I agree with Evelyn that there are special feminist  
applications of economic theory. Her point is that  
females, in general, have preferences (and/or  
perceived opportunities) that differ from males. There  
are also presumably male applications of economic  
theory. If this is all there is to feminist economics,  
then one could specialize in this subject by first  
learning economic theory and then learning about the  
special preferences or perceived opportunities of  
females. The same would presumably be true of a  
Chinese economics and a ghetto economics. As I recall,  
development economics is sometimes presented partly as  
an application of economic theory to the special  
tastes and perception of opportunities of people in  
less developed areas. But isn't there something else?  
Do females have different choice-making techniques?  
Are they more or less "entrepreneurial" than males?  
More or less technical? More or less inclined toward  
non-market interaction?  
  
Regarding Roy's response to Larry, it is easy to  
define "better" in the hard sciences because we can  
measure without attaching values. We can easily find  
out whether a Ferrari can travel faster than the  
Toyota or farther on a tank of petrol. In social  
science, we must choose values in order to define  
"better." Traditionally the values in economics have  
been broadly utilitarian. This is why the economists  
of the late 19th century developed a model of a market  
economy in which the value of a thing or action can be  
traced to the wants of individuals in the role of the  
consumer, via opportunity costs perceived by  
individuals in the role of the entrepreneur who know  
how to produce goods. This model dominates the  
textbooks today, which suggests that economists still  
adhere to broadly utilitarian values.  
  
Of course, it is possible to develop an economics  
based on different values. For example, people could  
propose that government policy X would be more likely  
to achieve eternal bliss according to the words in the  
Holy Book or in the writings of a revered ancestor.  
The logic and relevance of such an argument could be  
evaluated in the same way that economists evaluate the  
logic and relevance of arguments that policy X is in  
the interest of individuals in their role as  
consumers. But what is the point? Are there other  
standards for defining "better" that could compete  
with utilitarianism that are not merely modifications  
of it or supplements to it? Would an economics that  
completely neglected consumer utility be economics?  
  
Pat Gunning