it creates the very need that it meets.
c. Another example. It is a common administrative ploy to
underfund a department, then use its poor performance to justify funding it
less. This is kin to "blaming the victim."
d. An example is the idea that taxes can come out of wages. Why can't
they? Some workers at the bottom barely survive, cannot be taxed.
Progressive income tax rates are an attempt to tax workers who get above the
survival level. However, these skilled workers have invested effort and
capital to raise themselves. Market forces would have them invest just that
extra effort and waiting needed to get them to their desired level. If we
tax away the premium earnings, the same forces will make them demand -
successfully - that much more before taxes to return their after-tax incomes
to their relative standing absent taxes. That is, if one believes in market
forces.
That is why celebrities, lawyers, MDs, psychiatrists, top execs.,
etc., command such premia. Then, the very skewed salary structure that
results from high progressive tax rates is used to rationalize the very
rates that cause it!
G-14. Fallacy that TANSTAAFL.
Rather, TITSATAAFL (There Is Too Such a Thing As A Free Lunch). Examples
follow.
a. Improved allocation is free lunch. The "win-win" deal, if real,
is a free lunch.
b. Putting idle workers in good jobs is a free lunch. So is using
idle land, if the use is environmentally benign, and pays net rent.
c. Many positive feedback loops are free lunches. Examples: thawing
a frozen market; pooling risks; pooling supply and demand; creating
confidence.
d. Synergy. Spillovers, or "external economies" (which
Ellis-Fellner, Mieszkowski, et al. would like to define away).
e. Removing barriers to better allocation of resources.
f. Doubling the welfare of A by dropping B by 1%, etc. In
individual cases, this could be wrong, but on the average it is bound to be
right much more than wrong.
g. Sharing public goods is a free lunch. ("Public goods" are goods
whose use by more persons does not interfere with use by present users, or
others. Thus, they are supplies whose Marginal Cost (MC) = 0.)
h. Land rent and gains are a free lunch. The question is, who gets
them?
i. Moving toward more equal % shares is likely to improve
allocation, e.g. reducing farm water 5% to increase industrial water 100%.
j. Any policy that breaks an impasse is a free lunch. Especially policies
that compose two problems into one solution. Example: the fear of
overproduction should allay the fear of inflation, result is to level supply
and demand upwards.
G-15. Fallacy of Incommensurability
Example: The wealthiest Americans, those with $250,000 or more in personal
income, have XX% of the income.
[Income is not a measure of wealth. Income is a flow over time; wealth is a
balance sheet measure at a point of time. Some with high measured income
have little or no wealth; some with high wealth have little measured income,
e.g. if they are "land-poor."]
Example: Sales of GM > Switerland's NNP. (NNP measures value-added; GM
sales are gross of purchased components, materials, etc.)
G-16. Regression Fallacy
This is when you rank people by one measure, then judge or measure what they
have of another.
Example: the shortest 10% of the people had only 4% of the total height in
1980, but by 1990 had grown to have 7.5% of the total height. Therefore,
heights are getting more even.
Example: the smartest 1% of the population in 1880 (say, those with i.q.s
over 150) had a generation of children, most of whom had i.q.s under 150.
Therefore, the smartest few are becoming more like the average person.
(This is called "regression towards the mean," and is the origin of the
"regression" in regression fallacy.)
G-17. Fallacy of Infallibility of Authorities
"After you've won your first Nobel prize, perhaps you may disagree with
Galbraith or Stigler."
"Scientists agree that ... "; "Science says ... "; "Science has proved ...
"
"Economists take their production functions from engineers ... "
"Good forestry cannot pay interest at going rates. Therefore, interest
rates have no place in calculating good forest practice." (I am not making
this up - see any forestry textbook.)
"Professional Foresters determine what is good forestry; engineers determine
proper standards for structures and equipment; medical doctors determine
what is sound medical practice; etc. Meddlesome accountants must not
interfere with these professional judgments, based on professional codes of
ethics framed to protect the public interest."
Another view: "An engineer is a person trained to tell you the very best
way to do something that should not be done at all." - Kenneth Boulding,
evaluating the California Water Plan.
G-18. Fallacy of Analogical Argument (inferring a further degree of
resemblance from an observed degree; two things are the same in all respects
because they are alike in one respect).
Example: red flannel underwear keeps you warmer because red is the color of
fire.
Example: wage income is unearned, just like land rent, because it is higher
than opportunity cost; or because "it is a differential"; etc.
Example: man-made capital is just like land in all respects because both
have a present value derived by discounting future cash flows.
G-19. Fallacy of Tautology: making a definitional statement seem like a
causative one.
Example: "Soaring yields send bond market into a sharp decline."
G-20. Fallacy of Absurd Oxymoron
Example: "This recession ended in 1991. The unemployment rate and the
poverty rate kept rising after the recession ended."
Example: "Jobless prosperity."
G-21.
II. False Performance Standards
PS-1. Fallacy of Partial Maximization.
This is the Fallacy of Maximizing Average Product (AP) of just one input,
(usually labor), ignoring cost of others. You have been warned against this
in Micro-economics, but probably not often enough. Economists who should
know better are frequent violators: they haven't even listened to
themselves.
"Productivity" has become a buzzword leading to error, and often to ruin.
The AP of a Variable Factor (VF) is a max where the Marginal Product (MP) of
the Fixed Factor (FF) is zero, and v.v. That is, You (the boss) max the
partial AP of one input only by wasting all others. Not smart.
Don't judge the salesman without looking at his territory; don't judge the
professor without looking at his labs, experimental plots, and budgets;
don't judge the farmer without valuing his land; don't judge the nation
without looking at its territory.
a. Fallacy of single-factor efficiency. Every input has its zealous
champion who would economize only on it, or produce only one output, and
measure performance accordingly. Some value only labor, others energy,
foreign exchange, food, fine arts, ATVs, endangered species, habitat,
fishing, sex in its various forms, abstinence from sex, minority rights,
majority rights, women's rights, men's rights, the environment, speed,
highways ... you name it, there's a freak for everything.
A good manager (or a good statesperson) recognizes single-valued fanaticism,
and holds these fundamentalists in check. He must reconcile their demands:
not with simple-minded personal compromises, but with good economic
analysis. Sometimes, with ingenuity, he can compose them into a synthesis
that is better than a trade-off, achieving much of both or many goals.
Marriage, for example, has been known to satisfy the needs and overcome the
loneliness and insecurity of both parties. Now that is good managing (when
it works out); it takes good thinking.
b. Fallacy and Folly of Setting Naive Records ... like max sales, gross
output, budgets, height of building, speed of travel, size of office, area
of spread, cost of facing, fullest use of damsite (e.g., highest possible
dam), most perfect flood control, max output of forests and mines (aka
"low-grading"), greatest assets of firm or bureau, etc.
All those fallacies involve ignoring Marginal Costs (MC) in Stage II,B of
the production function. Stage II,B is that part of Stage II wherein
0<VMP<MC. Some of them can even carry you into Stage III, where the VMP of
the VF is <0; and Stage I, where the VMP of the FF <0.
