Pat Gunning said:  
>Regarding Roy's response to Larry, it is easy to  
>define "better" in the hard sciences because we can  
>measure without attaching values. We can easily find  
>out whether a Ferrari can travel faster than the  
>Toyota or farther on a tank of petrol. In social  
>science, we must choose values in order to define  
>"better." Traditionally the values in economics have  
>been broadly utilitarian. This is why the economists  
>of the late 19th century developed a model of a market  
>economy in which the value of a thing or action can be  
>traced to the wants of individuals in the role of the  
>consumer, via opportunity costs perceived by  
>individuals in the role of the entrepreneur who know  
>how to produce goods. This model dominates the  
>textbooks today, which suggests that economists still  
>adhere to broadly utilitarian values.  
>  
>Of course, it is possible to develop an economics  
>based on different values. For example, people could  
>propose that government policy X would be more likely  
>to achieve eternal bliss according to the words in the  
>Holy Book or in the writings of a revered ancestor.  
>The logic and relevance of such an argument could be  
>evaluated in the same way that economists evaluate the  
>logic and relevance of arguments that policy X is in  
>the interest of individuals in their role as  
>consumers. But what is the point? Are there other  
>standards for defining "better" that could compete  
>with utilitarianism that are not merely modifications  
>of it or supplements to it?  
  
Of course.  Just to scratch the surface, try Elizabeth Anderson, *Value in   
Ethics and Economics*, Jean Hampton, *The Authority of Reason*, Robert   
Brandom, *Making It Explicit*  There is a huge body of philosophical   
literature that denies that our reasoning about the good is   
consequentialist (the genus of which classical utilitarianism is a   
species).   Closer to home, try Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments!  
  
Kevin Quinn