------------ EH.NET BOOK REVIEW --------------
Published by EH.NET (February 2006)
Larry G. Gerber, _The Irony of State Intervention: American
Industrial Relations Policy in Comparative Perspective, 1914-1939_.
DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005. viii + 212 pp.
$40 (cloth), ISBN: 0-87580-347-4.
Reviewed for EH.NET by Gerald Friedman, Department of Economics,
University of Massachusetts at Amherst,
"How Many Exceptions?" There was a time when social scientists
explored American Exceptionalism and debated why the United States
lacked a strong socialist movement. But then American labor
historians challenged the premise of American Exceptionalism by
showing the strength of labor radicalism in the United States; and
experience has challenged the assumption that capitalism generally
leads to socialism because labor movements throughout the world have
become more conservative over time and have lost power and
membership. Now, instead of one there are many "exceptionalisms" and
the task for social scientists has become to explore the divergent
responses by workers in different countries to capitalist economic
development.
From this perspective Larry Gerber, Professor of History at Auburn,
has written a book that addresses questions of exceptionalism in a
way that also provides insight into current policy debates. Comparing
state policy towards labor relations in the United States and the
United Kingdom, he asks why countries with similar political cultures
adopted such different policies in the 1930s. "No nation," Gerber
contends, "is more identified with the philosophy and practice of
limited government than the United States." However, in the field of
industrial relations, "the American state has long played an active
and critically important role" culminating in 1935 with the enactment
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). By contrast, Gerber
argues, such intrusive "state intervention would have been
inconceivable during the same period in Britain, the one other major
industrial democracy generally viewed as having a 'weak state'" (p.
3).
Gerber attributes the paradox of an activist American liberal state
to a pattern of industrialization that weakened American labor
unions. The rapid development of large-scale enterprises in the
United States concentrated economic power, allowing powerful
capitalists to crush labor unions in major industries, such as steel,
automobiles, chemicals, and electric equipment manufacture. By
contrast, the slower pace of British industrialization allowed
British craft unions to survive and even flourish in older industries
left intact with large numbers of independent firms using older
technologies dependent on traditional craft labor. Because British
collective bargaining was established firmly when industry was still
overwhelmingly competitive and conducted in small firms, many British
employers came to rely on industry-wide collective bargaining to
contain competition. Without strong or hostile employers, British
labor did not need to go to the state for help, leaving antistatist
ideology, or "collective laissez-faire," unchallenged among workers.
By contrast, weak American unions needed state power to force
employers to accept collective bargaining.
Note that Gerber here reverses the popular social-democratic model
where stronger labor unions and working-class political organizations
win state support. Instead, his argument relies on some outside
motive for state officials to help relatively weak labor
organizations. Gerber argues that this happened during the Great
Depression of the 1930s when national politicians, notably New York's
powerful Senator Robert F. Wagner, sought to build up labor unions to
restore purchasing power by raising wages. Politicians with similar
concerns in Britain found little support among workers and unions;
but they were welcomed by American labor in desperate need of support
against overwhelmingly powerful employers. One might anticipate an
extension of Gerber's thesis to the last twenty years or so where
British unions have turned to the state for support against powerful,
anti-union employers who are behaving more like their earlier
American counterparts, and American unions have found little response
to appeals for labor law reform from state officials who no longer
believe in Keynesian ideas about restoring purchasing power by
redistributing income.
By integrating employers into a study of class conflict, Gerber's
work is a major advance. He adds a dimension to labor history, often
written as if only workers were active participants, and to political
history, which too often neglects the economy and social conflicts
completely. Nonetheless, his analysis remains too narrow. His
argument is essentially technological: rapid technological change in
American industry led to a larger scale of production using
semi-skilled workers where employers had the bargaining power to
resist unions but slower technological change denied British
employers this power. Immediately, one may question the direction of
causality: was slow technological change the cause, or was it the
consequence, of union strength? Were British unions strong because
technological change was slow in Britain? Or was technological change
slow because it was inhibited by strong trade unions? Recent work by
Chris Howell, _Trade Unions and the State_ (Princeton, 2005),
suggests the latter. Dismissing the concept of collective
laissez-faire as a myth, Howell rewrites the history of British
industrial relations by showing the _crucial_ role of state officials
in establishing industry-level collective bargaining before World War
I.
Gerber may also underestimate the importance of worker action in his
analysis of the development of American labor law. Rather than the
result of beneficent political action by liberal politicians with
proto-Keynesian economic notions, the NRA and the Wagner Act can be
seen as a response to labor and political unrest. An attempt to
contain strikes by establishing strong union institutions, these laws
were also part of a strategy by Democratic politicians to solidify
the emerging Roosevelt coalition. Concessions to organized labor were
meant to win working-class votes; and politicians hoped that
established union institutions would hold these votes for the
Democrats.
To be sure, these criticisms are a little unfair: the text of
Gerber's book is only 152 pages and we should not expect him to do
much more than to present and support an intriguing new thesis in
that space. As it is, Larry Gerber has written an important book that
adds to our understanding of class conflict and the state. It should
be read by anyone interested in comparative twentieth-century history
or the history of industrial relations systems.
Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst,
Gerald Friedman has written numerous works in labor economics and in
the history of France and the United States in the nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries including a study of the origins of the
modern labor movement, _State Making and Labor Movements: France and
the United States, 1876-1914_ (Cornell, 1999). He is currently
writing a book on union decline in advanced capitalist economies,
titled, _Reigniting the Labor Movement_ (Routledge, forthcoming).
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Published by EH.Net (February 2006). All EH.Net reviews are archived
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