The costs most often overlooked are imputed interest and rent on owned
assets. They often result from overacquisition or overretention of land
caused by Malthusian apprehensions, guarding against anticipated monopoly,
storing up for possible future needs, holding for the rise, securing
boundaries, avoiding sales to hide market values from tax assessor,
sharecropping, inflating rate base of utilities, etc.
Here are some more examples.
c. Maximizing yields per unit of land (the most corn; the tallest
building).
d. Maximizing sales
e. Maximizing "return on sales." This is the same as max AP of variable
inputs, ignoring value of fixed inputs.
f. Minimizing costs/output. Same as max AP of sum of variable inputs.
(This is a Fallacy unless "costs" include all fixed costs, marked to
market.) It is better than max AP of just one input, e.g. labor, but what
is just "better," while still wrong, is often more dangerous than what is
blatantly wrong, because harder to detect.
g. Beware of something called "benefit/cost ratio" (used in project
analysis). It is the AP of everything included in "cost," but often owned
inputs are omitted, leading to wasting them when you max this ratio.
In fine, AP is a dull tool for dimwits. Don't be one. Its main use is for
blurring issues and supporting fallacies.
PS-2. Fallacy of Arrogation
The Fallacy of Arrogation is imputing to B the product of A's effort or
saving. Its committers include most of those who oppose marginal analysis.
A theory may be understood better by understanding its opposition. Whom
does it threaten? Marginal analysis threatens all who gain by Arrogation.
These groups jointly form "The Omelette School," so-called because their
slogan is "you can't unscramble an omelette." They resist even scraping the
omelette off the skillet, so they can avoid analysis. Arrogators include
the following.
a. On the extreme left, those who believe that "labor produces all
value." This now includes workers in fat industries, where EP is low, who
would like to claim their AP. In syndicalist economies (worker control of
plants, one by one), such as recently found in Yugoslavia and parts of
China, some workers got good plants on good sites, others got marginal ones.
Those in the better plants claimed they produced all the value.
On the moderate left (Bertrand Russell), those who believe that production
is cooperative and it is impossible to impute specific amounts of production
to specific inputs. (Note how people often call something "impossible,"
when they really mean they think it undesirable on other grounds. Russell,
for example, thought imputation to specific inputs is destructive of
cooperative spirit, and hyperindividualistic).
b. On the extreme right, Tory rent-takers who seek to blend in with
productive management, and/or with savers who create capital, and take
credit as managers or savers for the high AP of labor.
c. Anti-rationalists who find it hard to follow analysis. The world
is full of these, seeking some easy rule to follow, so they needn't think.
They are easily stampeded by those who are perfectly able to follow the
analysis, but do not like its findings.
d. Managers seeking to overstate their performance. Fallacy of
understating true capacity of fixed input to yield rent.
Let G=Ground Value (annual), P=Product Value, and W=Work input.
Consider the ratio, P/(G+W). As G approaches zero, the ratio approaches
P/W. Then max P/W looks like max efficiency. Managers do that routinely,
to make themselves look better -- a Fallacy of Arrogation, meaning they are
arrogating to their credit the output properly imputable to the fixed input.
They do this by carrying land on the books at historical cost, and by
ignoring associated costs, complementary costs, allocated overhead, etc.
They fight like tigers against marking to market, reserve recognition
accounting, and such obvious devices for entering owned inputs at their true
values.
PS-3. Fallacy of Maximizing Usable Life of Capital (ignoring re-use value
of site it preempts).
a. In commercial forestry (where trees are valued for lumber content only),
that might mean maximizing growth per tree, an extreme error (except to
"tree-huggers," but that is another issue not addressed here). Or, it might
mean letting trees stand and grow so long as current growth covers interest
on the liquidation value of the tree (thus, in effect, earning no return on
the land). This is the fallacy that financial maturity arrives when value
of current growth just covers interest in harvest value of tree, leaving
nothing to cover rent of the site. Most economists fall into it - they are
trained to overlook land values.
b. Building extra durability into dwellings, cracking towers, boilers,
vehicles, etc., to "spread the overhead" of capital outlay over more years.
This position is advanced with great self-righteousness about the alleged
"myopia" of those who act otherwise. It overlooks at least three things:
i. The extra cost of the capital tied up over many years to provide the
durability;
ii. The fall in the present value of the reuse value of the space occupied;
iii. The waste of capital resulting from obsolescence in its many forms.
PS-4. Fallacy that Optimum is max MP, or TP
PS-5. Fallacy of Overvaluing Foreign Exchange (relative to earnings of
domestic currency).
a. In international trade and lending, this leads to maximizing exports,
without regard to cost of imports. It is treating foreign exchange as
though it were inherently worth more than domestic currency (at the market
rate of exchange). Foreign lenders have always pushed this one hard; they
still are, through IMF and World Bank. These agencies with this attitude
are doing a good job of giving free trade a bad name. (Through a confusion
of terms, their views are now labelled "monetarism.")
b. A variation on this idea, in local affairs, is the Fallacy that
Import-competing Firms are Nonbasic and Parasitic, so a city should court
and subsidize firms that export, "bringing money into the community." The
Riverside Chamber of Commerce has long been in the fell clutch of this
fallacy, treating little local import-competing businesses like poor
relations. Bringing money in is presumed to be more worthy than keeping
money from flowing out.
PS-6. Sometimes the reverse fallacy is in style, Undervaluing Foreign
Exchange or Trade relative to domestic currency or trade. This is the way
of "Autarky" (self-sufficiency). It was long practiced by Canada and its
various Provinces, which would supply the local market with cheap oil and
gas, rather than export it at much higher prices (even after NAFTA, I doubt
if this practice has been rooted out). Russia still does this, so everyone
can stay warm at 20 below zero, and you have to open the windows to avoid
overheating your room. In one phase, Henry Ford tried it for his motor
company ("The Rouge" steel plant remains). Hitler sought it as a goal for
the 3rd Reich.
PS-7. Fallacy of Minimizing Costs
The way to minimize costs, literally, is just to go out of business.
Something is obviously missing from this standard.
In practice, this false standard means minimizing just selected costs.
These days it means downsizing labor force while keeping land and capital
idle.
PS-8. Arbitrary assumptions about scale:
Bigger is better, or the reverse, small is beautiful
PS-9. Selective and exclusive emphasis on one side of a tricky optimizing
question.
Example: consider how "comprehensively" you should build the parts that fit
into a massive, integrated plan (e.g., the California Water Plan).
a. Build total project all at once: achieve economies of synchronizing,
integrating, and coordinating the building process, but getting way ahead of
demand. (Monument builders and empire-builders fall into this one, usually
naming the monuments for themselves and their friends, leaving the costs to
the rest of us.)
b. Build capital only as needed: gain economies of synchronizing supply and
demand, but ignoring the cost side. Example: to avoid borrowing money,
people in Utah used to build a basement with a tempo roof, and live there
until they saved enough to finish the house, and had enough children to need
the extra rooms.
c. The optimizing solution is "phasing." It is tricky, important, and
badly neglected by micro theorists.
PS-10. Fallacy that Maximizing GNP (or local or state, or any gross
product) is a normative objective of economic policy.
