It seems to me that at the center of the current discussion of "feminist  
economics" is the assumption about the neutrality of method.  People like James  
C.W. Ahiakpor, in his most recent contribution to the discussion, assume that  
methods are universal, and each can use them for whatever reason she is  
interested in.  
  
This is, of course, a revered approach in all sciences and perhaps the one most  
scientists still adhere too. Paradoxically among those who study science  
(natural, social, it doesn't matter), a growing approach, in some sub-fields  
even the dominant one, claims that scientific methods (in the plural and in  
lower-case letters) are the outcome of historical processes, negotiation, and  
local agreements that change from place to place and from one discipline to  
another. Such outcomes depend also on the power of various social groups and  
can therefore conceal below their claim of universality social interests (which  
doesn't mean that the practicing scientist, either an Einstein or a Becker, is  
aware of those interests). Just for illustration, when Marshall wrote his claim  
about the universality of economic method sometime between 1890 and 1920 he  
referred to a completely different science than the one Becker has been  
practicing.  
  
If I may, I would like to demonstrate my point using Ahiakpor's example from  
Dixon's case. Ahiakpor wrote:  
>  
> Had Dixon considered the cost of raising the funds for housing  
> construction and the need to earn enough revenue to cover such costs as  
> well as the income of the housing developer, he would have reached a  
> different conclusion.  Are black entrepreneurs averse to profit-making,  
> as compared to white, brown, yellow, or any other colored entrepreneurs?  
>   I don't think Dixon's flawed economic analysis merits being cited as  
> proof of the existence of "black economics."  
  
I don't know Dixon's paper but I assume that he prefered 21,000 apartments over  
23,000 not because of his assumption that the black entrepreneur is less  
motivated by profits but rather due to the positive impact of profits gained by  
black entrepreneurs (and assumingly, the more numerous black workers in their  
firms) on the overall economic standing of the Afro-American community. Earned  
income have a more lasting contribution than public housing.  
  
This might be debated, of course. And the same argument can also be maid in an  
elegant mathematical model with the appropriate neoclassical paraphernalia. The  
point is that most current economists tend to assume away most of these types of  
social considerations in order to show the working of one mechanism they are  
focusing on. This has the benefit of understanding better the potential impact  
of that one factor. But it comes with a cost.  
  
Other approaches, that Alfred Marshall had approved but have since been extinct  
from mainstream economics, prefer less rigorous methods but with a wider scope  
and with a willingness to consider evidence of a more variegated nature than  
most economists. While this preference might be related to personal issues, it  
has political and ideological consequences. The neoclassical apparatus is very  
useful in showing the power of the market to yield efficient outcomes. It is  
much less impressive in exposing actual (rather than making a hypothetical case  
for) market failures. It can therefore be called "bourgeois economics" (a term  
Ipersonally don't like very much) even if some of its practitioners come from  
working-class familes and still have a sympathy to a more active government.  
  
Going back to Becker, if I recall correctly, one of his claims was that minor  
differences between the spouses in terms of household duties justifies the  
specialization of men in labor market employment and women's specialization in  
cooking and diaper changing. This is perfect from neoclassical standpoint, but  
the question is what happens if the spouses decide to separate. In such a case,  
women are left stranded (and this is just one problem). Of course, it can be  
argued that Becker's model is just a starting point. One can now build a model  
(perhaps one has already been published) analyzing women's decisions and taking  
into consideration her assessment of separation (with full information about  
husband's tastes, sexual liaisons etc., or missing information), risk  
aversions, discount rates etc. etc. And then, after dozens of published  
articles in A level journals and dozens of years, reach the conclusion that  
women might be better-off with outside employment even if it is not the most  
efficient for the household in the short term.  
  
Surprisingly, such a conclusin has already been reached by feminists and  
published in the 70s, although not in an A level Econ journal. Now the question  
is why Becker has not considered such a scenario in his famous  
article, although nobody denies he is smart enough to think about it, and why  
most economists of the family have prefered his stories over those numerous  
stories published by feminists (based on ethnographic work, in-depth interviews,  
textual analyses) in A level journals in sociology, cultural  
studies, anthropology, psychology, political science etc. And why should  
feminists be interested in using economics tools when they use other tools that  
supply them with more vital answers even in questions about the economy.  
  
I aplogize for a too lengthy message, and being a sociologist I hope I didn't  
make any awful mistak ein economics.  
  
Sincerely  
  
Yuval Yonay