At 09:29 AM 6/11/2008, Pat Gunning wrote:
>Mises's goal was to provide a framework for
>dealing with phenomena thathad previously not
>been clearly identified as distinct from
>otherphenomena. That phenomena is interaction among distinctly human actors.
I was so astounded when I came across these
sentences, that I didn't quite know what to do.
The first reaction is to make a flip or satirical
reply, "Right, no one else has ever commented on
human relations." But that would not only be
unprofitable, it would be uncharitable. For
surely, Pat cannot mean what this sentence says.
Pat, like everyone else, knows what everyone else
knows. Namely that, aside from treatises on pure
mathematics and natural philosophy, every single
word ever written in every single language has
for its subject the relation of man to man, man
to woman, man to society, and man to god, and
commonly all of these together. There are no
other topics. Every play, poem, prayer, parable,
psalm, sutra, story, history, speech, argument,
article and joke has only these topics and no
other. Every learned tome and every learned
treatise in every learned journal--pure
mathematics and pure physics aside--have these
for their subjects. I have a little learning, and
read somewhat more than most, and yet in all my
education and all my reading, I cannot think of a
single exception to this rule. And I very much
suspect that you can't either. But if you know of
an exception, please bring it to my attention,
because I would certainly like to see this
strange and wonderful object. Strange it will be,
somewhat like (and I can only imagine here) the
opening lines of Lewis Carroll's Jabberwocky.
Since you cannot mean what you said, you can only
mean something different (there's an axiom for
you), and not merely different, but darker. You
can only mean (correct me if I am wrong) that it
has not been handled to your satisfaction, and
more, that you have discovered a way of handling
it to everybody's satisfaction, or at least to
everybody who will be admitted to the company of
"reasonable men." This is a darker claim indeed.
It is a claim to have what the post-moderns would
call a "meta-narrative," one capable of sitting
in judgment on all the other narratives. It is a
quasi-religious claim to have accessed the
springs of human action. Some in Chicago would do
this by reducing man to a cypher, and the
Austrians by reducing him to axioms. But it
always turns out that the meta-narratives cannot
even be applied successfully to the narratives of
their own lives, much less everybody else's. All
the rest of the literature whispers to Chicago
and Austria alike, "I am not a cypher, you cannot
reduce me to an axiom. Neither prison can hold
me." Now, it may be (I fully admit the
possibility) that you are right and the rest of
literature is wrong. However, this does involve a
strange conundrum, on that cannot escape the
attention of even the most ardent Austrian.
Mises claims, on the one hand, originality for
his Praxeology. But he also claims, on the other hand, that:
The a priori sciences-logic, mathematics, and praxeology?aim at a knowledge
unconditionally valid for all beings endowed with the logical structure of
the human mind. (HA 57)
In other words, this praxeology which nobody ever
noticed before has the same epistemological
status as does logic and mathematics. He
therefore posits an intuitively obvious but
hitherto unnoticed science. You will pardon me if I remain a skeptic.
John C. M?daille
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