This belief led Alaska to lease its state-owned oil lands prematurely,
turning them over to private people on the cheap, just as they began to rise
steeply in value. The oil lobbyists worked hard to nurture the correct
viewpoint - for them.
Subfallacy: any resource should be used the moment prices rise, or costs
fall, to the point that it becomes supramarginal.
PS-11. Fallacy of Engineering Efficiency, where:
a. Output is measured only in units engineers can observe, excluding other
aspects that consumers may value. Example: engineering "needs," as
determined by engineers. "Standards," without regard to diminishing
returns, or personal tastes or budgets. Engineers are not trained to be
modest about imposing their values on others.
b. Input, the same story, e.g. maximizing output/energy. The energy crisis
produced a flood of advice along these lines. Much of it added the fallacy
of defining energy strictly in physical terms, regardless of quality of
fuel, tendency to pollute, cost of use and shipment, etc.
PS-12. Fallacy of Prorating.
a. Managers on economy drives may cut back every enterprise, division or
dept. by x% of some input, or total budget, or capital.
b. Cartels that restrict output routinely cut back all members by x% of
some basis; or to operate their fixed input just y days/mo.
c. In Utah, in a dry year, all water users are cut back the same % of their
base entitlement (the California system is even worse, based on different
fallacies).
Results are not "equimarginal"; and usually have strong bias toward
substituting land and capital for labor. Cartels force all sellers to carry
excess capacity, which screens out lean firms w/o regard to their true
efficiency. Water law induces all users to install excess diversion
capacity, to build up their claims. Fishing quotas based on size and value
of boats have led to there being far more boats than fisheries can support.
Etc.
PS-13. Fallacy of Single-valued Priorities.
Example: "I read that oatmeal lowers your blood pressure, so the only crop
of real value is oats." Ergo, never let good oat land be used for corn, or
vines, or cities, or wildlife habitat, or anything but oats. There is only
so much Class I soil for growing oats. There is no market for oats, you
say? Then save up the land for future oat production.
You think I'm making this up? Try attending a few meetings on land-use
planning.
PS-14. Is efficiency uneconomical? Is economizing inefficient? (Recap)
A fallacy of partial economizing is to focus narrowly on Physical Efficiency
(e.g. energy-efficiency). Energy conservation is wonderful, but it is not
an economic performance standard. It is totally at odds with maximizing
labor productivity, for example: you can't have them both. Neither,
standing alone, is economical, because it totally overlooks the other.
Also, investing more capital to conserve energy is not always the most
productive use of the capital, nor the cheapest way to save energy.
a. In PS-1, and PS-2,d, we stressed the folly and fallacy of
maximizing AP of VF. True optimizing is maximizing the AP of the sum of VF
and FF, for total efficiency.
b. The AP of labor is often loosely called "productivity" and
equated with "efficiency." Interfirm, international, and interdivisional
comparisons by these measures are common, and fallacious, and harmfully
misleading. AP is partial efficiency of one input alone, and is maximized
only by wasting other inputs.
PS-15. Fallacy of Petty Incrementalism.
This Fallacy bids us consider only minor nibbling at fringes of existing
uses, overlooks major changes in uses, quantum leaps of all kinds. It can
easily lead us to a low local max on the shoulder of a peak: a "molehill on
a mountainside." It is one of the few errors by the estimable Alfred
Marshall, whose motto was Natura non facit saltum (nature makes no leap).
In fact, nature does leap (mutations, eruptions, extinctions, ice ages), and
so do mankind, society, and the economy. It was, rather, Marshall who made
no leaps - he was a cautious fellow.
We have seen that high-volume land uses (intensive, with high elasticity of
production) compete for land with low-volume land uses (extensive, with low
elasticity of production) where the low-volume uses yield high rents/worker.
The high-volume uses are marginal in those areas, so a small drop in prices
relative to variable costs wipes out their rents. Here, adjustments to
price changes are not minor marginal changes, but quantum changes in use.
Again, in urban growth there often comes a need to replace a collection of
individual systems with one large system, e.g. a mass of septic tanks with a
sewer system, or a gaggle of private cars by mass transit. Just prior to
the last, improving traffic control is rearranging deck chairs on the
Titanic.
The Fallacy of Petty Incrementalism vastly understates supply responses to
price and cost changes. A current petty incrementalist in California is
Prof. Robert Hagan, UC Davis, who studies the economy of water use and
declares that farmers cannot lower their water use by more than 2% without
basic changes (which are presumed to be unthinkable). He will consider only
incremental changes in current systems, overlooking possibilities of
shifting from alfalfa (high water use, low value) to berries, vines, and
orchards (low water use, high value); from primitive flood and furrow
irrigation to drip irrigation; etc.
PS-16. Fallacy of Free Rent. Examples follow.
a. Timber is financially mature when its growth rate is equal to the
interest rate (F'/F = i).
b. Dams should be sized so as to max the "benefit/cost ratio." (In
practice, the value of the damsite, reservoir site, and the water source,
however scarce, are omitted from "cost"). This has resulted in some "pygmy
dams" on certain key sites - dams apparently calculated more to seize and
hold the sites and power drops than to use them fully.
c. Parking meter fees must be limited to the cost of paying for the meters
and meter-maids.
d. Tolls on the Golden Gate Bridge must be set no higher than enough to pay
debt service on outstanding bonds.
e. Exxon is more efficient than mom and pop farmers in the hills because
Exxon has more sales per worker.
f. It is a senseless waste to tear down a sound structure when it could
provide more years of service.
PS-17. Fallacy of Subsidizing what is Largest
Example: "Farming is California's largest industry; therefore we must
supply it with cheap water." I am not putting you on: this argument is
seriously advanced, and carries weight with many people.
PS-18. Maximizing Mean Annual Increment of Forest Growth
In managing timberland, rotation ages should be chosen so as to maximize
mean growth per year, regardless of cost.
PS-19. Fallacies of Static Equilibrium
Example: the flow of timber from U.S. forests, and from each particular
forest, should be constant in perpetuity (sustained yield). The inventory
of timber should never fall below its present level. Timberland should
never be used for any other purpose. Etc.
PS-20.
III. Fallacies about Distribution
D-1. Fallacy that we must sacrifice allocative efficiency to achieve
distributive equity.
a. Rather, Efficiency is often sacrificed to promote distributive
Inequity. Example: Federal dams in California, Arizona, etc., where the
Feds give services and water contracts free or below cost to giant
landowners.
b. Some taxes are both progressive and efficient, e.g. pollution
charges, land taxes, etc.
D-2. Fallacy of Identifying Land with Capital
a. Fallacy that surplus profits are all competed away in a competitive
market.
Actually, rents are not competed away. There is nothing about competition
that invades land tenures, or produces more land.
b. Fallacy that economic growth solves problems resulting from
maldistribution of land.
Nice try, but land is the most maldistributed (concentrated) form of wealth,
and land does not grow with economic growth. It just rises in value,
worsening class divisions.
c. This writer has detailed eleven or more basic differences of land and
capital, in "Land as a Unique Factor of Production," for publication this
month.
