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From:
[log in to unmask] (Dr Chris R. Tame)
Date:
Fri Mar 31 17:18:45 2006
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Bruce Caldwell writes 
>3. In chapter 6, p. 82, Hayek states that: As Immanuel Kant put it (and Voltaire
expressed it before him in very much the same terms), "Man is free if he needs to obey no
person but solely the laws."
> 
>I found the origin of the quote from Voltaire, but does anyone know where I can find Kant
saying this?
> 
 
>From John Webb of London, forwarded by Chris Tame: 
 
Kant often uses the terms 'free' and 'freedom' to denote freewill rather 
than political freedom so bear that in mind. 
 
 'We shall study 
freedom under the teleological unity which accords with principles of 
reason; we shall look upon ourselves as acting in conformity with the 
divine will only in so far as we hold sacred the moral law which reason 
teaches us from the nature of actions themselves, and we shall believe 
that we can obey that will only by promoting the weal of the universe 
in ourselves and in others.' Kant, Critique of Pure Reason -last page 
Section II. 
 
'The members of a civil society thus united for the purpose of 
legislation, and thereby constituting a state, are called its 
citizens; and there are three juridical attributes that inseparably 
belong to them by right. These are: 1. constitutional freedom, as 
the right of every citizen to have to obey no other law than that to 
which he has given his consent or approval...' Kant, The Science of 
Right. 
 
Also, you may care to contrast the following from 'The Science of Right' 
with the right to forcible rebellion in Grosseteste, Sidney and Paine:  
 
'Resistance on the part of the people to the supreme legislative 
power of the state is in no case legitimate; for it is only by 
submission to the universal legislative will, that a condition of 
law and order is possible. Hence there is no right of sedition, and 
still less of rebellion, belonging to the people. And least of all, 
when the supreme power is embodied in an individual monarch, is 
there any justification, under the pretext of his abuse of power, 
for seizing his person or taking away his life (monarchomachismus 
sub specie tyrannicidii). The slightest attempt of this kind is high 
treason (proditio eminens); and a traitor of this sort who aims at the 
overthrow of his country may be punished, as a political parricide, 
even with death. It is the duty of the people to bear any abuse of the 
supreme power, even then though it should be considered to be 
unbearable. And the reason is that any resistance of the highest 
legislative authority can never but be contrary to the law, and must 
even be regarded as tending to destroy the whole legal constitution.' 
 
Chris R. Tame 
 

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