D-3. Fallacy that Only win-win exchanges can be shown to raise human
welfare (the Pareto Fallacy). Actually:
a. If you can't justify changes because interpersonal comparisons are
difficult, then you can't justify keeping things the same, either, for the
same reason. Thus, that anti-utilitarian put-off leads nowhere except to
confusion.
b. Welfare (probably, usually) rises when A gains more than B loses (unless
A is wealthier than B).
c. Welfare rises when A gains what B loses, but it is worth more to A than
it was to B (Yes, Virginia, you can make interpersonal comparisons). This
is the "Utilitarian Rule." Property fundamentalists bend every effort to
refute and undermine it. This is what Pareto and Edgeworth were up to.
D-4. Fallacies about the Function of Profit.
a. Fallacy that we should produce for use "instead of" profit.
[These are often compatible.]
b. Counter-fallacy: producing for profit is always producing for
use. [Much profit comes from counterproductive rent-seeking, law-breaking,
theft, polluting, etc.]
Synthesis: bad profits stigmatize good ones; good profits camouflage
bad ones.
Solution: distinguish good and bad profits, eliminate or tax away the bad
ones.
Problem: it is hard to distinguish good and bad; but isn't this what
Economists should do for us? What are Economists paid for?
D-5. Fallacy that Entitlements do Not Affect Allocation.
a. According to the Coase Theorem, we should create property rights in
pollution (tradable permits to pollute), then let people trade them freely.
It doesn't matter who gets the original entitlements, because markets will
achieve the same outcome in any case, because your Willingness-to-pay (WTP)
for someone else's entitlement is equal to your Willingness-to-accept (WTA)
money for the same permit, should you be the lucky receiver of the original
entitlement.
b. Pareto and his followers combine the main fallacy with another, covert
supplement: the Fallacy that the Burden of Proof is on those who want
change.
The Coasian trick is to put all the burdens on those who would question
pollution. The main burdens are two: the burden of buying the entitlement
from the polluter (instead of making him buy it from his victims); and the
burden of proof.
D-6. Fallacy that property is self-authenticating, an end in itself.
Rather, property needs a higher sanction, a functional rationale.
D-7. Fallacy of identifying (confusing) redistributive gains with net
social gains, and vice versa. Examples follow.
a. Farm price support via production control arguments. The
argument says that aggregate farm income does not rise as much as the value
of marginal output, because everyone's price drops. Therefore, they say, we
must stifle output to raise "farm income" (in practice, farm landowners'
incomes, not farm workers as such), and everyone's welfare. The fallacy is
equating farm income with national or world income, overlooking losses to
consumers, employees, tenants, suppliers, et al.
This is a blatant example of abusing the fallacy of composition, q.v. (under
Generic Fallacies). Why? Because this advocate first rebukes others for
using the fallacy, but applies it just partially, for the partial gain of
farmers over consumers. First he says it is false to say what is good for
one farmer is good for all; he says the farmer who takes customers from
other farmers is selfish and anti-social. Then he turns around and says
"What's good for farmers is good for everyone."
b. Arguments for protective tariff, that ignore the welfare of
consumers. Likewise, arguments for free trade that ignore welfare of
domestic producers.
c. Blindness to Marginal Cost (MC) pricing.
Wearing blinders, in this case, causes one to identify seller losses with
net social losses, ignoring consumer surplus. It takes some careful
teaching to keep this blind spot blind.
d. Ellis-Fellner Fallacy, dismissal of external economies. This is
pretty tedious stuff, and we probably will not spend time on it.
D-8. Fallacy of identifying (confusing) personal distribution and factoral
distribution.
a. Fallacy that supply is cut after personal bankruptcy, or other failure.
When demand for and prices of a product fall, recent investors on thin
equity may suffer personal bankruptcy; but the resources are not destroyed,
they just change hands. The creditors can keep the resources producing.
They usually do, to minimize their losses. (When they don't, it is often
because they are monopolists or speculators: the resources are still there.)
b. Fallacy that profit from land is similar to rent from land.
Actually, a given ground rent is 100% profit to an owner without debt, but
yields no net profit to one who is fully mortgaged.
D-9. Fallacy that manual labor is demeaning, undignified. One might
quibble that this is an "attitude," rather than a Fallacy, but the effects
are the same. This attitude takes many forms.
a. Fallacy that manual labor unfits a person for thinking.
b. Fallacy that performing manual labor is the evidence that a person has
failed to make it in the thinking professions.
c. Fallacy that manual labor is a sign of lower caste, hence unworthiness
to think or be heeded.
d. Fallacy that labor is surplus, and property owners are doing workers a
favor to "give" them jobs.
e. Fallacy that laboring is a sign and result of improvidence, meaning
failure to have saved, indicating "lack of character." ["Good character"
takes many forms, including willingness to work hard, and use your surplus
income or energy to help others - saving isn't everything.]
D-10. There are no net gains in this world, because what one gains, another
loses.
D-11. Fallacy of Original Purpose
It is all right for the Federal Government to give away natural resources to
selected persons for worthy purposes, e.g. building up the west. But it is
wrong and immoral to change:
a. It is wrong to "traffic" in the resources by selling them.
b. It is wrong to convert the resources to some other use than that deemed
worthy by a corrupt Congress in 1877.
D-12. Fallacy that Income Distribution and Allocation of Resources are
Unrelated
D-13.
IV. Fallacies about Capital Theory, Finance, etc.
F-1. Fallacy of Abstracting from time.
a. Treating investing in durables as a current expense, q.v.
b. Fallacy of disappearing inventory, q.v.
c. J.B. Clark and Frank Knight on capital - they denied it has a
period of investment, making it just like land. Sadly, much of modern micro
incorporates this fallacy, which explains why micro is virtually timeless -
it deals with relations of coexistence, ignoring relations of sequence.
d. Confusing supply curves with historical records of supply
response: i.e., ignoring that historical response is irreversible, while the
"supply curves" of micro are instantaneous.
e. In petroleum engineering, Fallacy of the "Maximum Efficient Rate" of
extraction. Here, "efficiency" is given a particular, narrow meaning as the
volume of petroleum recovered over time as a fraction of the volume
originally in place. It gives no value to recovering it sooner.
F-2. Fallacy of giving capital recovery priority over interest and rent.
Example: calculating "Payback time" as original capital input divided by
cash flow (or service flow, or cash savings).
F-3. Fallacy of identifying the carcass with the economic value of capital.
a. Fallacy that Demolishing an old building destroys a lot of capital
value.
b. Fallacy that the owner recovers his capital by demolishing the old
building. [What she recovers and recycles is the site taken up by the
building.]
F-4. Fallacy that Capital is stored-up labor, hence a form of labor.
Rather:
a. Capital includes stored-up services of land and earlier capital.
Consider, for example, a stand of mature timber.
b. Capital is formed by saving and investing, from any source of income,
not just labor.
F-5. Fallacy of treating capital outlays as current expenses.
a. Failing to annualize, thereby overstating Long-run Marginal
Costs (LMC).
b. Expensing exploration outlays, on grounds you are replacing
reserves just used, barrel for barrel. De facto expensing sneaks in when
the outlay comes from profits, and is used to replace something like an old
building, an exhausted mine.
c. Fallacy of internalizing company profits, claiming they are not profits
but current expenses when reinvested in the firm. Capital thus captured by
firm's management often accumulates beyond the firm's capacity to manage
productively.
Actually, a proper economic goal is total efficiency. [See under Micro.]
This is the same as max net product (aka rent) of a fixed input. To see
this as a ratio, like efficiency, add the full cost of the fixed input (G)
to the cost of the variable input (W), and max P/(G+W). It's really quite
simple and basic. It can only be lost when someone is trying to muddy the
waters, and others are letting her get away with it.
In this example, "G" is the accumulation of fixed assets added to by
ploughing back (internalizing) profits. The fallacy comes in when managers
treat this money as having no cost, because they needn't pay interest on it.
d. Equating GST or VAT with income tax.
F-6. Fallacy of Disappearing inventory.
The Fallacy is to say that "In a going concern, with normalized (staggered)
investments, the lapse of time between investing and liquidating capital is
eliminated."
Example: many (like Frank Knight, granddaddy of the virulent Chicago School)
say that conclusions drawn from "even-aged models" of, say, forest
management, are repealed when the model is "normalized" (one cohort of every
age). They say, in effect, that "In a going concern, the lapse of time
between investing and liquidating capital is eliminated." This is like
saying that when a college balances the outflow of graduates with the inflow
of freshmen, students get their degrees the moment they enter college.
Example, the Allowable Cut Effect (ACE) in forest regulation.
Under ACE, you get to cut mature timber in return for planting new.
Regulating agency considers this to be an equivalent, to conserve stock of
timber.
F-7. The Fallacy of "Ripening."
The Fallacy says that the prospect of rising demand, and/or technological
advance, bid us defer starting durable structures (and account for idle land
in and around cities).
[See RIMS for list of related fallacies.]
Actually, it can be shown that the prospect of rising future demand should
move an owner to invest in improvements earlier, not later.
F-8. Fallacy that Credit markets tend to shift money from rich lenders to
poor borrowers.
Rather, most money runs uphill, from median lenders to wealthy borrowers.
This is how economic power gets so concentrated, and economies of scale are
overstated, and diseconomies understated, by so many analysts.
F-9. Fallacy of Overvaluing Mineral Depletion
With oil at $18/bbl, every barrel I take from the ground through my well
lowers the value of the reserves by $18.
Corollary: I should be allowed to deduct $18 from my taxable income.
Corollary: every million bbls. of oil reserves should be valued at $18m for
loan collateral, property taxation, buying and selling, etc.
Double-think: the industry wants to deduct the $18 from taxable income, all
right, but not to pay property taxes on values at that rate, nor to pay
capital gains taxes at values that high.
F-10. Fallacy of Subsidizing Risky Ventures
Investors avoid risk. Risk is good. Therefore, we should subsidize risky
ventures, provide cheap insurance, tax breaks, etc.
F-11.
V. Fallacies in Macroeconomics
Mac-1. Fallacy of Partial Forces Causing General Inflation.
a. Examples: inflation blamed on profiteering; labor union demands; "supply
shocks" like overpriced oil imports; world inflation; etc.
Rather, inflation results mainly from misregulation of money supply,
resulting in oversupply of money. Rising velocity of money is also a
factor. "Fighting inflation" is used mainly as an excuse to hold down wage
rates, but also to cap rents, oil prices - whatever is politically
vulnerable at the time.
b. Rising employment causes inflation
Doesn't it make sense that more jobs mean more production? As people go off
welfare into production, their output rises more than their spending.
Mac-2. Fallacy of the Immediate Payroll.
Example: fallacy that pouring capital into public works will make jobs.
Rather, always demand to know, "Compared to What?" The same capital used in
other ways, with faster recovery and reinvestment, will make more jobs.
Mac-3. Fallacy of the Black Hole
This comes from ignoring half of Zero sum transactions.
a. Buying land or other existing asset aborts saving. [The other
half is that selling land or other existing asset frees up funds for
investing.]
b. Saving lowers aggregate spending. [This black hole used to called the
Infinite Liquidity Trap.]
c. Public spending gives the economy net fiscal stimulus (where does the
public money come from?).
Mac-4. Fallacy of the Oxymoron
Example: "Unemployment continues to rise, although the recession has ended."
Mac-5.
TO BE EXTENDED
VI. Fallacies in micro and production economics
MIC-1. Fallacy that Pricing is Counterproductive
a. Fallacy that the high price of an input keeps it from use.
(This is equating pricing with overpricing. There is such a thing as
overpricing: sometimes it makes serious problems, e.g. in speculative land
markets. Usually, though, in most markets, prices play a constructive
rationing role.)
Sub-Fallacy that the high price of an input removes the
advantage of using it, so it is used only marginally if at all. [Rather, it
drives people to use it sparingly by using it intensively, i.e. combining it
with other inputs. A good example is land on The Ginza, 5th Avenue, State
Street, and other famous central city hot spots.]
Sub-Fallacy that a high tax-price for holding valuable land will drive it
from use (Murray Rothbard). Some compartment-minded, double-thinking folks
will see privately-taken rent driving land to its highest and best use, but
reverse their story when the rent is taken in the form of a property tax on
holding land. Passionate anti-statism (like any other single-valued
ideology) leads one into contradictions.
b. Fallacy that the high price of an input is routinely and
necessarily passed on to consumers. Rather, it depends on elasticities of
supply and demand. Ditto for tax costs, q.v.
MIC-2. Fallacy of Melding (Consolidating Accounts, Averaging Costs) to
determine regulated prices, power rates, etc.
a. Average-cost pricing, even in simple case.
This fallacy entails:
i. Presuming that AC = MC.
ii. Conceiving "cost" narrowly only as something like burning up or rusting
out a material, overlooking that "cost," in the true sense, may mean
preempting scarce space or capacity of fixed land and capital (cf. #5).
b. Melding decreasing costs with increasing costs, to hide the
former:
Example: Milliman on cost of water supply. Milliman wanted to show that you
could price utility services at marginal cost, and still make profits,
because (he said) they were in the stage of increasing costs (MC>AC). He
said this because to serve more customers you must extend the lines further,
ignoring that you can serve more customers inside each perimeter by widening
each line.
c. Melding over space
i. Postage-stamp pricing (cf. #6).
ii. Letting rentable resources carry subeconomic operations: cross-subsidy.
Example: British Columbia Ferry service to small islands, costing $10 per $1
of revenue, is carried by profits made on the main runs between Vancouver
Island and Vancouver City.
d. Melding over time
i. Melding historical with current costs, during inflation.
"Historical-cost pricing."
ii. Allocating capital costs, and interest thereon, arbitrarily to specific
years, almost always by rote formula not based on actual depreciation paths.
This is a kind of melding over time.
e. Regulated pricing by industry average costs (cf. #3)
MIC-3. Fallacy of The Representative Firm.
a. Fallacy that the mean or median firm in any sense reacts the way other
firms do. This masks vital differences among firms, notably differences
between marginal vs. rent-taking firms. There are also differences among
divisions and enterprises within firms. It is another error by Alfred
Marshall (who is generally a good and useful analyst).
i. Natural gas price control in the U.S.
ii. British Columbia Gas Corporation field pricing.
Foolish plea of FPC economist David Schwartz, "let's just cut the price so
low that we eliminate rent."
b. Fallacy of representing all sellers as marginal.
No one wants tax-hungry legislators to perceive slack or fat in their part
of the private sector, so it is their interest to present a public image of
marginality -- the opposite of their image for bankers and stock buyers.
Their rhetoric is understandable by putting yourself in their shoes to
understand their motives. Remember, though, people who are grinding their
own axes often come to believe their own lies, used originally to exploit
others. Understand them, yes; but don't make bad judgments and lose your
shirt or waste your vote by actually believing it.
MIC-4. Fallacy that "productivity determines wages."
a. In its most primitive (and therefore most common) form, the fallacy is
one of equating MP and AP. Economic writers, who should know better, do it
often, sometimes because they are on someone's payroll, or hope to be if
they work the right side of the street.
b. Actually, the AP of labor is MP/EP (where EP = Elasticity of
Production).
c. From an employer's viewpoint, with wage rates given, it is actually wage
rates that determine marginal productivity. From a total system view they
are mutually determined by the interaction of supply (labor) and demand
(marginal product).
d. Subbing K for workers raises their AP but lowers their MP (lowers
elasticity of production). If subbing is widespread this drives down wage
rate.
MIC-5. Fallacy of not recognizing preemption as consumption.
a. Fallacy that people should not be charged for using streets
because they do not "really" consume them. Here, to "consume" is seen as
breaking things into little pieces. This fallacy would make streets a kind
of "public good," a commons of infinite capacity. This makes them like
telecasting, with no marginal cost of use. (See also under Taxation,
marginal cost pricing.)
Actually, occupying valuable space during a time-slot is how the space is
mainly consumed. Paving depreciates with time more than with use; and the
r.o.w. does not depreciate at all. Its social cost is purely the cost of
preempting its time-slots.
b. Fallacy that holding land is not consuming anything, because the
land is not used up or impaired. This attitude would make land be a kind of
public good: use by A does not preclude use by B. Rather, preempting land
for occupier A keeps its use from all others. Like the lawyer, its time is
its stock in trade.
c. Fallacy of Not Recognizing "The Second Law"
The Second Law of Thermodynamics says that adding entropy (chaos,
disorganization, adulteration) to a resource is consuming it.
Example: fallacy that only diversions of flowing water (less
return flows) are true "consumptive" uses of water (it's the law!). Rather,
loss of elevation and purity both lower value of residual water, consuming
its value.
d. Fallacy of Ignoring value of low-cost resources
Example: when oil production is prorated, deeper wells should be allowed to
produce more days per month than shallow wells, be cover the costs of the
deeper wells.
Example: oil and base prices should be controlled at the cost-of-production
at the individual wells. High-cost sources should be allowed higher prices
than low-cost sources.
MIC-6. Fallacy of Abstracting from space.
a. Rate regulation with postage-stamp pricing.
b. Overstating economies of scale when this involves "spreading
the overhead" of indivisible capital items over more land. The fallacy is
to overlook transportation cost of linking the lands. This fallacy is
widely committed by farm economists, explaining, for example, the advantages
of larger farm buildings and machinery. It is committed by urban economists
analyzing the scale economies in a city as a whole, overlooking or
trivializing the costs of urban sprawl.
Frequently, too, analysts make it worse yet by overlooking the opportunity
cost of the land itself, especially where the alternative use is untenured,
e.g. the service of sheltering wild waterfowl. The environmental movement
is a reaction against this kind of fallacy. The reaction generates its own
fallacies. Economists are inclined to sneer at these, but it is really our
fault, for failing to accommodate the environmental values in economic
thinking to begin with.
c. Example: measuring the cost of highway usage in ton-miles. In fact, the
empty truck uses as much space as the loaded truck.
MIC-7. Fallacy of fixed proportions
The Fallacy: Inputs are always combined in fixed
proportions, like chemical valences, for technological or natural reasons.
This belief arises from the same mindset that makes demand and supply curves
inelastic, and the price mechanism generally irrelevant and delusive.
Rather, the universal rule is that "Scarcity breeds
substitution." A good manager works with the cheapest suitable inputs
suitable to meet demands. History and practice show economic man is
flexible and imaginative in adapting over wide ranges. Dimwits say things
like "It takes $60,000 of capital to make one job," but assets/worker range
from $5,000 (Singer, Mattel) up to $700,000 (Chevron). Examples follow.
a. People who adapt to current prices and costs are accused of abandoning
proper "standards," "requirements," "duties," etc. Professional
associations (doctors, engineers, labor unions, building inspectors, etc.)
are notorious for insisting on rigid standards regardless of cost or
demonstrated need.
b. The Charls Walker Fallacy (one of several): national income bears a
fixed relation to energy consumption. (Walker is a highly skilled lobbyist
and "rainmaker" for foundations engaged in "deep lobbying," tax-exempt. His
very job is to promulgate fallacies for his clients, so we find his tracks
on several of them.) During the energy crisis, Walker's job was to stampede
people into exempting oil firms from taxation. Time has disproven this
Walker Fallacy, but he just keeps rolling along, spinning out more.
c. The Fallacy that Farming Requires a Fixed Input of Water.
Actually, water in California yields high returns or low, depending on the
crop to which applied: high for tomatoes, low for rice. There is no fixed
output per unit.
d. Fallacy that factor proportions remain fixed over the life of
curable capital.
Actually, factor proportions change automatically over the life of durable
capital. Measuring capital in value terms, a new auto provides
capital-intensive transportation; as it ages and requires more maintenance
and upkeep and operating care it provides labor-intensive transportation.
Ditto for houses and shelter; and if the location rises in value, and the
building ages, it becomes land-intensive shelter. All this from the same
sticks and stones, over time.
e. Fallacy of Transplanting Technology to regions with different cost
patterns.
i. Example: the "Ugly American" syndrome in foreign aid programs.
ii. Related example: the "Edifice Complex" of distant lenders, e.g. The
World Bank. This is a virulent complex, not easy to wipe out, because it
has been exposed and lampooned and admitted to over many decades. Various
Presidents of the World Bank have acknowledged it, and vowed to change - but
the World Bank does not change.
"Appropriate Technology" and "Intermediate Technology" and "Soft Path"
technology as solutions. Ridicule, marginalization, etc. as counterploys.
If the Bank won't reform, why don't we just stop subsidizing The Bank, then,
and let it die? One is drawn to conclude the Bank has another function
(promoting private rent-taking, and derivative political conservatism), for
which transferring capital is just a cover, and a tool of political
persuasion.
iii. Example from earlier times: Americans should adapt the best conserving
practices from crowded older countries like Germany, The Netherlands,
Belgium, and Japan.
MIC-8. Fallacy of 2-factor substitution
In this Fallacy, the marginal productivity of labor always rises when a firm
or economy adds more capital, whether in fixed form like plant/equipment, or
working form like energy and raw materials. The Fallacy ignores the
substitution of capital for labor; its preachers tell labor it is better
off, even though out on the street lining up for soup.
Rather, substituting A for B implies the presence of C: A occupies C
and displaces B from its former attachment to C. It's The Eternal Triangle
of Economics. This is not a case where "Three's Company."
Most texts are faulty and misleading on this point. They give
examples of "substitutability" between K and L. K would truly substitute
for L only if it lowered the MP of L, but in most examples in most texts,
adding K raises the MP of L. That would in fact cause more L to be hired,
and the firm to expand.
Here are some examples of true substitution. Farm machinery
displaces labor by bumping it off the land; so does capital in other forms
like sheep, cattle, timber, bar-code machines, automated controls, etc. So
may other natural resources used in fuel, fertilizer, pesticides and water
supplies.
Many of these substitutes, in practice, actually lower yields/acre.
Such an input is "preemptive." It is nice for landholders who want to cut
down their management input: labor is hard to manage. By the same token,
they are hard on displaced workers. The modern fallacy of 2-factor
substitution could only develop, thrive, and survive in a profession
dominated by a wish to keep people from seeing and understanding phenomena
like the enclosure movements of the 19th Century, that triggered off the
radicalism of both Marx and Henry George.
The productivity of a substituting input is measured in the cost of
what it displaces/replaces, less any decline of the Product (and plus any
rise of it).
Cobb-Douglas production function is faulty because it contains
built-in, unspoken presumption of complementarity between capital and labor:
more K always raises MP of labor.
Actually, capital is "Protean" (takes many forms), and changes form
each time it turns over and readapts. Some capital substitutes for land and
uses labor: e.g. tall buildings, fork-lifts, tomato vines, land-fills,
fertilizer, narrow-band broadcasting equipment, theatres, etc. Good land
generally complements (makes opportunities for) labor, and substitutes for
(obviates) capital. Developing marginal land is capital-using.
MIC-9. Fallacy of exaggerated compensatory effect
Sometimes an analyst will note that a major effect is tempered (muted, or
damped) by some compensatory reaction; then take the compensatory reaction
for the major effect, forgetting the prime reaction that causes it.
a. The Laffer Fallacy that raising a tax rate lowers the tax base
so much it lowers tax take. (This is possible, hence makes a good debating
point, but it is rare: Laffer's forecast turned out to be wrong.)
b. A new source of supply (e.g., letting imports into a country)
lowers price, which then lowers old sources of supply so much that price
rises (Paul Ehrlich, a pessimist who will not be comforted).
c. Higher interest rates lower land rents; the lower land rents make it
cheaper to hold standing timber on land, lowering the pressure to cut and
liquidate (this fallacy is rare).
MIC-10. Fallacies of historical cost
a. Shrinking the meaning of land rent to mean only returns in
excess of normal returns on historical purchase price of land. (Coupled
with redefining most labor income as a form of rent, this fallacy completely
reverses the classical idea of land rent is peculiarly eligible for heavy
taxation.)
b. Arrogating current rent to the credit of current management, by
carrying appreciated land at historical cost, instead of marking to market.
MIC-11. Fallacy of automatic, routine pass-through of higher costs and
taxes.
In fact, where prices are determined in world or national markets, large
local supply changes hardly affect prices at all. Sellers are price-takers,
not price-makers. Prices are determined by supply and demand. Costs are
only passed through if they cut supply, and demand is inelastic.
How is supply affected? Look at effects on marginal production (intensive
and extensive). Low EP probably means there is little marginal production
(the MP curve falls steeply).
A rise of fixed costs, in fact, may spare marginal production
completely, but force better use of fixed inputs. Thus it will actually
raise production, and lower price.
Higher variable costs abort only marginal production, and where EP
is low there is little of that. EP is low where rent/worker is high, and
here "royalties" based on units of production, and "share-cropping"
contracts are common, because their convenience and risk-sharing advantages
outweigh their incentive-killing effects.
Here is also where unions can raise wage rates. Low EP means a
steep MP curve; MP is the demand curve for workers; a steep curve means
inelastic demand. Employers with low EP may actually favor unions, which
hurt their marginal competitors much more than themselves.
Here also is where consumers can capture some rent, by getting
legislatures to impose max price controls. Examples: oil and gas; rents in
Sta. Monica and N.Y. City.
MIC-12. Sacrificing allocative efficiency to achieve distributive equity,
when:
a. Distributive equity is badly defined, e.g. parity for agriculture,
helping poor "regions" (with a few rich owners);
b. The policy does not serve the alleged end, e.g. shifting to state sales
tax to help poor people; shift to payroll tax to help workers; etc.
c. There are means to attain equity and efficiency jointly.
MIC-13. "First come, first served."
This is how most western water is distributed, resulting in cross-hauling,
through a "law of comparative disadvantage": San Francisco goes south for
its water, because L.A. might get there first; so L.A. goes north of S.F.
for water.
MIC-14. Fallacy of Extending Scale Economies in Production Functions
Indefinitely.
Example: the "Six-tenths Rule" of engineering says that Long-run Marginal
Cost (LRMC) = .6 x LRAC, in sizing structures, machines, etc. There must be
limits to this, but they are not found in The Rule.
MIC-15. Fallacy that Price Controls Always Distort the Allocation of
Resources (a Libertarian Fallacy).
If the sellers are already monopolized or cartelized, a price cap might
improve things
Where AC-pricing prevails, a cap = MC will improve things (with necessary
adjustments, like a flat-rate standby charge, to balance the books)
MIC-16. Fallacy that a monopoly or cartel gains nothing from holding
actions, because they must pay the piper tomorrow.
False, because money today is worth more than money tomorrow.
MIC-17. Another Libertarian Fallacy: Street congestion cures itself
optimally because drivers avoid congested streets and times.
Likewise, overdraft of aquifers cures itself optimally because as well-water
levels sink, pumping costs more.
MIC-18. Fallacy that Uniform Prices are Non-discriminatory
Example: belief that peak-load pricing is an example of price
discrimination. In fact, the absence of peak-load pricing discriminates
against non-peak customers.
Example: belief that zonal pricing is discriminatory. In fact, uniform
pricing is discriminatory, where costs of service are non-uniform.
MIC-19.
VII. FALLACIES IN PUBLIC FINANCE
A. General
PF, A-1. Fallacy of hard choices.
a. We must choose between efficiency and equity; inefficiency is the price
of egalitarianism. (With landowner subsidies they have it backwards.
Allocation and efficiency are sacrificed to promote distributive INequity.)
b. Studiously ignoring available means to achieve equity and efficiency (or
growth) jointly.
PF, A-2. Large-group equity
a. Taxing poor people in rich countries to help rich people in poor
countries, or regions: interregional equity.
b. Taxing poor people on good land to help rich people owning poor
(developmental) land.
c. Taxing poor people in rich cities to help rich farmers. "Parity for
farmers."
d. Help all widows because some are poor and worthy.
PF, A-4. Only win-win exchanges can be shown to raise human welfare. Both
parties gain. Otherwise, you cannot justify changing anything because
someone may be hurt, and interpersonal comparisons are impossible.
At the same time, you can justify keeping things they way they are, by
putting the burden of proof on change. (Actually, if you can't prove that
redistributing wealth will enhance welfare, neither can you prove that
keeping it the same maximizes welfare.)
PF, A-5. Analyzing economic concentration in terms of averages, ignoring
dispersion.
PF, A-6. Taxes are justified philosophically either by ability-to-pay, or
benefits-received.
PF, A-7. Ability-to-pay is synonymous with liquidity.
PF, A-8. All taxes are "in personam," meaning the taxable entity or unit is
always some person.
PF, A-9. Fallacy that Public schooling is a "pro-natalist" service which is
unfair to childless people and a subsidy to parents with large families.
PF, A-10. It is all right to use public domain without paying a market
rent, but it is entirely different, and unethical, to sell that privilege
for money.
PF, A-11. Since purchasing power is wrongly distributed, consumer
sovereignty leads to a wrong result. Therefore, we should abandon the price
system and substitute a rationing system.
PF, A-12. Regression fallacy
a. Horizontal and vertical equity are needed -- each defined in terms of
income.
b. The property tax is regressive.
c. An energy tax is regressive.
d. ALL taxes and charges other than income tax are regressive. All taxes
are judged by how much they resemble the personal income tax, as idealized.
PF, A-13. Anyone exporting an input (e.g. water) from a source area must
compensate all those who were receiving, or might receive, positive
externalities (either technological or pecuniary), from its use in the
source area. Likewise, anyone importing the input to a target area must
compensate all those who receive, or might receive, negative externalities
from its use there.
At the same time, those receiving benefits from the move, either in the
source or the target area, are receiving what is rightfully theirs as an
appurtenance of their property, and have every right to keep it all.
PF, A-15. The income of football quarterbacks is mostly unearned because
they were born big and athletic, and have no alternative use worth much.
Therefore, we should levy a high tax on persons whom the IRS identifies as
having these qualities.
PF, A-16. The value of government to a resident of a country is in
proportion to the income he earns there.
B. Fallacies about overall incentive effects
PF, B-1. The "income effect of taxation" means that income taxes cause you
to work harder. (Always ask, "compared to what?")
PF, B-2. Lower interest rates cause you to save more, because most people
have a target retirement income they must have, regardless of how much they
must save to get it.
PF, B-3. It doesn't matter how you pay taxes, but only how much. A tax is
a burden on enterprise and production in any case, and will drive business
away (even though all taxes are shifted forward to consumers).
C. Fallacies about tax incidence, shifting, allocative effects
PF, C-1. There are too few resources used in monopolized industries, and
too many in competitive industries. To redress the balance, we should tax
competitive industries more, and monopolies less.
PF, C-2. The best economic use of a resource is that yielding the owner the
highest return after taxes.
PF, C-3. All taxes are shifted forward, because prices are determined by
cost of production, and taxes are a cost.
PF, C-4. All taxes suppress, destroy and distort incentives, and therefore
reduce output. Heavy taxes are always a disincentive to economic activity,
growth, and development. We must lower taxes to get and keep jobs,
employers, etc. (Solution: distinguish different kinds of taxes.)
PF, C-5.
PF, C-6. The effect of higher taxes is to lower private investors' rates of
return after taxes.
PF, C-7. Excise taxes of any kind drive buyers and sellers away from the
taxed activity, and thus cause a misallocation of resources. (Not if the
taxed activity is harmful and has no buyer, e.g. pollution.)
PF, C-8. Investors may avoid risky ventures. Risky ventures may be very
productive. Therefore, Congress should allow special tax concessions for
risky ventures. Examples might be lower tax rates, partial exclusion of
revenues from taxable income, capital gains treatment of asset sales, and
expensing of investments.
PF, C-9. The income tax is neutral because it takes a percentage of net
income. The job that pays the most before taxes, also pays the most after.
The investment that yields the most before taxes, also yields the most
after.
PF, C-10. (Some low-wage workers are kept on part-time, making them
officially poor, so they qualify for food stamps, public housing, etc.)
This means the taxpayers are subsidizing employers who pay low wages.
(Think this one through more! When welfare saves people from seeking work
at any wage, it may put a floor under wage rates.)
D. Fallacies about marginal-cost pricing
PF, D-1. A street lamp is a pure public good.
PF, D-2. National defense is a pure public good.
PF, D-3. It is wrong to subsidize decreasing-cost operations, because that
means taxing other industries and regions.
PF, D-4. There is no way to identify the consumer surplus generated by
natural monopolies like distributing water, extending city services, etc.
PF, D-5. To finance a local public work like a toll bridge, you should
charge high tolls when it is new and worth a lot, then less as it gets
older, more crowded, and less desirable. When the bonds are retired, there
is no excuse for charging any toll at all.
PF, D-6. Regulatory fallacies: treated under Ind. Org. rather than Pub.
Fnce.
PF, D-7. Fallacy of consolidating accounts (abandoning marginal
exactitude).
a. Letting diversified firm (the taxable unit) deduct costs of losers
against gains of winners, when undiversified losers cannot do same. Cf.
opposition to "safe-harbor leasing," ca. 1980.
PF, D-8. Utilities are monopolies and should be taxed heavily in order to
extract the monopoly rents for public use. This lets other taxes be
lowered, and is thus a net gain to the people.
PF, D-9. Use of the public streets and roads should always be free: it is a
basic human right. This includes bridges, ferries, tunnels, elevators, etc.
It is proper to pay for airplane rides and train service, however, because
the flying and rolling stock is privately supplied.
People should not be charged for using streets because they do not consume
them. Thus, streets are a kind of "public good," like telecasting, with no
marginal cost of use.
E. Fallacies about intertemporal matters
PF, E-1. The income tax favors investments of shorter payout over longer,
because with shorter payout the writeoff is faster, and has a higher present
value.
PF, E-2. An income tax taps all sources of consumer purchasing power.
PF, E-3. Treating investing in durables as a current expense.
a. Failing to annualize, thereby overstating LMC.
b. Expensing exploration outlays, on grounds you are replacing reserves
just used, barrel for barrel.
c. Writing off cost of tree-planting against stumpage.
PF, E-4. "Fast write-off" of durable capital investments from taxable
income has no net effect on tax liability, because you just have to pay
tomorrow instead of today. Better pay up early, take your medicine like a
man, and get it over with. You'll improve your character, and face the
future with a clean slate.
PF, E-5. When oil at the well-head is worth $15/bbl, every barrel I pump
from any well lowers the value of my total deposit by $15. I should
therefore be allowed to deduct $15 from taxable income, as depletion.
PF, E-6. There is no net income from mining because the resource is
exhausted by use.
PF, E-7. Depreciating capital for income tax is biased against longer
investments, because the present value of their depreciation allowances is
less.
F. Fallacies about the property tax
PF, F-1. A lump sum tax would have no marginal disincentive effect. That
is, however, purely a theoretical construct with no real-life counterpart.
PF, F-2. If the discount rate is 5%, a property tax of 5% will take the
entire income, leaving nothing for the private owner.
PF, F-3. The property tax is minor, because its rate is only 1% in
California, while state income tax rates go up to 10% or so.
PF, F-4. A property tax, applied to standing timber, will take more money
over the growing period of a tree than the harvest value of the tree.
PF, F-5. A property tax applied to rising, speculative land on the growing
urban fringe makes the owners pay a higher share of their income in taxes
than other property owners do.
G. Fallacies about intergovernmental relations
PF, G-1. Federal grants to local governments are like manna from heaven.
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